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ABSTRACT 
Projects are a ubiquitous feature of today’s global economy, penetrating almost 
every sector to a greater or lesser extent. There is also a burgeoning knowledge 
base concerning their management encapsulated in research journals, innumerable 
text books, international standards of practice, and professional qualifications. 
Yet despite all the knowledge and experience gained from projects, the review of 
literature in this thesis finds frequent reports of projects having overrun in terms of 
time and/or cost.  The conclusion is drawn that further research is needed if 
overruns are to be mitigated or avoided. The review also finds calls from leading 
academics for project management research to move beyond the traditional 
positivist perspective on projects and adopt alternatives that might provide fresh 
insights. With critical realism as its methodological foundation, this research study 
answers this call by adopting a systemic modelling perspective to researching the 
phenomenon of overruns.  
Empirical investigation of two large health care Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
construction projects was conducted using a qualitative case study design coupled 
with a causal mapping technique. The projects were examined from the perspective 
of the construction company who was contracted to design, build, finance, and 
operate the facilities. One project was heralded by the company to be a success 
while the other experienced significant cost overruns during the operational phase.  
With the operational phase of both projects as the locus of investigation, the 
findings of this study suggest that feedback dynamics involving loss of client trust; 
delay triggers such as design changes; and contextual conditions such as human 
resource policies, can form a complex system that can induce cost overruns during 
the operating phase of projects. Using the case study findings, a model offering an 
explanation of the pathology of project operating cost overruns is developed. 
It is argued that the thesis makes two main contributions to theory. Firstly, it 
identifies a system of factors that can induce cost overrun in the operational phase 
of PFI projects and encapsulates this system in a model. The model offers a broad 
appreciation of the pathology of operational cost overrun and, while aligning with 
existing models in the extant literature, it also extends them in key ways. Secondly, 
the thesis makes a methodological contribution to knowledge by providing a detailed 
exposition of a critical realist approach to researching projects which offers an 
alternative to traditional positivist based approaches.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 RATIONALE FOR RESEARCHING PROJECTS 
Fuelled by frequent reports of projects being late, over budget or having failed 
meet other expectations (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002, Love et al., 2012), projects have a 
rather unenviable reputation. Yet despite their reputation, projects proliferate. Indeed 
Winch et al. (2012, p.141) suggest there is ‘a general trend towards project forms of 
organising’.  
Such is the strength of this trend that today projects can be found in almost 
every nook and cranny of the global economy, their propagation cultivated by 
changes to market conditions in the late 20th century (Kerzner, 2009). Growing 
consumer wealth saw the static, mass, homogenous markets of the earlier part of 
the century give way to a much more sophisticated group of consumers who sought 
product differentiation, variety, innovation and whose demands were subject to 
frequent change (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Another feature of this new 
landscape was the globalisation of firms which further enabled consumer choice 
and, at the same time, increased competition to satisfy that choice. The 
organisational forms that had obediently served the needs of consumers in the 
earlier part of the 20th century were not designed to cope with this new landscape. 
Honed by the likes of Ford (and Taylor in Europe) these forms of organising were 
designed for the production mass goods with low variation (Cicmil et al., 2009). 
Seeking an alternative, firms turned to projects.  
Projects provide the ability to integrate different permutations of knowledge, 
disciplines and technologies in a way that can be reconfigured quickly (Meredith and 
Mantel, 2010). These features enable uniqueness and variety in products as well as 
the ability to respond to fast changing market demands. Presumably lured by these 
exciting features, the ‘projectification’ (Midler, 1995) of organisations has been 
prolific. Originally the preserve of construction and engineering sectors, projects are 
now used in a wide variety of applications with some $16 trillion per year being 
spent globally on project based activities (Turner et al., 2010). 
The practice and profession of project management (PM) has also burgeoned. 
Early techniques such as Gantt and PERT have been complemented by computer 
software packages specifically designed to support the management of projects 
(Kidd, 1990). More sophisticated (and expensive) systems have seen project 
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management move from the level of an individual project to the enterprise level 
where programs and portfolios of projects can be managed (Meredith and Mantel, 
2010). Membership of professional organisations such as the Project Management 
Institute and the Association for Project Management continues to grow year on 
year. These organisations also offer internationally recognised standards of project 
management practice captured in ‘bodies of knowledge’ as well as offering a suite of 
industry recognised qualifications. Governments have also developed standards 
such as PRINCE2 and the OGC gateway procedure with industries such as 
software having developed their own specific methodologies (i.e. AGILE) to guide 
practice.  
Organisations and practitioners clearly have at their disposal a wide variety of 
armaments with which to support the practice of project management. Yet in spite of 
this, many organisations are left defeated by projects that experience overruns of 
cost and time. Looking at cost alone, the magnitude of overruns that can be 
experienced is significant with values of 13% (Love et al., 2009), 14% (Winch, 
1996), and as high as 44.7 % (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) being reported in the literature.  
Specific projects are identified within the literature as exemplars of the 
phenomenon of overrun at work. For example, Denver airport in the United States 
experienced a 200% cost overrun (Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995) and the Scottish 
Parliament in the UK which experienced cost overrun of almost 900% and was more 
than three years late (White and Sidhu, 2005). It seems reasonable to assume that 
the organisations tasked with delivery of these projects were reputable and had 
significant prior experience of similar projects. Yet still, they encountered failure.  
The phenomenon of overruns is not ‘breaking news’ to the community of 
practitioners and researchers involved in project management. Overruns have been 
an enduring theme within the literature dating back at least to the 1960’s with Avots 
(1969, p.77) asking ‘What are the reasons for failure?’  Yet it seems the basic line of 
inquiry is still as relevant today as it was over 45 years ago. 
In summary, despite their prevalence in a growing number of organisations and 
the availability of research, standards, and techniques, projects are still regularly 
reported as having overrun in terms of time and/or cost. Thus it appears work still 
needs to be done to improve our understanding of projects such that they might be 
managed in ways that mitigate the behaviour of overrun.  
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1.1 UNDERSTANDING OVERRUNS USING SYSTEMIC MODELLING  
Traditionally projects have been conceived as rationalistic, deterministic and 
predictive which Turner et al. (2010) describes as treating projects as though they 
are ‘machines’. Researchers have contended that this conventional perspective on 
projects does not adequately match their actuality. Morris (1997, p.2), for example, 
noted that ‘the successful accomplishment of a project may well require attention to 
range of factors not treated by the traditional project management literature’. 
Bredillet (2004, p.3) argues that project management deals with a ‘complex reality’ 
but that current theory is underpinned by assumptions that can lead to 
‘oversimplification’. Cicmil et al. (2009, p.83) points to the ‘paradox of project 
management’. The paradox is that project management identifies projects as 
unique, innovative, uncertain and changing but conventional theory and practice is 
underpinned by assumptions of rationality, determinism and standardisation where 
command and control are the order of the day. Williams (2005) suggested that 
rationalistic assumptions are inadequate because contrary to being ‘machines’ 
projects involve people and thus comprise ‘soft’ factors such as human nature, 
politics and relationships.  
From a practice point of view, Engwall (2003) for example demonstrated through 
research of two case studies that rigorous adherence to conventional project 
management theory did not guarantee success. The mismatch between 
conventional theory and the actual practice of project management is also visible 
with respect to issues such as stakeholder management. A number of researchers 
have pointed out the importance of stakeholders in the practice of project 
management (Morris and Hough, 1987, Winch, 2004, Cleland, 2008) yet it is only 
recently that subject has received exclusive attention in one of the most influential 
practitioner oriented texts, the PMI’s Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK Guide) (PMI, 2013) 
The limitations of a conventional perspective on projects have fuelled calls by 
leading researchers (Morris and Hough, 1987, Williams, 1999, Turner et al., 2010, 
Bredillet, 2013) for academics and practitioners alike to explore and adopt 
alternative perspectives that might better reflect their actuality.  However, although 
new perspectives have emerged (see Turner et al., (2010) for an overview), in the 
main, PM research like PM practice remains stubbornly welded to what Bredillet 
(2013) observes as hegemony of approach. This observation is supported by 
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empirical research by Smyth and Morris (2007). The authors report that much 
project management research is dominated by a single orientation characterised by 
a positivist (and associated empiricist) paradigm; a paradigm that speaks to a 
conventional conceptualisation of projects (Bredillet, 2004). Thus, while some 
researchers have proposed new perspectives (Ackermann et al., 1997, Bredillet, 
2013, Winch, 2015) they are much less prevalent in the literature than the dominant 
approach.  
Consequently, opportunity remains for fresh insights into project behaviour by 
using alternative perspectives on projects. Taking advantage of this opportunity, this 
thesis adopts a systemic modelling perspective (Williams et al., 1997, Eden et al., 
2000, Ackermann and Eden, 2005) for inquiry into overruns in projects in order to 
improve understanding of the phenomenon. A systemic modelling approach 
facilitates fine grained insight into the actuality of projects (Williams et al., 2003, 
Howick et al., 2008), insight that can be used to develop theory that can resemble 
the ‘complex reality’ (Bredillet, 2004) of projects and can thus offer enhanced value 
to practitioners following Lewin’s (1945) axiom that ‘nothing is so practical as a good 
theory’. Thus, the overarching ambition of this thesis was to achieve research that is 
both academically rigorous and of practical relevance (Pettigrew, 2001). 
 
1.2 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The research was undertaken in partnership with a large construction company, 
referred to hereon as BuildIt. The relationship with BuildIt in relation to the PhD 
research stemmed from the author’s prior involvement with the business which is 
described in more detail next.  
The author’s entry into researching project overruns was, to coin a phrase of 
Andrew Pettigrew’s, one of planned opportunism. The initial step was enrolment in a 
post graduate Masters (MSc) in Business Analysis, the award of which depended 
upon completion of a dissertation project. Exploring options for the dissertation topic, 
an opportunity emerged from the author’s then MSc supervisor (now PhD 
supervisor) to explore the issue of project overruns with a construction company 
(BuildIt).  
The combination of topic and opportunity to work with an organisation sparked 
the author’s immediate interest. Prior to joining the MSc, the author had been 
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involved in and led projects of various sizes and, therefore, had lived experience of 
the challenges associated with managing projects.  Furthermore, the opportunity to 
work within a ‘real life’ setting spoke to the same interest that had spurred the 
author’s enrolment in the MSc in the first place – the opportunity to help 
organisations improve.  
During the course of the three month MSc dissertation, the author’s supervisor 
broached the subject of pursuing a PhD in the topic (of project overruns). The 
proposal was initially met with the same scepticism that had twice led the author to 
decline PhD opportunities in the past. The scepticism was fuelled by a 
misconception about the nature of research and thus the author’s ‘fit’ as a 
researcher. The misconception was that research comprised only of theory1 which 
marginalised the author’s ambitions of helping to improve practice. However, regular 
discussions between the author and his supervisor regarding examples of research 
which had supported practice, coupled with Lewin’s (1945) axiom that ‘nothing is so 
practical as a good theory’, dispelled the misconception and the PhD journey began.  
A couple of events along the PhD journey are also worthy of a few words to help 
the reader contextualise the research. The PhD was started in Glasgow (UK) 
however at the end of the first year an opportunity arose (and was pursued) to move 
to Perth, Western Australia. While the relationship with BuildIt (which was based in 
the UK) was retained, the geographic distance meant field visits were naturally time 
bound opportunities. Furthermore, during the remainder of the PhD, BuildIt 
underwent a number of significant organisational changes. These changes, 
understandably, caused distraction from the research study within BuildIt and 
consequently access to data proved challenging. Despite the back drop of frequent 
change and the turbulence it brought with it, research on two case studies was 
completed. This thesis document describes that research and is structured as 
follows.  
 
 
                                               
 
1 It is somewhat ironic that during the Phd journey theory gripped the focus of the author, 
as reflected in particular within the research methodology section.  
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1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
Exploring the Extant Literature 
The review of literature is split into three sections. The first section frames this 
study by establishing why projects, and in particular project overruns, should be the 
subject of further research. The main findings are that projects are economically and 
socially important. Furthermore, despite much knowledge and experience having 
been gained about projects, there has been an enduring theme in the project 
management literature of project overruns. The conclusion drawn is that more needs 
to be done to understand the phenomenon of project overruns.  
The second section seeks to explore what has already been done to advance 
understanding of project overruns. It is found that extant research, although 
extensive, has tended toward explaining the influence a single factor has on 
overruns (for example, cost estimation or design changes) or identifying collections 
of discrete factors that are needed to secure project success and thus avoid 
outcomes such as overruns. However, the review also finds that individual factors 
do not operate in isolation from one another but rather they interact to bring about 
project behaviour such as overruns. The conclusion drawn is that to gain a fuller 
appreciation of project overruns an approach that identifies the factors that affect 
this behaviour and the relationships between those factors is needed. It is 
subsequently found that a systemic modelling approach offers a way forward in this 
regard.  
The aims of this study are to contribute to both project management theory and 
practice. The final section of the review attends specifically to the latter aim by 
exploring what approaches are available to aid practitioners in mitigating or avoiding 
the risk of project overruns. It is found that the conventional project risk 
management techniques while valuable have inherent limitations which could be 
offset by complementing these techniques with those using a systemic modelling 
approach to risk management. However, it is also found that development and 
application of systemic approaches to project risk are still relatively rare.  The 
conclusion drawn is that the findings gained from this study be used to develop a 
model that offers description of a pathology of project overruns that can be used to 
inform the practice of practitioners.   
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Research Methodology 
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive explanation of the research approach used 
in this study. The chapter is split into two parts. Part A focuses on explaining the 
theory of methods (methodology) that underpins the approach, examining the 
aspects of research philosophy, research procedure (strategy), research design, 
research method and research techniques. Of particular note is the adoption of a 
critical realist philosophy of research which is a departure from the traditionally 
positivist orientation of project management research. It is argued that this departure 
offers the possibility of new perspectives on project overruns which can complement 
the existing body of largely positivist based project management research.  
Through transparent and rigorous consideration of each of the methodological 
choices that comprise the research approach it is argued that the choices of a 
critical realist philosophy, a case study design, qualitative interviews, and a causal 
mapping technique interlock to provide a coherent approach to researching overruns 
in projects.  
Part B of the chapter concerns the practical application of the approach to 
research, focusing on data collection and data analysis. In summary, empirical 
investigation of two large health care construction projects was conducted using a 
qualitative case study design coupled with a causal mapping technique. The 
projects were examined from the perspective of the construction company who was 
contracted to design, build, finance, and operate the facilities.  One project was 
heralded by the company to be a success while the other experienced significant 
cost overruns during the operational phase. For each case study five participants 
with a range of roles were interviewed.   
Case Study Findings 
Chapter 4 presents the case study findings based upon the investigation of the 
two case study projects. With the operational phase of both projects as the locus of 
investigation, the study found that feedback dynamics involving loss of client trust; 
delay triggers such as design changes; and contextual conditions such as human 
resource policies, can form a complex system that can induce cost overruns during 
the operating phase of projects. Using the findings, a model offering an explanation 
of the pathology of project operating cost overruns is developed. 
 
8 
 
Discussion of Research Findings 
Chapter 5 examines the research findings from the case studies in light of extant 
literature in order to establish what contributions to knowledge the findings can 
make. It is argued that the overarching contribution to knowledge made by the thesis 
is revealing a system of factors that offers a wider appreciation of how operating 
cost overruns can be brought about. The implications for project management 
practice are also examined. Contributions to methodological knowledge are also 
argued for, in particular attending to knowledge gaps within the literature concerning 
the application of a critical realism within a project management context as well as 
the detailed exposition of a practical application of a critical realist methodology. A 
second contribution is also claimed concerning the application of a causal mapping 
technique to researching project overruns. The limitations of the research study are 
subsequently examined. 
Conclusions 
This brief final chapter brings the thesis to a close by examining how the 
research aims set out at the beginning of the thesis were addressed.  The specific 
contributions of the thesis to both theory and practice are presented before 
examining future avenues for research. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLORING THE EXTANT LITERATURE  
2.0 CHAPTER ABSTRACT  
This chapter reports on a review of the literature concerning the topic of project 
overruns. Following the advice of Tranfield et al. (2003), the literature review aims to 
examine and evaluate existing research within the field and, subsequently, to inform 
the development of research questions that can further the existing knowledge base.  
In order to ensure transparency and repeatability with respect to method, the 
chapter opens with a brief description of the method that was used to review the 
literature 
Next, the project management literature is reviewed to establish why projects 
are of relevance for further research and thus establish the rationale and scene for 
the remainder of the thesis document. The review finds that projects are of 
significant economic and social importance owing to rapid growth in adoption by 
organisations from around the late 20th century. Similarly, the project management 
knowledge base is also found to have burgeoned with numerous handbooks and 
academic journals relating to the field. However, the review also finds that despite a 
growing wealth of experience and knowledge, projects are regularly reported as 
having been late, exceeded their budgets or failed to meet other expectations. The 
conclusion drawn is that more research needs to be done to better understand why 
projects exhibit the behaviour of overruns such that they might be managed in ways 
that can mitigate or avoid this behaviour. 
The review proceeds by examining the literature to establish what research has 
already taken place to understand overruns in projects. The review finds that a 
variety of perspectives have been adopted. One is to explore the influence of a 
single aspect of projects and their management such as cost estimation. Another is 
to explore the influence of a collection of factors such as success or failure factors. 
The review finds that both these approaches offer valuable insights but that neither 
has specific concern for interrelationships between factors. Interrelationships are 
found to be important because the literature suggests that factors do not operate in 
isolation but rather they interact with one another making the relationships between 
factors as important as the factors themselves. Consequently, it is argued that a 
research perspective that has concern for factors and their interrelationships is 
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needed in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of overruns in 
projects.  
The review finds that a systemic modelling attends to this need because it 
conceives of project behaviour as a manifestation of a system of factors rather than 
discrete factors operating in isolation. It is subsequently argued that a systemic 
modelling approach is a suitable way to proceed for further inquiry into project 
overruns. However, the review also reveals that adopting a systemic modelling 
approach is a departure from conventional project management theory. The nature 
of the departure is explored and it is argued that it is both warranted and in demand 
because it answers a call by a number of leading researchers for the adoption of 
alternative perspectives on projects. 
Understanding why projects overrun is valuable but is, in and of itself, insufficient 
for the aims of this thesis which are to contribute to both theory and practice. To 
more fully attend to the latter aim, the review turns attention to the practice of project 
management, in particular project risk management, to examine the techniques that 
are available to practitioners to help them manage the risk of overruns in projects. 
Of particular note is the finding that managing risk using conventional project 
management techniques marginalises the role of ‘soft’ human factors as well as the 
possibility of risks interacting with one another, both of which are identified in the 
literature review as having an important influence on project behaviour. 
Consequently, it is argued that using a conventional approach to project risk 
management leaves projects vulnerable to soft risks and systemicity of risk (the 
interaction of risks).  
The review finds that a systemic approach to risk management offers a way 
forward to attend to this vulnerability but that the development and adoption of 
systemic risk management tools within project management remains novel. Findings 
from the literature suggest that existing tools can be highly sophisticated, require 
specialist expertise to use, can be costly, and time consuming which creates 
barriers to adoption. On the basis of these findings two conclusions are drawn. First, 
that the rarity of available tools offers a fruitful avenue for the development of a new 
tool to support practitioners in taking a systemic approach to risk and its 
management and second that the new tool should attend to the barriers described 
earlier in order to facilitate its adoption.  
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As discussed earlier, the research in this thesis took place with a construction 
company (BuildIt) and thus the study focuses upon construction projects. In 
particular, the thesis’ focuses upon Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects and 
therefore the penultimate section of the review examines literature surrounding 
PFI’s. With reference to the work of Pettigrew on conducting research in 
organisational settings, the section begins with some context as to the reasoning 
behind the thesis’ particular focus on PFI’s. Reviewing the PFI literature reveals four 
significant findings that provide opportunities for this thesis’ to contribute to 
knowledge on PFI projects. First, although time and cost performance of PFI 
projects is good in the majority of cases, the concept of project overrun is none the 
less relevant in PFI’s as a significant proportion of projects still overrun. Second, 
there have been few fine grained studies of PFI projects presenting opportunity for 
the sort of detailed inquiry offered by a systemic approach (described earlier in the 
literature review). Third, because PFI projects include the operational phase as part 
of the project lifecycle, they are in tension with the conventional project lifecycle 
model espoused in the project management literature. Findings emerging from the 
extant literature suggest that, when conducting research in the context of PFI 
projects, the project lifecycle needs extending to include the operational phase. If 
not, the conceptual basis of the research will be inconsistent with the actuality of the 
projects being studied. Reviewing the PFI literature in light of a project lifecycle that 
includes the operational phase reveals a fourth and final finding. It was found that 
despite extensive and growing research on PFI projects, there remains significant 
gap in the literature which is that there have been no empirical studies of cost 
overruns in the operating phase of PFI projects. 
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2.1 METHOD OF REVIEWING THE EXTANT LITERATURE 
Silverman (2013, p.343) provides the following questions as guidance for what 
the researcher should be aiming to examine as part of their review of the literature: 
• What do we already know about the topic? 
• What do you have to say critically about what is already known? 
• Has anyone else ever done anything exactly the same? 
• Has anyone else done anything that is related? 
• Why is your research worth doing in the light of what has already been 
done? 
• Where does your work fit in with what has done before? 
Jorgensen and Bozeman (2007, p.358) suggest that in any literature review ‘the 
analysis is more one of interpretion than science’.  While the analysis of literatures 
might be subject to interpretation, systemising the search for literature improves 
repeatability, a central tenet of academic research (Johnson and Harris, 2002).  
Observing the advice of Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) that literature reviews 
progressively zone in on the focal research topic, the review of literature followed a 
process of logical progression as a means of systematically searching for literature 
that attended to Silverman’s(2013) questions above. The process of logical 
progression began by selecting a set of ‘seed’ publications, chosen on the basis of 
their relevance to the broad topic of project management. These comprised the two 
leading project management journals International Journal of Project Management 
and Project Management Journal as well as the more recent International Journal of 
Managing Projects in Business. Journal publications were complemented by 
‘classic’ (Söderlund and Geraldi, 2012) project management texts including Morris 
and Hough (1987). The combination of texts and journals formed the ‘seed’ 
publications with which to begin the review of literature.  
Journals were mined using the search terms below:  
• Project fail* 
• Project success 
• Project overrun* 
• Project delay* 
• Project cost* 
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Asterisk denote the use of wild cards to search for variants of the search term. 
For example ‘Project fail*’ will return results for ‘project failure’, ‘project failures’. The 
application of search terms also followed a process of logical progression by starting 
with the broad topic of ‘project failure’ and then progressively zoning in on literature 
relating to the focal research topic of project overruns before zoning in still further to 
the particulars of project delay and project cost. 
Reflecting the dispersed nature of project management research (Kwak and 
Anbari, 2009), literature from the ‘seed’ publications revealed publications in other 
disciplines including operational research, engineering management, and 
construction that contained research relevant to project overruns. The search terms 
above were applied within these new search spaces revealing yet further 
publications and so the literature review also followed a process of snowballing on 
‘discipline’ beginning with project management then moving in to related fields.  
The results of the literature review are organised under three headings. The first 
heading, Contextualising Projects, frames the proposed research study by 
establishing why project overruns should be the subject of further research. The 
second heading, Understanding the Behaviour of Projects, sets out to understand 
what research has already been done to understand the behaviour of overruns in 
projects. The final heading, Mitigating Project Overruns, examines the extant 
literature to establish the state of the art with respect to tools and techniques for 
mitigating the risk of undesirable project behaviour such as overruns reflecting the 
aims of the study to contribute to both theory and practice.  
 
2.2 CONTEXTUALISING PROJECTS 
2.2.1 Definition of a Project 
Within the literature there is no universally accepted definition of what 
constitutes a project. One definition put forward by the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK) (PMI, 2013, p.5), and referred to regularly within the literature, 
is that a project is ‘a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, 
service, or result’.  
The PMBOK definition offers a foundational understanding of what a project is 
but it lacks sufficient richness to apprehend a comprehensive appreciation of what is 
14 
 
meant by ‘a project’. For example, the meaning of ‘temporary endeavour’ gives no 
sense of what the nature the ‘endeavour’ is. Researchers however have provided 
elaboration suggesting that the endeavour be viewed as an enterprise and thus that 
a project be conceptualised as a ‘temporary organisation’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 
1995, Turner and Müller, 2003). The organisation brings together resources to 
achieve a specific outcome and by its temporary nature is time bound in its 
existence. 
The PMBOK definition also asserts that individual projects are ‘unique’ which 
implies that projects share no common ground and, consequently, practices and 
research findings are not applicable outside of those projects within which they are 
developed. The assertion is, however, contradictory to the many handbooks, training 
packages and BOKs that capture practices of project management that are believed 
to be applicable to all projects. This apparent contradiction can be explained by 
elaborating on the meaning of uniqueness with respect to projects. Turner and 
Müller (2003, p.1) for example suggest that ‘no project before or after will be exactly 
the same’ (emphasis added). For example, the construction of two schools will bring 
together similar stakeholders although the specific composition of those 
stakeholders might differ. The construction processes and techniques used to create 
the schools will be similar but might also involve particularities, for example due to 
ground conditions. The construction project will also result in the production of two 
similar facilities although their layouts may differ. The point being made here is that 
projects are not unique in every respect but rather as Maylor (2010, p.5) asserted 
‘something like it has almost certainly been done by someone somewhere before. 
For this reason, projects are said to have aspects of uniqueness’.  
Based upon the foregoing, projects can be conceived as being temporary 
organisations (Turner and Muller, 2003) that comprise both elements of uniqueness 
and elements of repetition. However the review of literature revealed a further 
concept that is relevant in relation to projects – complexity, in particular structural 
complexity (Williams, 1997). Structural complexity concerns the interrelatedness of 
the components of a project (Kharbanda and Pinto, 1996) that might include 
technologies, production processes, teams, stakeholders and skill sets but to name 
just a few. Indeed projects can involve many and varied components each in some 
way related to others, creating a large number of interrelationships and structural 
complexity in the project (Baccarini, 1996, Cooke-Davies et al., 2011). Moreover, 
parallel working used to meet demanding project time scales, can create yet further 
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interdependence between components and thus increased structural complexity of 
the project (Williams, 1997). Finally, uniqueness in projects means the details of the 
entire project are rarely known at the outset and, therefore, uncertainty can exist 
concerning tasks and goals. As clarity of tasks and goals emerge through 
progressive elaboration (PMI, 2004), Williams (1997) suggests it may become 
necessary to add new elements to the project leading to yet more interrelationships 
and structural complexity.  
Turner (1999) suggests that structural complexity as characterised by the three 
dimensions of uncertainty, integration and urgency, distinguish projects from routine 
operations management. Consequently, structural complexity is relevant to a 
comprehensive understanding of what is meant by a project. 
In summary, while the literature review found no definitive definition of a project, 
based upon the foregoing findings from project management literature this research 
conceives a project as being: 
• A temporary organisation that comprises aspects of uniqueness and 
repetition and that exhibits characteristics of structural complexity.  
 
2.2.2 The Ubiquity of Projects  
Although projects are without a definitive definition, this has not prevented their 
wide spread adoption by organisations. Historically the preserve of engineering and 
construction sectors, the project organisational form now pervades large portions of 
economic activity. The proliferation of projects can be explained by a change in 
market conditions over the course of the late 20th century (Kerzner, 2009). 
Historically, markets had been characterised as homogenous, mass, and relatively 
static in terms of change and thus low costs and high volumes were the order of the 
day (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). These were conditions that were well suited to 
organisational forms typical of that era and characterised by ‘Fordism’ (and 
Taylorism in Europe) (Cicmil et al., 2009).  
By the late 20th century however new market conditions had begun to emerge. 
Increasing consumer wealth created markets of customers whose needs changed 
frequently and who demanded variety, innovation and brand rather than simply low 
cost. Moreover, internationalisation of firms meant there was increased competition 
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in the market place to satisfy those demands. The organisational forms of Fordism 
were suited to ‘high volume throughputs of standardised products and services and 
for making decisions in a relatively stable technological and market environment’ 
(Maylor et al., 2006, p.664). These forms of organising, that had obediently served 
the needs of masses over the earlier part of the century, were no longer fit for 
purpose in these new market conditions. Consequently, organisations had come to 
realise that to compete and prosper in these new conditions, they ‘must be dynamic 
in nature; that is, they must be capable of rapid restructuring should environmental 
conditions dictate’ (Kerzner, 2009, p.92). 
Seeking an alternative form of organising that could cope with these new 
conditions, organisations turned to projects which are ‘ideally suited for managing 
increasing product complexity, fast changing markets, cross-functional business 
expertise, customer-focused innovation, and market and technological uncertainty’ 
(Hobday, 2000, p.871). The strength of projects in dealing with the market 
conditions described above saw organisations undergoing what Midler (1995) refers 
to as ‘projectification’ whereby they made the transition from the mass production 
efficiencies and hierarchical organization structures (Daft and Lewin, 1993) of a 
classical functional form toward project based forms.  
So aggressive has been the ‘projectification’ of organisations that projects are 
now of central economic and social importance as evidenced by Turner et al. (2010) 
who estimated that world expenditure on projects is in the region of $16 trillion or 1/3 
of global spend. Although these figures are recent, the literature suggests that 
organisations have long been dependent upon projects for success. For example, 
more than two decades ago Pinto and Covin (1989, p.50) were of the view that it 
had ‘long been acknowledged that the effectiveness of an organization depends, in 
large part, upon the successful management of its projects’.  
Given that projects proliferate in today’s economy and that they have been 
important to organisational success for some time, it seems reasonable to assume 
that many organisations have developed experience in the use of projects.  Yet, as 
introduced earlier, projects are regularly reported as having failed to meet their 
expectations. The implication for this research is that work remains to be done to 
understand why organisations, despite having gained experience, continue to 
encounter project failure. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
conditions that cultivated proliferation of projects (such as increasing consumer 
wealth) will endure and, consequently, project based activity which already occupies 
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a large portion of global economic activity will continue to grow. Therefore it is 
argued here that improved understanding and thus performance of projects is of 
organisational, economic and social importance and, consequently, is worthy of 
further research. 
  
2.2.3 The Growing Complexity of Projects  
As well as growing in popularity, the literature suggests that projects are growing 
in complexity (Baccarini, 1996, Williams, 1997, Cooke-Davies et al., 2011). To 
compete in the market conditions described earlier, organisations continually strive 
to provide consumers with ever more sophisticated products (and services) in ever 
tightening time scales. Increasing sophistication means the projects used to deliver 
products must bring together and integrate wide ranges of expertise and 
technologies. As a consequence the number of project elements increase and so 
too do the interconnections between them increasing the project’s structural 
complexity.  To achieve tight time scales the need for concurrent working increases 
‘which by definition increases project complexity further’ (Williams, 1997, p.15) 
because it creates yet further interconnections between elements.  
A second aspect of project complexity is uncertainty. As noted earlier, 
uniqueness in projects means the details of the entire project are rarely known at the 
outset and, therefore, uncertainty exists concerning project objectives and the 
methods to achieve those objectives (Turner and Cochrane, 1993). As clarity of 
methods and objectives emerge through progressive elaboration (PMI, 2003) it may 
become necessary to add new elements to the project leading to yet more 
interrelationships and increasing structural complexity (Williams, 1997). 
Cooke-Davies et al. (2011, p.2) point out that uncertainty also concerns how the 
various elements of a project can change, noting that in complex projects 
particularly each element ‘can change in ways that are not totally predictable, and 
which can then have unpredictable impacts on other elements that are themselves 
capable of change’. The authors also point out that structural complexity is more 
than a large number of interrelated elements, it is the ‘woven togetherness’ of the 
elements (Cook-Davies et al, 2011, p.2). In other words, structural complexity refers 
to the intricacy of the relationships between elements.   
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Increasing project complexity increases the difficulty of managing projects. This 
is because complexity, as characterised above, makes project behaviour ‘difficult to 
predict intuitively’ (Williams, 2005, p.502) due to the intricacy of relationships 
between elements. Furthermore, change in one element can have ‘major effects’ 
across the whole project, effects that can be difficult to understand because of the 
aforementioned intricacy of relationships.  
As will be discussed later (section 2.2.5), there have been regular reports of past 
projects experiencing overruns. The review of literature above suggests that projects 
of the future will be more difficult to manage than past projects due to increasing 
complexity. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the issue of project 
overruns will remain of concern into the future. The implication for this research is 
that more needs to be done to understand and cope with project complexity in order 
to mitigate or avoid project overruns in the future.  
 
2.2.4 The Growing Knowledge Base of Project Management  
Allied to the growth in adoption of projects by organisations  the knowledge base 
concerning projects and their management has also burgeoned. The evolution of 
modern project management began between the 1930’s and 1950’s (Morris, 1997) 
with early developments in terms of standardised tools and techniques attributed to 
Operational Research within, for example, the U.S. defence sector in the 1950’s 
(Turner et al., 2010). 
Kerzner (2009, p.2) suggests that the practice of managing projects using 
standardised techniques is ‘relatively modern’. However, the field has undergone 
rapid growth with techniques such as Gantt and PERT now complemented by 
computer software packages to support the management of projects (Kidd, 1989, 
Kidd, 1990). More sophisticated systems have enabled the management of projects 
to move from the project level to the enterprise level were individual projects can be 
viewed as programs or portfolios of projects (Meredith and Mantel, 2010). 
Methodologies such as PRINCE2 (AXELOS, 2015) and Agile (Agile Manifesto, 
2015)) have also emerged to support effective project management and there has 
been rapid growth in professional membership organisations (Meredith and Mantel, 
2010) such as the Project Management Institute(PMI), Association for Project 
Management (APM) and International Centre for Complex Project Management 
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(ICCPM).  These organisations offer standards, guidance and training for project 
management. PMI and APM both provide ‘bodies of knowledge’, texts reflecting the 
evolving understanding and practice of project management and capturing core 
elements of standard practices. For practitioners, a range of qualifications is on offer 
to help them develop and demonstrate their project management competence. 
Similarly for organisations there are means of assessing and developing 
competence using, for example, project management maturity models (PMI, 2003). 
These models capture a collection of organisational best practices which 
organisations can assess themselves against and aspire toward to improve 
competence.  
Research interest in the field of project management also continues to expand. 
The domain has two well established and internationally recognised journals, the 
International Journal of Project Management (IJPM) and Project Management 
Journal (PMJ) which have more recently been joined by a third journal, the 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business (IJMPB). Texts and 
handbooks are in abundance with most major publishing houses (e.g. Oxford, Wiley, 
Sage and Gower publishing) having published a guide or text relating to the subject 
of project management.  
The above findings suggest that the knowledge base, what is understood about 
projects and the practice of project management is significant and growing. 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that the various tools, techniques and 
methodologies are being put to use by practitioners and organisations (White and 
Fortune, 2002, Besner and Hobbs, 2008, Fortune et al., 2011) though their 
application can differ depending upon project type (Shenhar, 1998, Payne and 
Rodney Turner, 1999, Crawford et al., 2006) 
Yet, as will be shown in the next section, the literature also suggests that many 
projects are reported as having failed to meet their expectations. Therefore, despite 
the availability and use of a growing body of knowledge, organisations still face the 
spectre of project failure. This tentatively suggests that there may be limitations with 
current available tools for managing projects, a suggestion that is supported by 
research by White and Fortune (2002). The authors surveyed practitioners’ views on 
the practice of project management, finding that the most frequently mentioned 
limitations of existing tools were an inadequacy for managing complex projects and 
difficulty in modelling the ‘real world’.  
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The implication for this thesis is that if current tools and techniques cannot 
adequately cope with complexity (identified earlier as growing in projects) and 
actuality of projects then more work needs to be done to develop tools and 
techniques that can cope in order to augment existing tools. Furthermore, to 
facilitate practitioner’s adoption of the tools, it is posited that they should attend to 
the limitations of existing tools identified by White and Fortune. 
 
2.2.5 An Enduring Theme of Project Failure 
The findings of the literature reviewed have suggested the variety and number of 
organisations adopting projects has grown dramatically and, consequently, many 
organisations have experience in managing projects. Furthermore, it was found that 
the knowledge base of project management has burgeoned with tools, techniques 
and methodologies, and that these are being put to use by organisations and 
practitioners.  
Yet despite all the experience and knowledge that has been gained concerning 
projects they are still regularly reported as being late and/or having exceeded their 
budgets. Although not restricted to construction projects (Standish Group, 2009) this 
field appears to receive the lion’s share of attention in the literature with respect to 
overruns, perhaps owing to the magnitudes which can be significant. For example, 
Winch (1996) reported an average of 14% cost overruns and 11% time overruns in 
the UK for public sector procured construction projects such as roads and hospitals. 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) suggests that average cost overruns for infrastructure 
projects such as roads, bridges and rail can be upwards of 20%. Love et al. (2013) 
in an analysis of 276 construction and engineering projects in Australia revealed an 
average cost overrun to be 12.22%. 
Love et al. (2014) stress that the concept of ‘overrun’, particularly in relation to 
cost, should not be confused with the concept of ‘escalation’. Cost overrun is 
concerned with an unanticipated increase in cost due to changes within the project 
whereas cost escalation is concerned with an anticipated growth in budget due to 
market forces such as inflation (Love et al, 2012). 
The literature suggests that the phenomenon of overruns is immune to 
geographic and economic boundaries with reports of project overruns from countries 
such as the UK (White and Sidhu, 2005), USA (Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995), India 
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(Doloi et al., 2011), Hong Kong (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 1996), Saudi Arabia 
(Assaf and Al-Hejji, 2006), Ghana (Frimpong et al., 2003) and Nigeria (Mansfield et 
al., 1994) but to name a few.  
Furthermore, it appears experience offers little defence. Denver International 
Airport (Szyliowicz and Goetz, 1995) and the Scottish Parliament (White and Sidhu, 
2005), for example, both experienced extensive overruns but were presumably 
delivered reputable companies with significant prior experience in delivering similar 
types of projects and still they encountered failure. 
Such has been the performance and reputation of projects, that Hodgson and 
Cicmil (2006, p.7) are of the view that frequent cost overruns, delays and 
underperformance ‘seem to have become the rule and the reality of contemporary 
projects’. 
Although the literature discussed thus far is contemporary, projects failing to 
meet their cost and schedule expectations are not a recent development. In fact the 
review of literature finds that the phenomenon has been an enduring theme in the 
literature with mention as far back as the 1960’s (Avots, 1969) and in almost every 
decade thereafter (Morris and Hough, 1987, Atkinson, 1999, Eden et al., 2005, 
Turner et al., 2010).  
In considering the theme of project overruns in light of the foregoing discussion it 
seems that, despite being equipped with the armaments of experience and 
knowledge, organisations are still struggling with projects that fail to deliver against 
expectations. Furthermore, it seems the battle against project failure has been a 
campaign that spans many decades. The implication for this thesis is that work 
needs to be done to better understand why projects overrun and to use this 
understanding to develop tools and techniques that can support practitioners to 
mitigate or avoid this behaviour.  
The preceding discussion has centred on the concepts of cost and time overruns 
as the criteria for defining ‘project failure’. However it is recognised that there are 
other criterion against which project failure (or success) can be judged. Indeed 
defining such criterion has become a research topic of its own (Wateridge, 1995, 
Atkinson, 1999, Shenhar et al., 2001). While a variety of different criteria have been 
put forward there is growing consensus within the literature that success (or failure) 
of a project is dependent upon the perspective from which it is viewed (De Wit, 
1988, Yu et al., 2005, Bryde and Robinson, 2005, Turner, 2009). Therefore, 
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selection of criteria will differ depending upon which perspective is adopted.  As will 
be discussed in more depth later, the research presented in this thesis was 
undertaken from the perspective a commercial construction organisation ‘BuildIt’ 
whose criteria centred upon cost and time.  Therefore, while it is recognised that 
there are other criteria against which project success (or failure) can be measured, 
the focus in this study was cost and time overruns.  
 
2.2.6   Summary  
The review of the literature has revealed an enduring theme of project failure 
with projects regularly being reported as having been late, exceeded their budgets 
or failed to meet other expectations. Cultivated by changes in market conditions 
over the late 20th century, a large and growing proportion of organisations have 
turned to projects to deliver their products and services. Consequently the topic of 
project failure is of wide spread economic relevance. Allied to the growth in 
adoption, the review also found that the project management knowledge base is 
burgeoning with handbooks, training course and standards. Yet despite the 
armaments of knowledge and experience, the literature review finds that 
organisations are still frequently defeated by projects that overrun in terms of time 
and/or cost, so much so that some researchers suggest this behaviour has become 
a reality of contemporary project management.  
Looking forward in time, the review suggested that the market conditions that 
have cultivated the proliferation of projects are likely to endure therefore projects will 
remain an important feature of the future economic landscape. Furthermore, and as 
a consequence of aforementioned market conditions, the review suggested that 
projects of the future are likely to be more complex and thus more difficult to 
manage than those of today or the past.  
The main conclusion drawn from the literature reviewed thus far is most 
succinctly captured by paraphrasing an observation made by Avots (1983, p.145) 
more than 30 years ago which is that it is still not known with any confidence what 
causes project failure, and without such knowledge, it will be difficult to manage a 
project so as to avoid it. Thus, two broad initial research questions are set: 
• What causes overruns in complex projects? and consequently 
• How can this knowledge be put to use to mitigate or prevent overruns? 
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To make progress on this agenda the literature review continues by exploring 
how prior research has gone about understanding the behaviour of overruns in 
projects. 
 
2.3 UNDERSTANDING THE BEHAVIOUR OF PROJECTS 
Project overruns have been examined from a wide variety of perspectives and 
thus the literature on the subject is extensive. Consequently, rather than attempt to 
provide an exhaustive list of literatures, the aim of this section is to provide a 
synthesised account of the main strands of research that have taken place. To this 
end, the literature on project overruns is arranged and reviewed around three foci: 
research that has focused attention on a single aspect of projects and their 
management (for example, cost estimation), research that has explored the 
influence of collections of factors (for example critical success factors), and research 
that has examined overruns as the manifestation of a system of factors (for example 
exploring the role of feedback dynamics).  
The section begins by presenting a synopsis of the first two foci followed by a 
short critique of both, using the literature to reveal their strengths and limitations. 
The third focus (a systemic perspective) is then examined which is found to attend 
to the limitations of the previous two foci. It is subsequently argued that a systemic 
perspective offers a valuable approach for future research into project overruns.  
 
2.3.1 Focusing on a single Aspect of Projects 
One approach that has been adopted to examine project overruns has been to 
focus on the role and influence of a single aspect of projects and their management. 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002, 2005) after Wachs (1989) for example, focused on the issue 
of cost estimating.  Examining 258 transportation infrastructure projects valuing 
USD$90 billion, Flyvbjerg et al (2002) found that nine out of ten projects 
experienced cost overrun with an average overrun of 28%. Based upon their 
analysis of these projects, the authors conclude that the overruns are ‘best 
explained by strategic misrepresentation i.e. lying’ Flyvbjerg et al (2002, p. 290) by 
decision makers about the true cost of the projects in order that their projects be 
approved.   
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Later Flyvbjerg (2008) added the influence of optimism bias in underestimation 
of project costs drawing upon the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
While optimism bias can lead to underestimation of project costs, the error is not 
driven by an intention to deceive as it is with strategic misrepresentation. Rather, 
optimism bias is ‘a cognitive predisposition found with most people to judge future 
events in a more positive light than is warranted by actual experience’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2008, p.6) leading to underestimation of project costs.  
Akintoye and Fitzgerald (2000) explored cost estimation from the perspective of 
construction contractors finding that the causes of inaccuracy in cost estimating 
included a lack of adoption of estimating tools and techniques, time constraints to 
prepare cost estimates and those responsible for cost estimation lacking practical 
knowledge of the construction process.  
 A further line of inquiry has been to focus on project change as a cause of 
overruns in projects. Love et al. (2002) looked at change and how it causes rework. 
Wu et al. (2004) focused on the causes of change. Sun and Meng (2009) conducted 
a review of existing lists of changes and effects to create two taxonomies which 
synthesised and listed potential changes and effects drawn from the literature.  
Related, others have looked at the process of how changes in projects are managed 
(Hwang and Low, 2012).   
Other researchers still have focused upon the influence of more qualitative 
aspects of projects. Olander and Landin (2005) looked at the influence of 
stakeholders on projects and how their negative attitudes toward a project can 
cause overruns. Meng (2012) examined the influence of relationship management 
as factor in project cost and time performance suggesting that the deterioration of 
relationships between project participants, in particular supply chain partners, might 
increase the likelihood of poor project performance. Turner and Müller (2005) 
focused on the role of the project manager, in particular their leadership style, 
competence, and emotional intelligence suggesting that these qualities could play 
an influential role in project success. 
Cutting across all of the foregoing topics is research focusing on the subject of 
risk management. Risk management has been a focus of attention for some time 
within the literature as a central cause of overruns in projects (Franke, 1987, 
Williams, 1995). Akintoye and MacLeod (1997) shed light on the nature of this 
cause. Based upon a survey of the construction industry in the UK, the authors 
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found that formal risk analysis techniques such as decision trees and Monte Carlo 
simulation were rarely applied because of a lack of knowledge and doubts about 
their suitability.   
The individual aspects of projects discussed thus far operate at the level of the 
project. However, researchers have also sought to examine individual factors that 
exist at the organisational level. For example, Keegan and Turner (2001) focused on 
the value of organisational learning between projects exploring current learning 
practices and found that the time pressures which are common in project based 
organisations reduces the quality of learning practices and in turn could affect the 
performance of future projects. 
 
2.3.2 Focusing on Collections of Factors  
As well as focusing upon the influence of an individual factor such as risk 
management process or project manager competence, research has also examined 
the influence of collections of factors on project outcomes. In particular, literature in 
this space has sought to understand what factors are important to achieving the 
outcome of project success by defining collections of critical success factors (Pinto 
and Slevin, 1987, Bing et al., 2005b, Müller and Jugdev, 2012). Success factors are 
defined as ‘the things we can influence to increase the likelihood of achieving a 
successful outcome’ (Turner et al., 2010, p.81) and the aim of research has been to 
reveal the collections of factors that can influence project success.  
Revealing critical success factors has been a long standing area of focus within 
project management research (Baker et al., 1983) and is still important today 
although Fortune and White (2006) suggest that publications identifying new factors 
are in decline. Although contemporary research focuses on success factors, a 
retrospective look at research in this space uncovers that avoiding project failure 
was the original frame of reference. For example, Turner (2009) suggests early 
publications listed a collection of ‘pitfalls’ to be avoided to improve the likelihood of 
project success. Though as early as the 1960’s, academics such as Avots (1969) 
had begun to list reasons why projects exhibit behaviour such as cost and schedule 
overruns albeit he did not specifically term them ‘factors’. Success and failure 
factors are, in essence, the same criteria looked at from two different points of 
reference, indeed some researchers such as Belassi and Tukel (1996) examine 
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factors from both failure and success perspectives.  On the basis of the foregoing 
points, success as well as failure factor research is relevant to this thesis document. 
Although not the first to tackle the issue of success factors, one of the most cited 
lists according to Turner et al. (2010, p.93) is that by Pinto and Slevin (1987) in 
which 10 factors of success were identified. In the prevailing 25 years since Pinto 
and Slevin’s seminal work, investigation into the factors affecting project success 
and associated failure has continued apace.  
Research has explored critical success factors for project types, project types 
such as R&D (Pinto and Covin, 1989), construction (Sanvido et al., 1992) and I.T. 
(Wateridge, 1995). Other researchers have looked at the issue of success factors 
exploring the applicability of particular factors within specific geographic contexts 
(Mansfield et al., 1994, Doloi et al., 2011). Other researchers still have taken steps 
to try to consolidate factors and move toward a more definitive list that might be 
applicable across project types (Cooke-Davies, 2002). 
 
2.3.3 Critique of Approaches 
Whether exploring collections of success factors or focusing on a single aspect 
of a project both approaches are valuable in their own respects for understanding 
project overruns. Knowledge of success factors gives broad insight into the variety 
of factors that can have influence over project outcomes.  Focusing on a single 
aspect of projects offers the possibility of revealing the particularities of how that 
individual factor might affect project outcomes.  
However, one aspect that neither of the approaches has explicit concern for is 
relationships between factors. By its very nature, examining an individual aspect of a 
project omits the possibility of relations to other factors. Although critical success 
factor research reveals collections of factors it has no facility to attend to 
interrelationships between them (Fortune and White, 2006).  
Yet the critical success factor literature has recognised that the interrelationships 
between factors are ‘at least as important’ as the individual factors themselves 
(Fortune and White, 2006, p.54). Cooke-Davies et al. (2011) suggest that the 
approach of breaking a project down into its constituent parts and examining each 
separately is a common practice in dealing with complicated situations in project 
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management but that the practice ignores the important relationships between the 
parts. This is, in effect, the practice being conducted in success/failure factor 
research. 
Belassi and Tukel (1996, p.142) suggest that many of the success/failure factors 
‘do not, in practice, directly affect project success or failure. Usually a combination of 
many factors….result in project success or failure’. The authors  illustrate their point 
by suggesting that the availability of project resources may be a consequence of 
other organisational factors. The authors suggest that without understanding the 
relationships between factors managerial action might be misplaced in that action 
might attend to the symptom (e.g. availability of resources) rather than the cause 
(other organisational factors). Without attending to the cause, the symptoms may 
subside but are likely to return. Thus Belassi and Tukel (1996) suggest that 
knowledge of relationships between factors can focus managerial action where it is 
most needed. This view is echoed by Nandhakumar (1996) who suggests that if 
success factors are to offer guidance to practitioners then improved understanding 
of the relationships between the factors is needed. 
To summarise thus far, the literature suggests that individual factors (elements) 
of a project do not exist in isolation from one another, each making its own discrete 
contribution to project behaviour free from interference by others. Rather, they 
interact with one another to bring about project behaviours. The notion of 
interrelations is likely to be particularly important in understanding the behaviour of 
complex projects given, as outlined earlier; one of their key features is 
interrelatedness. The implication for this thesis is that taking a discrete approach to 
understanding projects whereby the influence of a single element or collection of 
discrete elements is examined risks a partial understanding of overruns being 
achieved because concern for the relationships between factors have been 
marginalised.  Consequently, understanding the individual elements and the 
relationships between them is needed to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
project behaviour such as project overruns. One approach to researching projects 
that attends to this need is that of systemic modelling. The following discussion 
examines the features of this approach 
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2.3.4 Focusing on Systems of Factors  
Attending to the Whole 
A fundamental feature of a systemic modelling approach is systems thinking 
(Senge, 1990, Checkland, 1999) whereby understanding of project behaviour is 
arrived at through comprehension of how the system of factors operates as a whole. 
To gain this comprehension, a systemic modelling approach has explicit concern for 
individual factors, and the particular relationships between them, that can influence 
project behaviour. Knowledge of elements and the particular relationships that hold 
the whole edifice of factors together to form a particular combination unlocks 
understanding by uncovering the system of factors that are interacting to bring about 
project behaviour as illustrated in the example below which is excerpt from Eden et 
al’s (2000) disruption and delay model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Causal map of project response to increased use of overtime. 
 
The example above also illustrates how comprehension of how the whole 
system of factors operates can offer enhanced understanding of project behaviour. 
In the situation above, continued use of overtime is found to result in further slippage 
in project schedule. By understanding what factors are at work, and the relationships 
between them, a systemic modelling approach reveals the system of factors 
Management actions & 
intentions 
Potential impacts of 
management action 
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underlying this phenomenon and in doing so offers explanation of why continued 
use of overtime can result in the counter-intuitive outcome of increased slippage in a 
project.  In short a systemic modelling approach can offer more comprehensive 
understanding of project behaviour by seeing project behaviour as the manifestation 
of structurally related factors that form a system of factors. In essence factors 
interact forming structures that are deep within the project and manifest in project 
outcomes such as overruns.  
Attending to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors 
A second feature of a systemic modelling approach is the attention paid to ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ factors (Williams, 2005, Ackermann et al., 2007, Ackermann et al., 2014). 
This is illustrated in the example above which identified ‘hard’ factors such as 
‘expected delivery date’ and ‘soft’ human factors such as ‘morale’ or ‘fatigue’. As can 
be seen from the example, attending to both types of factors is important to 
explaining project behaviour. However attendance to ‘soft’ factors is of particular 
note because they ‘often appear to dominate feedback structures’ which are 
discussed next (Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996, p.215).  
Attending to Feedback Dynamics 
A third feature is the ability of a systemic modelling approach is the capability to 
reveal dynamic behaviour such as the feedback loops which have been found to 
play a powerful role in project behaviour (Eden et al., 2005). For example, in the 
illustration above, Eden et al. (2000) show the feedback loops that can derive from 
managerial action in response to disruptions. Howick and Eden (2001) revealed the 
effects that feedback can have when projects are compressed to meet tightened 
time scales. The concept of feedback also features highly in Cooper’s (1993a) 
description of the rework cycle. As can be seen from the example above, 
understanding this dynamic behaviour can enhance comprehension of project 
behaviour.  
Use of Modelling Techniques 
A final feature of a systemic modelling approach is the use of models to support 
understanding. While the example shown above is a simple model of project 
behaviour, the multitude of factors and relations that could be present within a 
project, particularly a complex project, could mean factors and relationships are 
many in number. Reflecting Simon’s (1972) theories of bounded rationality, 
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understanding of the whole is, therefore, likely to be cognitively challenging. A 
systemic modelling approach adopts modelling as a means of easing the cognitive 
load and thus improving understanding of project behaviour (Edkins et al., 2007). 
Models that have been used include causal modelling (Ackermann et al., 2014), soft 
systems methodology (Winter and Checkland, 2003), influence diagramming 
(Howick et al., 2008) as well as computer models such a system dynamics 
(Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996, Lyneis et al., 2001, Taylor and Ford, 2006, Lyneis 
and Ford, 2007, Rahmandad and Hu, 2010). 
Although the features of a systemic modelling approach have been presented 
individually, the features are not mutually exclusive (as has been alluded to above). 
For instance, the ability to attend to dynamic project behaviour is in part reliant upon 
an ability to attend to soft human factors since these often form important nodes in 
feedback loops (Ackermann et al., 2007). Similarly, the ability to attend to the whole 
is underpinned by the use of modelling in order to support comprehension 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2005).   
Using the qualities of a systemic perspective and modelling tools, a systemic 
modelling approach has revealed valuable insights concerning project behaviour. 
For example, one of the earliest examples from Cooper (1980) was used as a 
diagnostic tool in a $500m litigation claim against the US Navy.  Ackermann et al. 
(1997) also applied the technique in litigation revealing the causes of disruptions 
and delays to complex projects and Williams (2004) applied the technique to post-
hoc analysis of projects to reveal hard to expose ‘non-intuitive’ lessons.  
To summarise thus far, the literature suggests that knowledge of the various 
factors is, in and of itself, not enough to build comprehensive understanding of 
projects. This is because factors do not exist in isolation from one another, each 
making its own discrete contribution to project behaviour free from interference from 
others. Instead factors interact with one another forming intricate structures deep 
within the project and it is these structures that manifest in project behaviour.  
The implication for this thesis is that the behaviour of overruns might be better 
conceptualised, not as the direct consequence of individual or collections of discrete 
factors, but as a manifestation of structurally related factors. With this 
conceptualisation, to gain understanding of project overruns concern is needed for 
revealing both content (what are the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors involved in project 
behaviour) and structure (how do these factors interact with one another). 
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Knowledge of both content and structure allows the project to be examined as ‘an 
integrated whole to obtain a full view of the total system’ (Turner et al., 2010, p.62) 
enabling understanding of how the system of factors can bring about the behaviour 
of overruns.  The implication for this thesis is that a research design that adopts a 
systemic modelling perspective would appear to offer a nuanced understanding of 
overruns in projects. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the foregoing review of literature, the two initial 
broad research questions set out in section 2.2.6. are revised to 
• What are the factors, and the relationships between them, that describe 
systems of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects?  
• How can knowledge about systems of factors that can influence overruns 
in projects be put to use to by practitioners to mitigate overruns in current 
and prospective projects? 
 
2.3.5 Contextualising a Systemic Perspective with Extant PM Theory 
While a systemic modelling has provided valuable insights into project 
behaviour, Williams (2005) suggests that adoption of the approach is a departure 
from conventional project management theory in a number of ways. Conventional 
theory has informed much of the project management knowledge base of research 
and associated practice (Bredillet, 2004). Therefore, if a systemic modelling 
approach to researching overruns is to be pursued, some brief attention is needed 
to expose the ways in which the approach departs from conventional project 
management theory and to understand how this departure fits with the extant 
knowledge base.  
A systemic modelling approach makes three departures from conventional 
project management theory each of which has been touched upon above.  Firstly, 
understanding of project behaviour is arrived at by taking a holistic perspective 
(Eden et al., 2005). That is, comprehension of how the system of factors and 
relations that comprise a project operate as a whole is central to unlocking 
understanding of project behaviour. Conventional project management theory 
however, advocates that understanding of the whole be achieved by breaking the 
project down, analysing its components, then rebuilding it to provide explanation 
(Turner et al., 2010, Cooke-Davies et al., 2011). In short, project management 
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theory is based upon an engineering/science paradigm which initiated project 
management and which proffers a reductionist approach, whereas, a systemic 
modelling approach proffers a holistic approach.   
Secondly, a systemic modelling approach explicitly attends to ‘soft’ human 
factors (Williams, 2005, Ackermann et al., 2014). As discussed above, these have 
been found through empirical research to play a crucial role in explaining project 
behaviour. If projects are conceived as temporary organisations (Lundin and 
Söderholm, 1995), then the importance of soft human factors come as little surprise. 
Indeed, Cooke-Davies (2002, p.189)  asserts that ‘it is fast becoming accepted 
wisdom that it is people who deliver projects, not processes and systems’. There 
has been awareness of soft factors within the project management research 
literature for time. Pinto and Slevin (1987) for example, recognised almost 30 years 
ago that while ‘hard’ factors were important soft ‘organisational and behavioural’ 
factors needed much greater attention and were ‘essential’ for project managers to 
understand. However, despite these observations conventional project management 
theory as espoused in the various BOK’s remains based upon a ‘hard’ systems 
perspective where a project is analogous to a ‘machine’ (Turner et al., 2010). With 
projects conceived as machines, the focus in developing understanding is largely for 
things that are tangible or quantifiable in nature, for example finance, time and 
numbers of human resources. ‘Soft’ human factors such as social relations, politics 
(small ‘p’ and large ‘P’) and culture but to name just a few have no place in 
machines and thus are marginalised(Ackermann et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
metaphor of projects as machines underpins the earlier assumption of reductionism. 
Machines comprise components that are deterministic in nature and thus 
understanding of their operation can be arrived at through reductionism. Thus in 
considering projects more as soft systems rather than hard systems, a systemic 
modelling approach departs from conventional theory. 
A third departure of systemic modelling is its attendance and concern for 
dynamic project behaviours, in particular feedback loops (Cooper, 1993a, Eden et 
al., 2000). Convention theory, based upon ‘hard’ system thinking, assumes linearity 
of relationships and therefore cannot adequately account for complex feedback 
behaviour (Williams, 1999).  As noted earlier, the ability to attend to dynamic 
behaviour is in part dependent upon the ability to attend to soft human factors as 
these often form important nodes in feedback loops. Williams (2005, p.502) notes 
that since conventional project theory ‘rarely’ considers these soft variables, even if  
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feedback was ‘allowed’ to be identified it could not be achieved since without 
acknowledgement of soft variables the reciprocal dependence is no longer visible. 
 
2.3.6 Summary 
To summarise, a systemic modelling approach departs from a conventional view 
of projects in a number of ways. Conventional project management theory takes a 
‘hard’ systems perspective whereby the system (project) is characterised largely by 
elements that are rationalistic, deterministic and tangible in nature (Cicmil et al., 
2009) and thus the project can be conceptualised as a machine(Turner et al., 2010). 
A systemic approach on the other hand views projects as ‘soft’ systems wherein the 
project can comprise both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors (Ackermann et al., 1997). 
 Using a conventional conception of projects as ‘machines’, understanding of 
project behaviour can be arrived at through reductionist techniques and 
management of projects achieved through command and control with predictive 
results. Treating projects as ‘soft’ systems on the other hand, systemic modelling 
seeks understanding by comprehension of the whole system and recognises that 
results of managing projects do not always follow intuitive logic because of the 
presence of human factors within the system that are not deterministic in nature (as 
illustrated above). 
While the conception of a project adopted by a systemic modelling approach 
departs from that of the conventional project management theory, the review of 
literature suggests that the departure is both warranted and in demand. A growing 
body of research has challenged the conventional conception of projects because 
the conception does not comprehensively match the actuality of projects (Williams, 
2005, Cicmil et al., 2009, Turner et al., 2010, Bredillet, 2013). This was recognised 
as far back as the late 80’s (Morris and Hough, 1987) with Morris (1997, p.2) Morris 
(1996)  later commenting that ‘the successful accomplishment of a project may well 
require attention to range of factors not treated by the traditional project 
management literature’. These other factors included ‘soft’ issues such as 
stakeholders and their management and led Morris (1997) to consider the notion of 
‘management of projects’ rather than project management. The latter encapsulating 
the conventional view of projects and the former a much wider perspective on 
projects.  
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Research has also pointed to the deficiencies of a conventional approach to 
project management at a practical level. Engwall (2003, p.797), for example, 
describes the findings of an empirical study of two projects, one that closely follows 
conventional PM practice and ‘fails’, the other 'deviated from several of the most 
basic principles of project management......However this project was a tremendous 
success’. Similarly, Howick and Eden (2001) showed how management responses 
guided by conventional thinking (such as the use of overtime) to accelerate projects 
can in fact have the opposite effect of increasing delay. 
While the paradox between conventional project management theory and the 
actuality of projects has been recognised for some time, project management 
research and associated practice has remained welded to what Bredillet (2013) 
refers to as a hegemony of approach underpinned by the conventional conception.  
There is evidence that researchers have ventured outside of conventional theory 
(Winch, 2002, Ackermann et al., 1997, Bredillet, 2013) however research by (Smyth 
and Morris, 2007) suggests that the adoption of alternative perspectives is still very 
much in the minority in the project management landscape. The authors found that 
much of research is still of a single persuasion that is characterised by a positivist 
philosophy and the use of associated quantitative methods which, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, correspond with a traditional conception of projects. 
This has perhaps fuelled fresh calls by leading academics in the field for 
researchers (and practitioners) to adopt new perspectives that might help extend 
understanding and thus improve management of projects. 
In summary, there is a growing view within the literature that the conventional 
conception of projects does not comprehensively reflect project actualities. 
Consequently, researchers have called for new perspectives on projects in order to 
extend and develop knowledge within the field that better reflects project realities.  
While contributions have been made toward this agenda, they are in the margins by 
comparison to the dominant approach.  
Earlier, it was suggested that further research into project behaviour could 
benefit from taking a systemic approach, and, that this approach offered an 
alternative perspective on projects. In light of the foregoing review of literature 
concerning the challenges to conventional project management theory a number of 
implications for this research are revealed: 
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• Adopting a systemic modelling perspective on projects could be fruitful in 
terms of generating new insights into the behaviour of projects because 
research remains largely of a single persuasion. 
• Making use of qualitative research strategies within a systemic perspective 
could complement the existing knowledge base by providing a more 
nuanced understanding of project realities. Using this fine grained 
understanding to inform theory development could then yield theory that 
more closely resembles the actuality of projects and thus can inform 
improved management of projects. Such an approach would satisfy the aims 
of this research set out in the introduction of developing knowledge that is 
academically rigorous and of practical relevance. 
One final item is worthy of note. As discussed earlier, adopting a systemic 
modelling approach is a departure from conventional project management theory. A 
concern for the author of this thesis, that has also been raised by other researchers 
such as Cicmil et al. (2009, p.86), is that using an alternative perspective might 
result in research that is disengaged from ‘the project management mainstream’. 
However, through careful consideration of the philosophy of research used to 
underpin this thesis the author argues that outputs from research with an alternative 
on projects can complement instead of compete with existing knowledge that has 
been driven by a more conventional perspective. This issue is discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter 3:. 
  
2.4 MITIGATING PROJECT OVERRUNS  
The aims of this research are to contribute to both project management theory 
and project management practice. The previous section focused on the former of 
these aims by examining how existing research has gone about gaining knowledge 
about project overruns and thus informed theories of overrun. It was concluded that 
adopting a systemic modelling approach in future research could offer new insights 
because the approach can give a comprehensive account of complex project 
actualities and, by comparison to the dominant approach, has received much less 
attention within the literature.  
An aim of this thesis is to use the insights gained from research to improve 
project management practice with a view to mitigating the phenomenon of overruns 
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in projects. In other words, the aim is to mitigate the risk of overruns in projects. 
Consequently, the topic of discussion in this section of the literature review is project 
risk management. 
By exploring the literature on project risk management, the aim of this section is 
to understand the state of the art within the field, determine whether more should be 
done and, if so, what could be done to improve project risk management using 
knowledge gained from a systemic approach.  The discussion is prefaced with some 
brief context on the topic of project risk management providing a definition of ‘project 
risk’, discussing the process of project risk management, and revealing the 
organisational importance of managing project risks. As discussed earlier, much of 
project management practice is underpinned by conventional project management 
theory therefore the section begins by exploring conventional project management 
risk practices. Two principal limitations of current practice are revealed – the 
comprehensiveness of risks considered and the systemic nature of risks. A brief 
review of systemic modelling approaches to risk management is then conducted 
which reveals that such approaches can attend to the need for more comprehensive 
risk consideration and systemicity of risk. Finally, a critical review of existing 
systemic modelling approaches to risk management is conducted which suggest 
that a conceptual model could offer value.  
 
2.4.1 Context on Project Risk and its Management 
Royer (2000, p.6) suggests that ‘unmanaged or unmitigated risks are one of the 
primary causes for project failure’. The Project Risk Analysis and Management 
guide (APM, 2004, P.17) defines project risk as ‘an uncertain event or set of 
circumstances that, should it occur, will have an effect on achievement of one or 
more of the project’s objectives’, going on to say that such an event ‘can be 
identified, assessed and managed through the project risk management process...’. 
PMBOK Guide (PMI, p. 237) defines Project Risk Management(PRM) as: ‘PRM 
includes the processes concerned with conducting risk management planning, 
identification, analysis, responses, and monitoring and control on a project; most of 
these processes are updated throughout the project. The objectives of PRM are to 
increase the probability and impact of positive events and decrease the probability 
and impact of events adverse to the project’.  
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The temptation in PRM might be to aspire to tackling every source of uncertainty 
in order to completely eradicate risk, however researchers council against this for 
two reasons. First, Flyvbjerg et al. (2003, p.11) suggest that project risk can never 
be ‘completely eliminated; but it can be moderated’ therefore aspiration of complete 
eradication is somewhat futile. The second reason is of a practical nature. Chapman 
and Ward (2003, p.277) note that ‘any RMP [risk management process] is not 
without costs’ therefore it is important that the ‘process is efficient as well as 
effective’. The point here is that, while it might be desirable to ascertain and manage 
every possible risk, the cost of doing so could render a project unviable. It would 
seem then, that in developing project risk management techniques some balance 
needs to be struck between the ideal of identifying every possible risk to the nth 
degree and the need for risk management to be an efficient process. In short there 
is a need to follow Ashby’s (1958) law of requisite variety.   
The concern for project risk extends beyond the level of the project itself upward 
to the organisational level. Project risks can have important implications for overall 
organisational performance.  Hartman (1997, p.15) for example points out that pro-
active risk management by mitigating risk before they happen means resources are 
not needed to recover from the impacts of a risk event, improving overall 
organisational profitability. Chapman and Ward (2003) point to a related issue of 
opportunity cost. As part of risk management strategies at the project level, 
contingencies will be made at the organisational level (such as the provision of a 
contingency fund) as a precaution in case risk events occur. This means some 
additional fraction of the organisations finite resources are being committed to the 
project (at least temporarily since the risk event might never occur) and therefore 
cannot be used for other purposes and thus a potential opportunity cost is incurred. 
Robust management of project risks then, not only plays a role in project success 
but also organisational success.  
As discussed earlier, there is a view and supporting rationale within the project 
management literature that the complexity of projects is increasing. As a 
consequence, Hartman (1997, p.21) suggests that ‘This means that risk 
management is not only more complex, but more important than ever'. Moreover, 
researchers suggest that PRM is still in its infancy Raz et al. (2002) and there is a 
need for more tools to support the management of risks (Maytorena et al., 2004) . 
The next section examines the conventional approach to project risk management 
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through the lens of a commonly adopted tool (the project risk register) to establish 
why new tools might be needed.  
 
2.4.2 Conventional Techniques for Project Risk Management 
Williams (1993, p.7) suggests that the Project Risk Register (PRR) is ‘the most 
common administrative device’ for identifying, assessing, attributing ownership of 
and managing risks’. The importance of the PRR is also emphasised by the PMBOK 
Guide (PMI, 2004) which identifies the PRR having a role in 8 of the 9 steps 
involved in the project risk management process.  
A project risk register contains a list of potential risk events associated with a 
project, an example of which is presented below. For each risk event an assessment 
is made as to the level of risk exposure which is calculated as the product of 
likelihood and consequence. In each case mitigating actions are identified. 
Reflecting upon the PRR as a tool for risk management, reveals a series of 
benefits. First, the PRR appears to be low in sophistication making it accessible for 
use by a broad range of project participants. Second, the PRR follows a relatively 
standardised template. Standardisation aids familiarity with the tool further 
contributing to its accessibility but also aids efficient analysis of risks across multiple 
projects. Third, and on the basis of the previous two benefits, the PRR appears to 
meet Chapman and Ward’s (2003) call for project risk management to be efficient. 
The PRR’s simplicity, standardisation and familiarity across project settings is likely 
to contribute to an efficient PRM process.  However, despite these benefits the PRR 
has limitations. 
The limitations are borne out of the theory which underpins the PRR, that is, 
conventional project management theory. The previous section highlighted issues 
with conventional theory in particular that concern for ‘soft’ human factors is 
marginalised and that there is a tendency to achieve understanding of project 
behaviour by breaking the project down into its constituent parts (Cooke-Davies et 
al., 2011). Both these issues manifest in the project risk register (Ackermann et al. 
2007).  
Conventional theory and associate techniques, such as the risk registers, tend to 
focus largely on ‘hard’ risks, such as technical and financial risks with less emphasis 
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placed on other sources of risk such as ‘soft’ human risks (Ackermann et al, 2007). 
As discussed earlier, projects are inherently human structures and human activity 
can have significant influence over project behaviour. Consequently, if a 
comprehensive view of project risk is to be achieved, it is essential that risk 
management ‘include not only the technical factors but also a realistic assessment 
of environmental and social risks’ (De Lemos et al., 2004, p.63). Despite the 
importance of ‘soft’ risks, Thevendran and Mawdesley (2004, p.137) in their study of 
the construction industry observed that ‘there is a dearth of formal procedures 
available to identify and control human risk factors’. This suggests that projects are 
currently vulnerable to ‘soft’ risks and, coupled with the comments from Raz (2002) 
above, that more needs to be done in terms of the development of techniques and 
processes to support risk management in projects. An implication for this research is 
that tools are needed for the management of project risk and that tools which can 
provide an integrated view of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ risks would be highly valuable.  
Kwan and Leung (2011, p.635) suggest that ‘a common practice of current risk 
management approaches is to consider risks as independent events’. The PRR is 
an example of this approach in action where each risk is treated as a contained unit 
and is thus assessed as though insulated from other risks (Morris and Pinto, 2004). 
As noted earlier, the tendency to examine project elements as discrete units is a 
feature of conventional project management theory. However, while the theory 
suggests that project risks can be conceieved as independent of one another in 
practice this is often not the case (Williams et al., 1997). Instead risks can interact 
within one another such that ‘The impacts that some risks have might compound the 
impact of others – so the effect of two risks might be more than the sum of the two 
individual effects thus reflecting systemicity’ (Williams et al., 1997, p.345). These 
impacts can result in non-linear growth in project costs which Eden et al (2005) 
describe as ‘amoebic’ growth.  Coupling this issue with the rising complexity of 
projects the need to attend to interrelationships between risks becomes even more 
apparent.  Indeed Williams (1999) suggests that as projects become more complex, 
conventional project management approaches become less adequate.  
 A conclusion drawn for this research is that, if comprehensive understanding 
project risks is to be achieved, revealing interrelationships between risks that give 
rise to systemicity of risk is necessary. However, in the main, current project risk 
management practices are without a facility to attend to interrelationships between 
risks and therefore opportunities exist to develop techniques in this space.  
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Finally, Maytorena et al. (2004, p.467) point out one further limitation of the 
project risk register which is that ‘its development is typically ad hoc’. The authors do 
not expand on the meaning of ad hoc development but it seems reasonable to 
deduce that the development of the project risk register is without a systematic 
approach and, therefore, potentially a less comprehensive consideration of risks is 
being achieved. The implication for this research is that, in future, any techniques 
developed in should attempt to encourage a systematic approach to risk 
consideration.   
In summary, the project risk register clearly has benefits of accessibility due to 
its simplicity, standardisation and efficiency. However, approaches to risk 
management that are founded upon conventional project management theory, as 
the PRR is, are likely to leave projects vulnerable to two forms of risk - ‘soft’ risks 
and systemicity of risk. This is because the underlying theory has an inability to 
account for human risks and interrelationships between risks. Moreover, it appears 
that the PRR in particular has no systematic means of development thus wide 
consideration of risk is perhaps not taking place.  
Based upon a review of the literature, the following section explores the use of a 
systemic modelling perspective to project risk management as a means of attending 
to the limitations of the typical conventional approach of using a PRR and thus 
enhancing the management of project risks. Furthermore, the section attends to the 
second research question identified earlier in this chapter of  
• How can knowledge about systems of factors that can influence overruns 
in projects be put to use to by practitioners to mitigate overruns in current 
and prospective projects? 
 
2.4.3 Systemic Modelling Techniques for Project Risk Management 
As well as being used for developing understanding of the behaviour of project 
overruns, systemic modelling approaches have been shown to offer value in the 
management of risk in projects. Although the systemic modelling approach has been 
applied within project management, the application of approach to risk management 
is still novel (Maytorena et al., 2004, Ackermann et al., 2014) thus presenting a 
fruitful area of development for this study. 
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Williams (2004) attributes much of the work in the systemic modelling space to 
two teams of researchers, one team originated from the University of Strathclyde, 
and the other from PA Consulting. Thus work by these two teams would seem to 
offer a good start point for consideration. Williams (2004) however observed that in 
comparison to the University of Strathclyde approach, the PA Consulting method to 
systemic modelling was sparsely described within the research literature. None the 
less, sufficient literature exists to provide a brief overview of recent developments 
from both teams, as well as others, which is then followed by a critical review of the 
approaches in order to reveal where new techniques might best focus attention. 
In the main, the approaches used for systemic modelling of project risk revolve 
around the use of qualitative modelling (Ackermann et al., 2014), quantitative 
modelling in particular system dynamics (SD) (Cooper, 1993b, Lyneis and Ford, 
2007) or a combination of the two Howick et al. (2008). The approach used by the 
PA consulting team focuses largely on the use of quantitative modelling using 
system dynamics (Cooper, 1993c)) (albeit that qualitative modelling through 
influencing diagramming is a precursory step to the development of the SD model). 
An example of this approach is Godlewski et al. (2012) which describes the 
development of a system dynamics (SD) model at the Fluor corporation and was 
used to foresee the cost and time implications of changes to projects, as well as to 
simulate the effects of management actions in response to these changes. The 
model is reported as having added significant value, with suggested savings having 
been achieved that exceed $800m over 100 projects. 
Use of qualitative modelling techniques has also begun to demonstrate 
significant value for the management of project risks. For example, Ackermann et al. 
(2014) recently reported on their development and application of a risk management 
workshop using causal mapping to explore the risks associated with the 
development of a new power station to supply a remote island in Scotland. On the 
basis of feedback canvassed from participants, perceived benefits of the approach 
included the ability to reveal and illustrate a comprehensive suite of risks that was 
thought not possible by participants using conventional approaches. Furthermore, 
participants suggested that the causal mapping technique encouraged consideration 
of interrelationships between risks (systemicity of risk) rather than treating risks as 
insulated from one another as might be the case with traditional approaches. Finally, 
and related to the previous two points, participants of the workshops noted that the 
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approach offered the ability to see the bigger picture view i.e. to see the individual 
risks within the context of the whole system of risks.  
A further approach to systemic risk modelling is to mix qualitative and 
quantitative modelling techniques such as the use influence diagrams as a first step 
toward quantitative modelling techniques (Huseby and Skogen, 1992, Dikmen et al., 
2007). For example, Tah and Carr (2001, p.174) develop what they refer to as a ‘risk 
structure map’ which is used to support identification of sources of risk and the 
relationships between them as a precursor to quantitative modelling using fuzzy 
logic. An excerpt from a qualitative model used by Dikmen et al. (2007) is presented 
below: 
 
Figure 2 Example of qualitative model (except from Dikmen et al. (2007)) 
Neither, Dikmen et al. (2007) or Tah and Carr (2001) indicate how influence 
diagrams that are used to identify risks and their relationships is arrived at. 
However, Dikmen et al’s (p.497) comments that the qualitative risk models are 
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‘basic assumptions’ of the process’ which suggests that the influence diagrams are 
defined a priori rather reflecting the actuality of projects. 
Ackermann et al. (2007) also use a form of influence diagram, causal mapping, 
as a step in the development of their risk filter tool. The authors explain that the risk 
filter is a questionnaire that offers assessment of project risk at the beginning and 
during the life of a project, the analysis of which is achieved through quantitative 
modelling (Monte Carlo method). Unlike the approach of Dikmen et al. (2007) and 
Tah and Carr (2001), however, the causal model that forms the basis of the risk filter 
is not a standard a priori model but rather is developed from in depth interviews with 
project participants. The consequence of using causal mapping and in depth 
interviews is maps that are far richer in detail and thus give a more nuanced 
understanding of risk. Moreover, developing the maps from the ground up, as it 
were, does not restrict thinking to those areas of risk identified by a framework that 
has been defined a priori.  
A further example of using causal mapping with quantiative modelling is 
described in Howick et al (2008). The authors provide insight into their ‘modelling 
cascade’, an integrated methodology for transitioning in an auditable manner from 
qualitative data that is first captured in causal maps to quantitative system dynamics 
models.   
It is also worthy of note that critical success/failure factor research has also 
sought to convey the relationships between factors that can influence project 
outcomes (Fortune and White (2006), Belassi and Tukel (1996)). The approach 
used by Belassi and Tukel (1996) was to gather factors into similar types whereas 
Fortune and White (2006) grafted the success and failure factors on to a pre-existing 
conceptual framework. While both frameworks are valuable, the identified 
relationships between factors are not based upon the actuality of projects leading 
back to the issue of whether theory is representative of complex project reality.  
 
2.4.3.1 Critical Review of Systemic Approaches to Risk Management 
There are clearly a number of options available for the management of project 
risk using a systemic modelling approach however they largely boil down to a choice 
of quantitative and qualitative modelling techniques. While quantitative techniques 
like system dynamics have added much value to project management, Rodriguez 
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and Bowers (1996, p.219) conclude that application of the technique is ‘still relatively 
rare’. This rarity is perhaps a consequence of three interrelated barriers that the 
authors make reference to – sophistication, skills and cost. SD models are far more 
sophisticated than conventional approaches to the management of project risk such 
as the project risk register. Sophistication of the models means they are not as 
readily accessible to project staff because of the need for specialist skills for 
construction and management of SD models. With specialist skills, comes additional 
costs and thus impacting on the cost efficiency of the risk management process. A 
further barrier was identified by Loosemore and Cheung (2015) who found that a 
systems approach challenges conventional thinking and practices which are deeply 
embedded within the practitioner community.  
The implication for this thesis is that, while quantitative modelling using the likes 
of SD might be valuable, wide spread application of quantitative models to projects 
is likely to be problematic due to the sophistication of the technique, the specialist 
skills and associated cost of application.  
The use of qualitative modelling through, for example risk workshops also has 
barriers to access. While the approach might appear less sophisticated than the 
development of quantitative models, risk workshops require significant specialist 
facilitation skill as well as expert ability in the associated causal mapping technique. 
Indeed, beyond the developers of the systemic risk workshop approach (Ackermann 
and Eden, 2005, Ackermann et al., 2014) there are no examples within the literature 
of practitioner driven applications which is perhaps a reflection of the challenges.  
Reflecting upon the research question below (set out earlier in this chapter) in 
light of the foregoing discussion: 
• How can knowledge about systems of factors that can influence overruns 
in projects be put to use to by practitioners to mitigate overruns in current 
and prospective projects? 
The literature suggests that there are a number of tools and techniques available 
to support a systemic approach to risk management. However, it also appears that 
there stands a chasm between these techniques and adoption by the wider project 
management practitioner population because they (techniques) require significant 
specialist skill and associated investment to implement. Moreover, the foregoing 
review of literature suggests that systemic modelling challenges current custom and 
practice of project risk management which perhaps further obstructs the adoption of 
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systemic modelling techniques. Thus the final element of this chapter is to consider 
how the research reported in this thesis document aims to attend to the research 
question above. 
 
2.4.3.2 Next Steps for the Development of Systemic Risk Modelling  
Given the context above is seems that the development of a technique or tool 
that can draw upon the characteristics of current approaches to project risk 
management and that of a systemic modelling approach could offer a first step in 
making systemic modelling more accessible to a wider practitioner population. In 
essence achieving a ‘light touch’ approach to systemic modelling of project risk, one 
that has the benefits of a conventional approach, in terms of simplicity, accessibility, 
cost and efficiency but also brings to bear the benefits of systemic modelling in 
terms of comprehensiveness of risk consideration and systemicity of risk.  
What is proposed by this author is that the factors, and the relationships 
between them, that are revealed from the investigation of project overrun in this 
research be used to develop a qualitative causal model of project risks. 
Consequently, the model will be based upon empirical analysis of actual projects 
and should, therefore, be a more closer resemblance of project actualities than the 
deployment of an a priori model (used by the likes of Dkimen et al. (2007)).  
It is proposed here, that the development of a qualitative causal model of project 
risks could attend to the issues concerning the adoption of systemic modelling 
techniques by practitioners in the following ways: 
Attending to Cost and Skill Associated with Systemic Risk Modelling 
As noted earlier, specialist knowledge and associated costs of implementing 
current systemic modelling techniques can be a barrier to practitioner use. Exploring 
risks in a conceptual form would keep the level of sophistication and consequently 
minimise the need for specialist knowledge and associated costs making the tool 
accessible to a broad base of project participants.  
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Attending to Comprehensive Coverage of Risks  
A model that reveals potential sources of risk at a conceptual level could be 
used to support PM’s (and other project participants) in a simple but effective way to 
open their mental antenna to the multitude of risks that can face a project. 
Attending to the Systemicity of Risk  
Using a systemic modelling approach to construct the model would reveal 
potential interrelationships between risk sources. Representing these relationships 
might help practitioners see through the complexity of interrelated risks (Williams et 
al., 2012) but more generally might encourage the behaviour of considering risk 
systemicity and, consequently, reveal new sources of risk and relationships that are 
particular to their specific context. 
A Segue to other Systemic ModellingTechniques  
A conceptual model could provide a segue forward into the adoption of more 
sophisticated techniques. The simplicity of a conceptual model might serve to 
encourage the adoption of systemic modelling techniques thus introducing 
practitioners to the basic ideas and benefits associated with a systemic modelling 
approach. Consequently this might encourage the pursuit of more sophisticated 
tools such as risk workshops or system dynamic models.  
A conceptual model could also provide a segue back from a systemic view of 
project risk to the use of more conventional tools such as the project risk register 
(PRR). For example, a model of project risks could be used to elicit, understand, 
and assess project risks in light of their relationships with one another and then be 
deconstructed into a PRR. Thus the assessment of risk in the PRR would be 
informed by risk systemicity, albeit that the risks would be presented in a typical 
PRR format and the visibility of risk systemicity, therefore hidden. Nevertheless, the 
PRR is a conventional and thus more accepted practice than systemic modelling. 
Presenting risks in a PRR format would allow for the gradual introduction of a 
systemic approach. 
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2.5 PROJECT OVERRUNS AND THE PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE (PFI) 
2.5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in section 2.1, the research presented in this thesis was conducted 
with an organisation - a construction company called BuildIt. Pettigrew (1997, p.343) 
stresses that when researchers conduct studies in organisational settings they must 
be aware that they have ‘no god given right to expect other people’s organisations to 
be their laboratories’. The researcher therefore cannot expect to design their study a 
priori and then simply demand their host organisation to provide access to particular 
data, departments or people that meet the needs of their study. Instead, Pettigrew 
(1997, p.286) advises researchers to engage in a ‘reciprocal relationship’ with the 
organisation whereby the researcher gives something back to the organisation (for 
example research findings or running workshops) in return for access to parts of the 
organisation and its data. In this arrangement the two parties work together to shape 
and focus the research in ways that can meet their respective needs.  
Following Pettigrew’s advice, the author of this thesis worked closely with his 
host organisation (BuildIt), shaping the research in a way that could meet the needs 
of the study but also those of BuiltIt. This process is discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 3 but in summary it led the study to centre upon the investigation of a 
particular type of project – the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Consequently, this 
penultimate section of the literature review focuses specifically on the extant 
literature concerning PFI projects so as to accurately frame the research questions 
and corresponding research findings.  
To set the scene and provide background, the section opens with context to the 
Private Finance Initiative as a form of contracting to deliver public services. 
Academic interest in PFI projects is then examined, revealing the types of research 
that have already taken place and identifying gaps in the literature to which this 
thesis might attend. Attention is then turned to the PFI project lifecycle which is 
found to include the operational phase, a feature that puts PFI projects in tension 
with the conventional view of the project lifecycle as espoused in the project 
management literature. Supported by extant literature, the section then goes on to 
argue that the conventional life cycle model must be extended to include the 
operational phase when working in the context of PFI projects. If not, the conceptual 
basis of research will be inconsistent with the actuality of the projects being studied. 
Finally, literature concerning the phenomenon of project overruns in PFI projects in 
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particular is examined. It is found that although the performance of PFI projects 
concerning overruns is generally reported as good, PFI’s are in no way immune to 
the phenomenon. Most significantly, it is found that there are currently no empirical 
studies of cost overrun in the operational phase of PFI projects, presenting a fruitful 
avenue for this thesis to make a significant contribution to knowledge.  
 
 
2.5.2 Context to the Private Finance Initiative  
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a form of contract that has been used by 
governments around the world as a means of investing in public services (Bing et 
al., 2005a). Many different types of public services have been delivered using the 
PFI approach including hospitals, schools, roads and bridges (Bing et al., 2005b). 
Such projects are of central concern to governments because of the important 
contribution they make to a country’s social and economic welfare. However, they 
are also incredibly expensive to deliver which presents a challenge to budget 
constrained governments. To overcome this challenge, governments have turned to 
Private Finance Initiative contracts as a means of engaging the private sector to 
deliver these important projects (Osborne, 2000).   
In a PFI contract government ‘delegates responsibility to the private sector to 
design, construct, finance, operate and maintain infrastructure projects that would 
normally be the responsibility of national government working on its own’ (Turner, 
2004, p.350). Thus in a PFI project it is the private sector not the public sector that 
finances, designs, builds and operates facilities. The private sector then uses the 
facilities to provide public services in return for a charge to the public sector (Ball 
and King). Although each PFI project will have its own contractual nuances, typically 
the project will involve a public sector client (e.g. NHS, education department or 
roads department) engaging a consortium of private organisations (also referred to 
as ‘the service provider’ or the ‘concessionaire’) for a period of around 25-30 years. 
Akintoye suggests that the private sector consortium is likely to comprise of a main 
contractor, finance institutions, specialist consultants (e.g. health planners), and a 
maintenance company. As discussed above, a number of important public projects 
have been delivered using this approach.  
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2.5.3 Academic Interest in PFI Projects 
PFI projects have received growing interest from the academic community.  In 
their review of PFI literature between 1998 and 2003 Ke et al. (2009) found that 
early research focused largely on just three topics (risk, procurement and finance). 
However, a more recent review by Tang et al. (2010) suggests a significant 
broadening of research topics to include innovation (Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser, 
2008), project success factors (Zou et al., 2014), transaction costs (Reeves, 2008), 
concession periods (Xu et al., 2012) performance assessment (Love et al., 2015, 
Akbiyikli, 2013, Hodge and Greve, 2007) and value for money (Gaffney et al., 1999, 
Akintoye et al., 2003, Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2010).  
However, despite growing research on PFI projects, Yuan et al. (2009) point out 
that there remains a significant gap in the literature. Yuan et al.’s (2009, p.256) 
review of PFI literature revealed that the majority of extant research was conducted 
at a macro-level of analysis, examining PFI’s ‘at a broad social or organisational 
level’. Research at this level of analysis has examined for example finance 
structuring (Turner, 2004), the rationale for the PFI model (Hodge and Greve, 2005, 
Roehrich et al., 2014), the costs of the PFI procurement process (Tang et al., 2010) 
as well as risk allocation/sharing between public and private sectors  (Grimsey and 
Lewis, 2002, McDowall, 2003, Bing et al. 2005a). Yuan et al (2009) points out that 
the emphasis on macro-level research has left a ‘significant gap’ in current 
understanding of PFI’s concerning the ‘micro-level’ processes of managing these 
projects. The authors suggest that all factors, not just the macro ones ‘must be 
considered if they may affect the process, implementation and success’ of PFI 
projects (Yuan et al., 2009, p.256).  
Examining literature in the prevailing period since Yuan et al’s (2009) finding, a 
small number of studies have emerged that take a more fine grained approach to 
research. For example, El-Gohary et al. (2006) examined the management of 
project stakeholders using an in-depth case study, Holmes et al. (2006) conducted a 
qualitative fine grained study of health care projects from bid stage through to 
construction, De Lemos et al. (2004) conducted a case study of the Lusoponte 
bridge project in Portugal, and Edelenbos and Teisman (2008) conducted an in-
depth study of a road infrastructure project. However, despite these contributions to 
fine grained understanding of PFI projects, research at the macro-level remains the 
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dominant approach and so the ‘significant gap’ identified by Yuan et al. (2009) 
largely remains.  
Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2010) offer an explanation for the lack of fine grained 
studies of PFI projects. The authors suggest that commercial confidentialities 
surrounding PFI projects are so significant that PFI’s are almost impregnable by 
researchers, hampering access to the detailed data needed for fine grained studies. 
Consequently, PFI research tends to be based upon publically available data which 
is usually reported at the macro-level.  
The lack of fine grained studies of PFI projects presents a gap in the literature to 
which this thesis can attend. This is because the research adopts a systemic 
modelling perspective on projects (as discussed in section 2.3), a perspective that is 
concerned with gaining nuanced understanding of project realities through fine 
grained study. Furthermore, the research is conducted by working directly with a 
construction company (BuildIt), mitigating the barrier identified by Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert concerning accessing the detailed data needed for in-depth study of PFI 
projects. Based upon the foregoing points therefore, this thesis has the potential to 
attend to the current gap in literature for fine-grained study of PFI projects and 
contribute new insights that offer nuanced understanding of these projects.  
 
2.5.4 Reconceptualising the Project Lifecycle for Researching PFI’s  
One of the distinguishing features of PFI contracts touched upon above is the 
inclusion of the operational phase as part of the project lifecycle (Ive 2004). In a 
traditional design and build contract, for example, the operational phase does not 
form part of the project. The private sector is contracted to deliver physical 
infrastructure which is then handed over to the client to operate. In a PFI contract 
however the project is not transferred to the client after construction because the 
private sector is contracted to provide the physical infrastructure and manage its 
ongoing operation. Thus for a consortium delivering a PFI project, the build phase 
(including design and financing) is only part of the project’s lifecycle as they continue 
to be responsible for the project during its operation,. This can include providing 
services such as cleaning, catering and security as well as the ongoing maintenance 
and repair of the physical infrastructure.  
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The inclusion of the operational phase in the PFI project lifecycle puts PFI’s in 
tension with conventional wisdom espoused in the project management literature 
concerning the project lifecycle. For example, Turner (2009, p.10) asserts that there 
is ‘growing agreement’ within the literature that projects comprise 5 phases of 
‘concept; feasibility; design; execution (construction); and close’, a view that is 
echoed by other academics (Morris, 1994, Kerzner, 2009, Meredith and Mantel, 
2010) as well as practitioner texts such as the PMBOK Guide (PMI, 2004). The 
conventional lifecycle model therefore defines the project as coming to a close 
following the execution (construction) phase. However, as described earlier, 
completion of the build phase in a PFI project does not herald the end of the project 
but rather a key milestone in the project’s lifecycle. Furthermore, the inclusion of the 
operating phase means PFI’s can be 25 – 30 years in duration, challenging the 
conventional wisdom that projects are ‘temporary’ in nature (Lundin and Söderholm, 
1995, Turner and Müller, 2003, PMI, 2004)  
PFI’s are not the only type of project to challenge the conventional wisdom 
concerning the project lifecycle. Projects delivered using other forms of contract 
such as Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) and contracts used in defence that 
must adhere to the Concept-Assessment-Development-Manufacture-In service-
Disposal (CADMID) project life cycle (UK Ministry of Defence, 2012) will present a 
similar challenge. This is because these contracts also define the operational phase 
as being part of the project. What the foregoing suggests is that, when research 
takes place in the context of projects whose contracts define them as including the 
operating phase, there is a need to extend the conceptualisation of the project 
lifecycle to include the operating phase. If not, the conceptual basis of the research 
will be inconsistent with the actuality of the projects being studied. 
Calls to extend the project lifecycle to include the operating phase in project 
contexts such as PFI are beginning to emerge in the literature particularly in relation 
to performance assessment. For example Love et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2015) 
call for the lifecycle to be extended when assessing the performance of PFI projects 
so as to provide a more accurate reflection of the project’s whole life performance. 
Similarly, Artto et al. (2015) points out that project’s continue to provide value-add 
well beyond completion of construction and therefore there is a need to connect the 
construction phase with the operational phase to gain a sense of overall value add. 
Outside of academic research, Turner (2009) cites organisations such as the World 
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Bank who have also adopted alternative models of the project lifecycle for 
performance assessment.  
On the basis of the foregoing points, this thesis adopts a conceptualisation of 
PFI projects that includes the operational phase as part of the project lifecycle. 
Using an alternative conceptualisation of the project lifecycle is consistent with the 
assumption made earlier in this chapter which is that projects are context specific. In 
the context of PFI projects, the contract defines that the project comprises the 
elements of design, build, and operate. Thus, it is necessary to include the operating 
phase in our theoretical conceptualisation of PFI projects such that it accurately 
reflects the actuality of the projects being studied.  
 
2.5.5 Overruns in PFI Projects 
Ive (2004, p.366) suggests that PFI projects ‘have achieved an excellent track 
record of becoming operational at or before contracted date’. On first inspection the 
most recent report from the UK government’s National Audit Office (NAO) on PFI 
project performance appears to substantiate Ive’s (2004) observation, reporting that 
time and cost objectives were met in ‘the majority of PFI projects (NAO, 2009, p.17). 
However, closer examination of the data underlying this statement reveals a 
different perspective - 31% of PFI projects were delivered late and 35% exceeded 
their contract costs. Thus, while it is fair to say that the majority of PFI projects are 
indeed delivered to time and cost, there are a significant proportion that are not. 
Furthermore, the situation with respect to time and cost overrun in PFI projects 
seems to be worsening. The earlier National Audit Office report (NAO, 2003) found 
that 24% of projects overran in time and 22% overran in cost as compared with 31% 
and 35% respectively reported in the 2009 report.  
The figures reported by the NAO suggest that the phenomenon of overruns is 
clearly relevant in the context of PFI projects. As discussed in the previous section, 
this thesis adopts a conceptualisation of PFI projects that sees the operating phase 
as an inherent part of the project lifecycle. Reviewing the PFI literature through this 
conceptual lens reveals that a number of researchers have identified cost overrun 
during the operational phase as a central risk to PFI projects (Bing et al., 2005, 
Kwak et al., 2009, Ke et al., 2010). Yet despite this recognition, to date, there have 
been no empirical research studies of cost overrun during the operational phase of 
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PFI projects. Again, this absence might be explained by Cuthbert and Cuthbert’s 
(2010) observation that strict commercial confidentialities surrounding PFI projects 
act as a barrier to accessing data. However, as discussed earlier, this barrier is 
mitigated in the context of this thesis as a consequence of working with an 
organisation. The implication for this thesis is that any insights gained from empirical 
study of overruns in the operating phase of PFI projects would represent a 
significant contribution to knowledge.  
In summary, the literature reviewed in this section has revealed that there is a 
lack of fine grained studies of PFI projects. Moreover, there is an absence of studies 
examining the phenomenon of overrun during the operating phase of PFI’s even 
though the literature has identified cost overrun in the operating phase is known as a 
critical risk in PFI projects. The conclusion drawn is that the landscape of existing 
PFI research presents an opportunity for this thesis to make a significant 
contribution to knowledge if the findings generated through fine grained study of PFI 
projects reveal insights into the phenomenon of overruns in the operating phase of 
PFI projects.  
Based upon the preceding review of the literature the aims of the thesis are thus 
refined to the following: 
• To identify the factors, and the relationships between them, that describe 
a system of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects, and subsequently   
• To use the knowledge gained about the system of factors to develop a 
conceptual model that could be put to use by practitioners to mitigate 
overruns in current and prospective PFI projects. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of this study is the phenomenon of overrun in projects. In order to 
inform the development of research questions that could further the existing 
knowledge base on the phenomenon, a critical review of the extant literature was 
conducted. 
The review revealed that despite growing experience with projects and a 
burgeoning knowledge base, organisations are frequently left defeated by projects 
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that are late, exceed their budgets or fail to meet other expectations. The conclusion 
drawn was that more research needs to be done to better understand why projects 
exhibit the behaviour of overruns such that they might be managed in a way that 
mitigates this behaviour.  
The review found that the topic of overruns has already been the subject of 
research but it was revealed that the tendency has been toward exploring 
collections of discrete factors or individual factors with less emphasis on the 
relationships between factors. The literature suggested that the relationships 
between factors are of equal importance as the factors themselves because, in 
practice, factors do no operate in isolation from one another. Instead, they interact 
with one another. A conclusion was thus drawn that if further understanding of 
project overruns was to be gained, then future research would benefit from adopting 
a perspective that attends to both factors and their relationships. The review 
revealed that one such perspective was that of systemic modelling.  
Systemic modelling conceives of project behaviour as the manifestation of 
factors that are interlinked with one another to form a system of factors. The review 
found that by understanding how the whole system of factors operates, systemic 
modelling has been able to unlock understanding of complex project behaviours 
such as overruns. Despite these valuable insights, however, the literature suggests 
that this perspective is a departure from conventional project management theory. 
The nature of the departure was explored and it was found that leading researchers 
have called for the adoption of alternative perspectives on projects due to perceived 
inadequacies of the conventional view. Consequently, it was concluded that the 
adoption of a systemic modelling perspective is both warranted and in demand. 
The review then turned attention to the practice of project risk management 
(PRM) as a means of mitigating project overruns. Again, the literature suggested 
that, in and of themselves, conventional perspectives on PRM are inadequate for 
mitigating the behaviour of overruns in projects because they leave projects 
vulnerable to two types of risk that influence overruns – ‘soft’ risks and systemicity of 
risk. The review found that a systemic approach to risk management offers a way 
forward to attend to this vulnerability but that developments and applications of this 
approach were still relatively rare in project management.  
Exploring literature on existing systemic risk management techniques within 
project management, the review posited that the rarity might be due to a number of 
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barriers to adoption such as the high level of sophistication, skill level and cost 
associated with existing tools. Two conclusions were drawn. Firstly, that the rarity of 
techniques offers a fruitful avenue for new developments of tools to support a 
systemic approach to project risk management, and secondly, that the development 
of new tools should attend to the identified barriers to adoption.  
Finally, the review explored literature surrounding PFI projects, reflecting the 
thesis’ particular focus on this type of project. The review found that despite a 
growing research base understanding and enhancing knowledge of PFI’s ‘continues 
to be a matter of significance and importance’ (Kwak et al., p.51). In particular, the 
review revealed a gap in the literature which is that there have been no empirical 
studies of cost overruns in the operating phase of PFI projects, presenting this 
thesis with an opportunity to make a significant contribution to knowledge. 
Based upon the preceding review of the literature the aims of this thesis were as 
follows: 
• To identify the factors, and the relationships between them, that describe 
a system of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects, and subsequently   
• To use the knowledge gained about the system of factors to develop a 
conceptual model that could be put to use by practitioners to mitigate 
overruns in current and prospective PFI projects. 
The next section describes the research methodology that was adopted to 
attend to these aims.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.0 CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
The overarching goal for this study is to make a contribution to the academic 
body of knowledge within the field of project management. To achieve this goal, the 
contribution must be assessed as being of scientific quality. The three metrics most 
often used to assess quality in the methodological literature are validity, reliability 
and replication (Johnson and Harris, 2002). 
In order to attend to these metrics this chapter provides a clear and full 
explanation of the approach to research in this study. To explain the approach in a 
coherent manner, the chapter is split into two parts. Part A focuses on explaining the 
theory of methods (methodology) that underpins the approach, examining the 
aspects of research philosophy, research procedure (strategy), research design, 
research method and research techniques. Part B concerns the practical application 
of the approach to research, focusing on data collection and data analysis.  
 
3.1 PART A – THEORY OF METHODS 
This section focuses upon the theory of methods (methodology) that 
underpinned our approach to research. In particular, the section explains the theory 
that informed each of the methodological choices associated with the approach to 
research. The methodological choices that are examined concern research 
philosophy; research procedure (strategy), research design, research method, and 
research technique. The four terms in italics have abundance of meaning within the 
methodological literature, for example, what Bryman and Bell (2011) refer to as a 
design, Saunders (2009) calls a strategy, and Yin (2009) a method. In all three 
instances reference is being made to a case study.  In order to avoid 
misunderstandings between the researcher and reader, presented below is the 
author’s understanding of the four terms based upon reading of methodological 
literature (Danermark et al., 2002, Sayer, 1992, Saunders, 2009, Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2008, Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
• Research procedure (or strategy) –describes the dominant persuasion of the 
study whether qualitative or quantitative.  
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• Research design – describes the overall design of the study, examples of 
which include experiment, survey and case study. 
• Research method – the data collection methods included as part of the 
research design such as interviews and questionnaires. 
• Research technique – the techniques, included as part of the research 
method which focus on elicitation, capture and analysis of data. 
In attending to the above aspects, a fundamental aim of this section is to instil 
confidence in the reader that the approach to research was developed in a rigorous 
and thoughtful manner. To achieve this aim the section: 
• Reveals the logic underpinning each of the choices.  
• Demonstrates that the choices are informed by sound reasoning and a 
rounded understanding of methodological issues.  
• Demonstrates that, while the approach is derived from individual choices, the 
choices are logically compatible with one another and thus form a cohesive 
approach to research that will generate credible findings that can be 
accepted into the extant body of research 
• Attempts to synchronise the reader’s methodological expectations with those 
of this research study 
 
3.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
3.2.1 Section Overview 
This section explains the author’s choice of research philosophy, critical realism 
(Bhaskar, 1975, 2008),  in light of possible alternatives. Two main varieties of 
research philosophy are examined, one underpinned by relativist ontological 
assumptions and the other by realist ontological assumptions. It is revealed that the 
author’s understanding of projects, as set out in the preceding chapter, is more 
compatible with realist assumptions than those of relativism. Consequently, the field 
of view is focused on realist approaches to research.  
A review of methodological literature reveals that empiricism and critical realism 
are the two main realist approaches to research. The review of literature also finds 
that empiricist assumptions underpin a positivist approach to research, an approach 
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that has been used extensively in the study of projects (Smyth and Morris, 2007). 
Consequently, it is suggested that positivism is a contextually relevant alternative 
with which to draw comparison with critical realism. 
With the field of view narrowed to a discussion of positivism and critical realism 
as two alternative realist approaches to research, close examination and 
comparison of these alternatives is conducted. The examination finds positivisms 
epistemic assumptions and its corresponding approach to explanation to be 
incompatible with the needs of this research study. Drawing comparison with a 
positivist approach, the alternative critical realist approach is then shown to offer 
epistemic assumptions and a form of explanation that is more consistent with the 
needs of this study.   
To provide a rounded assessment of critical realism, its limitations are explored. 
It is revealed that knowledge claims are fallible, temporary and are, by comparison 
to positivism, limited in their generalizability. However, it is argued that a) these 
knowledge claims are consistent with the emerging understanding of projects as 
being contingent in nature; b) critical realist research can make a strong contribution 
to theories of project management; and c) that critical realist knowledge claims are 
logically consistent with Merton’s (1968) middle range theory, a type of theory that 
has been called for in project management research (Packendorff, 1995, Söderlund, 
2004, Bredillet, 2013)  but as yet has not been unified with a critical realist 
methodology.   
Finally, while diversity of methodologies within a field can lead to fragmentation 
of ideas and thus limit theoretical progress (Söderlund, 2012), it is shown that the 
adoption of critical realism offers the opportunity to develop new theoretical 
perspectives that can be convergent with the existing body of extant positivist-based 
research. Consequently, adopting a critical realist approach contributes to an 
agenda of theoretical progress rather than theoretical fragmentation and also 
attends calls from leading academics in the field for researchers to explore projects 
from new perspectives (Turner et al, 2010, Söderlund, 2012, Bredillet, 2013,).  
Figure 3 provides the reader with an overview of the structure of this section as 
well as the underlying questions being attended to in each of its sub-sections and 
the intended contribution of each sub-section to the thesis.   
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 Sub-
Section 
Underlying Questions 
Being Attended to 
Intended Contribution of Sub-
Section to Thesis 
3.2.2 Context Why is examination of 
philosophical assumptions 
necessary? 
 
 
What is the methodological 
state of the art in project 
management? 
 
Where does critical realism 
feature in PM research? 
 
Contribute to reader confidence that the 
approach to research is informed by a 
rounded knowledge of methodological 
issues. 
 
Reveal the dominance of positivist-
based approaches to researching 
projects.  
 
 
Reveal the scarcity of critical realist 
approaches to PM research and 
opportunities for contributing to 
methodological PM knowledge  
 
Inform the positioning of a critical realist 
contribution within the project 
management literature in later sub-
sections.  
3.2.3 Realism & 
Relativism – 
Two Main 
Varieties of 
Research 
What are the assumptions of 
these two varieties of 
research? & how do they 
compare with our 
understanding of project 
realities? 
 
 
Demonstrate the logical consistency of 
choosing realism over relativism for our 
study of overruns in projects by making 
transparent the compatibility of realist 
assumptions with our understanding of 
projects as well as illuminate the 
incompatibilities of relativist 
assumptions. 
 
3.2.4 Comparison 
of Two 
Particular 
Realist 
Approaches 
to Research  
What are the particular 
ontological assumptions of 
the realist philosophies of 
critical realism and 
positivism?  
What is it about critical 
realism that makes it more 
compatible with the needs of 
this study than positivism? 
 
Demonstrate the logical consistency of 
choosing critical realism over positivism 
for our study of overruns in projects 
3.2.5 The 
Structure of 
a Critical 
Realist 
Explanation 
What does a critical realist 
explanation look like? 
Provide the reader with forward visibility 
of the type of explanation being aimed 
for by this study of overruns in projects.  
3.2.6 Critical 
Realism – 
Implications 
for 
Contributing 
to Theory  
What claims can justifiably 
be made about theory 
developed using a critical 
realist approach to 
research? 
 
 
How is theory developed 
using a critical realist 
approach positioned with 
respect to the extant PM 
research, the majority of 
which is positivist-based? 
Synchronise the reader’s expectations 
with those of the research by providing 
forward visibility of its ambitions with 
respect to contributing to theory.  
 
Demonstrate that a critical realist 
contribution to PM knowledge is 
different to, but not separate from, the 
extant body of work because the 
knowledge is complementary to existing 
positivist generated knowledge (and 
vice versa). 
   .   
 
Figure 3 Structure of Research Philosophy Section 
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3.2.2 Context 
Philosophy of research is central to inquiry. A philosophy of research 
encapsulates a set of assumptions concerning the nature of reality (ontological 
assumptions) and the nature of knowledge (epistemological assumptions) 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Consequently, it determines the methods that are 
appropriate for inquiry (Morgan and Smircich, 1980) and defines what claims can 
justifiably be made about knowledge produced from inquiry (Creswell, 2009). 
Philosophies of research can be classified into individual paradigms (Kuhn, 
1996), each having its own particular slant on ontological and epistemological 
issues. A number of paradigms are available to the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 
2011) but none can categorically be claimed ‘the best’ for inquiry (Söderlund, 2012, 
p.42). Consequently, there is no default paradigm that readers of a research study 
can assume has been used to guide the inquiry.  
Explanation of the research philosophy used to guide inquiry is therefore 
necessary to allow the reader to harmonise their expectations toward the methods 
and knowledge claims associated with the particular paradigm that has been 
adopted. However, simply stating the name of the paradigm is insufficient because 
available paradigms are often without a unified, static definition. For example, the 
long established ‘scientific’ paradigm of positivism is described by Bryman and Bell 
(2011) as difficult to pin down in terms of a precise definition. Furthermore, 
proponents of a particular paradigm may disagree with one another on its 
particularities, and over time they may even ‘disagree with themselves’ (Easterbury-
Smith et al., 2008, p.22). Consequently, though the researcher and reader might 
recognise the same label of a paradigm they might diverge in their understandings 
of the assumptions which it constitutes. This lack of synchronisation of researcher 
and reader understandings could lead otherwise valid choices of method and claims 
about knowledge to be brought into question by the reader (Creswell, 2009), thus 
creating a situation whereby credibility of the research is threatened.  
This section aims to avoid this situation. It provides a clear statement of the 
philosophy of research used to guide inquiry and a full explanation of the authors 
understanding of it with a view to aiding the reader to orientate their expectations 
toward the methods and knowledge claims associated with the philosophy of 
research, case critical realism. 
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In preparation for this philosophy of research section, a review of the project 
management literature was conducted to get a sense of the methodological state of 
the art within the domain. Two findings were made that are pertinent to this section 
in particular and the study more generally. First, while there might be no ‘best’ 
approach to research, within project management research there is a dominant 
approach – that of positivism (Williams, 2005, Smyth and Morris, 2007). Prominent 
researchers have drawn attention to the emergence of alternative approaches to 
researching projects and emphasised the value of multiple perspectives within the 
domain (Pollack, 2007, Winch, 2004, Turner et al, 2010, Bredillet, 2013). However, it 
would appear that the domain of projects remains stubbornly tied to positivist-based 
research and, therefore, it would seem that choosing a critical realist approach to 
guide this research study is a departure from the norm, further emphasising the 
need for explanation of the choice.  
The second finding from the review of the literature is that critical realism has 
only been recently introduced as an approach to research in project management 
(Smyth and Morris, 2007). Since then, there have been no explicit instances of its 
application in the central journals of project management research – IJPM, PMJ. 
Smyth and Morris (2007, p.427) suggested their aim was to introduce critical realism 
as a ‘possibility’ and to ‘stimulate consideration of this option among researchers’ 
rather than provide a detailed exposition of the approach (which they leave to future 
research projects). Consequently, important gaps in contextualising critical realism 
within project management research remain. Gaps include elucidation of how it is 
that critical realism can have concern for the particular and the general (Smyth and 
Morris, 2007). Little discussion has been had in the context of project management 
research concerning connecting the approach with appropriate methods. Nor has it 
been brought to light how a critical realist contribution ‘fits’ with an extant PM 
research base that, as noted earlier, is largely positivist orientated (Williams, 2005). 
By adopting a critical realist approach to research, the above gaps present 
potential threats to, and opportunities for, this study of overruns in projects. Threats 
emerge, for example, from claims that critical realism has concern for the particular 
and the general when highly regarded researchers such as McGrath (1981) have 
convincingly argued that the researcher can pursue the particular or the general but 
not both in equal measure. This apparent contradiction threatens the methodological 
coherence of a critical realist approach.  
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Opportunities are presented by the gaps in terms of potential contributions to 
methodological knowledge that can be made by attending to the gaps. Contributions 
could take the form of addressing the above apparent contradiction, illuminating 
methods that can be compatible with a critical realist approach, and finally 
establishing how findings using a critical realist approach relate to findings in the 
extant literature, the majority of which have been generated by an alternative realist 
approach of positivism.  
To summarise, the aims for this and proceeding sections are firstly to reinforce 
the credibility of research findings by demonstrating a logically coherent approach to 
research, and secondly to make a methodological contribution to PM knowledge by 
elucidating a critical realist approach to researching overruns in projects and further 
demonstrating that critical realism is a logically coherent approach that ‘stacks up’ 
as appropriate for the study of projects.  
Given the lack of attention to critical realism in project management and the 
need to ground the discussion within extant literature, the following sections 
necessarily make use of literature sources from other disciplines (e.g. social 
sciences) where critical realism has received much more attention and its features 
have been elucidated in depth.  
The start point for discussion is to examine the underlying ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of the two main varieties of research philosophy - 
realism and relativism.  
 
3.2.3 Realism and Relativism - Two Main Varieties of Research 
Although there are many research philosophies to choose from (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980) the choice can be distilled down to two opposing varieties - those 
philosophies underpinned by relativist ontological beliefs and those underpinned by 
realist ontological beliefs (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008).  Ontological assumptions are 
concerned with the nature of reality and are therefore ‘the foundation for every other 
assumption we make’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p.18) about our research. Relativist 
based philosophies hold an ontological belief that reality is subjective in nature that it 
is ‘a projection of human imagination’ (Morgan and Smircich, 1980, p.493) and 
therefore deny that ‘there is anything knowable that is independent of mind’ (Collier, 
1994, p.12).  
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Research philosophies with a realist ontology on the other hand are of the 
opinion that reality is in fact objective in nature. In other words, realist philosophies 
claim that reality exists ‘out there….independently of our knowledge of it’ 
(Danermark et al., 2002, p.17). In support of this claim, realist researchers argue 
that ‘Reality simply does not react in accordance with our expectations, but on the 
contrary with considerable autonomy’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p.18) and therefore 
reality must be external to the observer.  
Various realist researchers provide propositions  that support the argument for 
an external, autonomous reality (Sayer, 1992, Danermark et al., 2002, Fleetwood 
and Ackroyd, 2004). These propositions resonate strongly with this authors 
understanding of project realities set out in the literature review chapter. For 
example, one proposition is that mistakes are made. Project management research 
has shown that mistakes can be made, for example, during project bid development. 
A second proposition is that reality takes us by surprise. Project stakeholders are 
taken by surprise when their project is not going according to the plan. Another 
proposition is that wishful thinking does not work. If wishful thinking worked in 
projects then there would be little need to better understand the behaviour of project 
to improve their performance since stakeholders could simply wish their project to 
be better. Furthermore, project management research suggests that understanding 
project is not easily achieved through, for example, simple reflection (Williams, 
2004, p.275). This difficulty resonates with the final realist proposition that it takes 
significant effort to understand reality (Sayer, 1992). The consistency of realist 
propositions with the author’s understanding of project realities, suggests that an 
approach to research which is founded upon a realist ontology is an appropriate way 
to proceed in researching project overruns. Thus attention is focused on exploring 
research philosophies underpinned by realist ontology.   
While there are ‘several varieties of realism’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.19), 
Bryman and Bell (2011) suggest the two most prevalent are empirical realism and 
critical realism (Bhaskar, 2008). Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004) point out that it is 
empirical realist ontological assumptions that underpin the positivist paradigm. 
Furthermore, as has been discussed, positivist based approaches are dominant 
within project management research (Smyth and Morris, 2007). Thus, positivism 
provides a contextually relevant alternative paradigm with which to draw 
comparisons with critical realism because it is both a realist paradigm and has been 
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used extensively in researching projects. Consequently, the philosophies of critical 
realism and positivism are the focus of the remainder of the discussion.  
 
3.2.4 Comparison of Alternative Realist Approaches 
Although the paradigms of critical realism and positivism are both based upon a 
realist ontology, they are not based upon the same realist ontology. In short, the two 
agree that there is a reality ‘out there’ but they differ in what they conceive that 
reality to be like.  Critical realism, for example, conceives of reality as being 
‘stratified’, comprising three ontological levels illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
 
 Pure Empiricism Positivism Critical Realism 
Level of 
reality  Experiences Events Mechanisms/ Powers 
Empirical x x x 
Actual  x x 
Real   x 
 
Figure 4 Critical Realisms Conception of Reality (Adapted 
from Collier, 1994, p.44) 
 
The three levels of reality in Figure 4 are described as the empirical level which 
‘consists of what we experience, directly or indirectly’; the actual ‘where events 
happen whether we experience them or not’ and the level of the real where ‘that 
which can produce events in the world, that which metaphorically can be called 
mechanisms’ exist (Danermark et al., 2002, p.20).  The basic premise of critical 
realism is that reality comprises what we can directly observe or experience of 
events taking place in the actual, but that reality also comprises ‘powers and 
mechanisms which we cannot observe’ which operate in the real level and bring 
events into being (Danermark et al., 2002, p.20). Thus, for critical realism, reality 
comprises of what can and what cannot be directly observed or experienced.   
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By comparison, positivisms model of reality is restricted to what can be observed 
or experienced directly (Figure 4). This restriction is brought about because of 
positivisms epistemic assumption that ‘knowledge is only significant if it is based 
upon scientific measurement’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.22). The belief is that 
the instruments of science (such as observation) can provide unmediated access to 
reality to reach matters of fact or ‘truth’ (Sayer, 1992).   
However, restricting valid knowledge to scientific measurement, in turn, imposes 
ontological restriction, since to be ‘measured’ an entity must have some physical 
properties. Consequently, Fleetwood and Ackroyd, (2004) say the term ‘real’ must 
largely be reserved for things of a physical nature. The logic of this restriction is 
exposed by the authors as having committed an epistemic fallacy whereby 
‘ontological concerns are collapsed into epistemological concerns’ (Fleetwood and 
Ackroyd, 2004, p.29). As Danermark et al. (2002) explain further, positivism reduces 
what there is to what can be known about it, thus conflating epistemic and 
ontological assumptions. Put simply, in a positivist paradigm, reality is forced to 
comprise of scientifically measurable entities, not because that is what reality is like 
but because epistemic assumptions restrict legitimate knowledge to scientific 
measurement. 
Positivism’s epistemological, and thus ontological, stance is problematic for this 
research study. In reviewing project overrun literature, it was revealed that human 
factors such as managerial pressure, politics and social issues can be instrumental 
in bringing about overruns in projects (section 2.3.4). Human factors do not lend 
themselves to the scientific measurement required by positivism and consequently a 
reasonable assertion is that human factors are precluded from the analytical field of 
view in positivist research. 
 This assertion might be met with opposition from claims that sophisticated 
scientific instrumentation can acquire knowledge of human factors. For example, it 
could be argued that a Likert scale can provide knowledge about the extent of 
pressure placed on project staff to meet a particular project milestone. However, it is 
the research participant (subject) that uses a Likert scale to convey to the 
researcher their feeling (a subjective phenomenon) of pressure. Therefore, the 
measurement is not ‘scientific’ in the positivist sense described above of being made 
in an unmediated, objective manner by the researcher. Consequently, if we are to 
adhere to positivist assumptions, then strictly speaking, even where sophisticated 
techniques like Likert scales are used, human factors are still out of analytical reach. 
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Restricting our view of reality to what can be scientifically measured also 
impacts explanation. The components of positivist explanation (data) are events 
taking place in the actual and consequently explanation is reduced to ‘regular 
associations (or ‘constant conjunctions’) of causes and effects’ (Sayer, 1992, p.108) 
of the sort illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The Co-Occurrence of event E following event A 
 
The aim of this research study is to explain causes of overruns in projects. Sayer 
(1992, p.104) suggests that to explain what causes something ‘is to ask what 
‘makes it happen’ or in other words produce a causal explanation that says 
something about ‘why we observe what we observe’ (Hedström and Bearman, 2009, 
p.9). A regularity model of explanation of the sort shown in Figure 5 can provide 
insight into ‘what’ causes overrun but it ‘doesn't answer the question why?’ (Easton, 
2010, p.118) . The aim of this research study is to get beyond recognition of what 
causes project overrun to understanding why such causes maturate to bring about 
the phenomenon of overrun therefore a positivist form of explanation falls short of 
this research study’s needs..   
Critical realism, on the other hand, offers a much deeper form of explanation, 
one that addresses why and how events (such as overruns) can be brought into 
being. This form of explanation is provided by virtue of reality being conceived as 
having a third level, the real, (touched upon earlier, Figure 4) where mechanisms 
exist, which although ‘seldom visible’ (Danermark et al., 2002), bring observed 
events into being. 
The conceptual third level of real is what distinguishes critical realism from other 
forms of realism and allows for a deeper form of explanation (Figure 6) than the 
regularity model of positivism (Figure 5). The reason critical realism is able to 
Observation of co-
occurring events 
taking place in the 
actual  
A  E  
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conceive of a third level of reality is its underlying ontological assumption that 
something (an entity) is ‘real’ ‘if it has an effect or makes a difference’ Fleetwood 
and Ackroyd (2004, p.29). This ontological statement says nothing about how 
knowledge is to be gained about the entity therefore ontological and epistemological 
concerns are kept quite separate in critical realism. This separation means the 
epistemic fallacy encountered by positivism is avoided and thus reality can be 
conceived as more than what is directly visible by scientific means, enabling a 
deeper form of explanation to be achieved.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 A Conceptual model of critical realist explanation                                            
(adapted from Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p.59)) 
When compared to a critical realist explanation, positivist explanation might be 
thought of as providing a shallow form of explanation that focuses on regularly 
observed events.  For critical realism, simply knowing that event E regularly followed 
event A, ‘is not enough’ (Sayer, 1992, p.106). To attain ‘usable knowledge’ 
(Danermark et al., 2002, p. 316) a ‘Deeper explanatory understanding’ is needed. 
This deeper level explains ‘the causal mechanisms that have generated the macro-
level observation’ that E has generally followed A. Critical realism thus recognises 
that scientific explanation ‘necessarily involves observation of events’ (Danermark et 
al., 2002, p.22) but posits that explanation must articulate the mechanism that 
brought the regularity into being. Thus explanation is about ‘postulating (and 
identifying) mechanisms’ that ‘make intelligible the regularities we observe’ (Sayer, 
1992, p.107), a type of explanation that is referred to by Hedström and Bearman, 
2009, p.4) ‘a mechanism-based explanation’. 
The term ‘mechanism’ is  metaphoric  in nature (Danermark et al., 2002, p.20) 
and is used to refer to description of ‘the entities of a causal process that produce 
the effect of interest’  describing the ‘continuous and contiguous chain of causal or 
intentional links between the explanans and the explanandum’ illustrated in Figure 6 
(Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p.50). This mode of inference in which events are 
Observation of co-occurring 
events A and E taking place in the 
actual  
A  E  
B  C
  
D  
Underlying causal mechanism 
existing in the real and explaining 
co-occurring events A and E  
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explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of 
producing them is called ‘retroduction’ (Sayer, 1992, p.106). Hedstrome and 
Bearman (2009, p.3) explain that retroduction is not about guessing what 
mechanisms are like but rather they must be detailed in ‘clear and precise ways’ 
revealing the ‘cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to 
be explained was brought about’. 
 
3.2.5 The Structure of a Critical Realist Explanation 
 The previous section focused on making transparent the rationale for selecting 
a critical realist approach to researching project overruns. This section explores the 
requirements of a critical realist explanation to provide forward visibility of the type of 
explanation being aspired to. 
The term 'causal process' is suggestive that the structure of a mechanism is 
linear and simple of the sort illustrated in Figure 6 above. In fact the structure of a 
mechanism, and thus critical realist explanation, is much more complex. Hedström 
and Ylikoski (2010, p.52) suggest mechanisms are hierarchical in structure where ‘a 
mechanism at one level presupposes or takes for granted the existence of certain 
entities with characteristic properties and activities (mechanisms), it is expected that 
there are lower-level mechanisms that explain them’. The concept of hierarchy is 
illustrated conceptually by Sayer (1992) (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 Conceptual model of the structure of a critical                                                     
realist explanation (Sayer, 1992, p. 112) 
 
Sayer’s (1992) conceptual model (Figure 7) shows that to achieve explanation of 
phenomena using a critical realist methodology means describing a lattice work of 
mechanisms interacting with one another to produce the phenomena. The operation 
of each mechanism within the lattice, itself described with reference to nested 
mechanisms. Only by understanding the whole edifice can an explanation be 
achieved.  
Furthermore, critical realism asserts that the relationship between identified 
mechanisms and their effects is ‘not a given but contingent’  upon the presence of 
appropriate contextual ‘conditions’(Tsoukas, 1994, p. 291).  These ‘conditions’ are 
other entities that have their own causal powers/liabilities’ (mechanisms) (Sayer, 
1992) and which serve to either trigger the identified mechanism or counteract its 
effects. Consequently, context is an integral part of the critical realist model of 
explanation whereby contextual conditions form part of the lattice work which, 
together with the identified mechanism, explains the ‘causal process[es] that 
produce the effect of interest’ (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p.50)  illustrated below 
(Figure 8).   
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Figure 8 Illustration of critical realist explanation of events 
 
Examining Eden et al. (2000) work on disruption and delay through the lens of 
Sayer’s (1992) conceptual model and the language provided by Hedstrome and 
YLikoski, (2010), helps to illustrate the structure of a critical realist explanation in the 
context of project management research. (Though it should be noted that the 
authors do not define that their philosophical position as critical realism).  
 
 
Figure 9 A disruption and delay mechanism (Eden et al. 2000, p.298) 
 
External (contingent) 
relationship 
Internal (necessary) 
relationship 
Entity 
Mechanism 
Conditions 
  Events 
71 
 
Figure 9 illustrates a model of disruption and delay in projects – a D&D 
mechanism. The D&D mechanism is formed from a ‘hierarchy’ of mechanisms. At 
one level of the hierarchy there is a structure comprising a lattice work of two 
mechanisms.  A mechanism that explains delays caused by pressure on staff (staff 
pressure mechanism) and the other describing delays caused by the use of 
overtime (overtime mechanism). These two mechanisms are themselves explained 
by nested mechanisms operating at a lower level in the hierarchy, such as ‘staff 
fatigue’ and ‘staff morale’ (which are themselves a consequence of human 
structure). Thus the D&D mechanism operating at one level is explained by the 
operation of lower level mechanisms (like overtime and pressure) which are 
themselves explained by still lower level mechanisms like fatigue.  As touched upon 
above, it is only by understanding how the whole edifice operates that explanation 
can be achieved.  
 
3.2.6 Critical Realism – Implications for Contributing to Theory 
The previous sub-section provided forward visibility of the sort of explanation 
being aimed for in this study. The agenda for this sub-section is to provide the 
reader with forward visibility of the implications for theory of adopting a critical realist 
approach to investigating overruns in projects. As discussed earlier, (page. 61), 
such implications have received little attention in the project management literature. 
For example, it has not been explained how it is that critical realism can have theory 
concerned with both the particular and the general (Smyth and Morris, 2007) of 
projects, when others have coherently argued that pursuit of both in equal measure 
is futile (McGrath, 1981). Nor has it been brought to light how critical realist theories 
‘fit’ with an extant PM research base that is largely positivist orientated (Williams, 
2005, Bredillet, 2004).  
These gaps could put the coherence of the critical realist approach used in this 
study at threat. Therefore, by attending to the gaps in literature, this sub-section 
aims to demonstrate that critical realism is a logical coherent paradigm suitable for 
the study of projects while at the same time as providing forward visibility to the 
reader of the type of theory being aimed for in this study. The discussion is 
structured around the following characteristics of theory developed using a critical 
realist approach to research: 
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• Theory that is fallible and temporary rather than ‘final’ 
• Theory that is generalisable but not predictive  
• Theory that is of the middle range (Merton, 1968) but is strong  
 
3.2.6.1 Theory that is Fallible and Temporary 
As discussed, explanation in critical realism is about revealing the causal 
mechanisms that bring about phenomena. However, gaining access to these 
mechanisms is problematic since they are ‘seldom directly visible’ (Danermark et al., 
2002, p.22). In fact, it is critical realism’s assertion that accessing any parts of reality 
is not a straight forward matter ‘because we cannot gain access to the world 
independently of the concepts we use’ (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004, p.3). In other 
words access to reality is always mediated by available concepts (e.g. language, 
diagrams, mental images). 
Other realist paradigms argue against the notion of concept mediation. For 
example (as discussed above) positivism asserts that reality is directly accessible 
through application of appropriate scientific methods. Such direct, unmediated 
access is, however, based upon an assumption that ‘thought objects’ (concepts 
such as language, diagrams, mental images) have a one-to-one relationship with 
‘real objects’ (Sayer, 1992, p.47). That is to say, our concepts are direct, 
unequivocal, representations of the real objects being observed and therefore can 
be assumed to be matters of ‘fact’ or ‘truth’.  
Critical realism lays down a simple assertion that rules out the possibility of 
claims for ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ which is that ‘No one can step out of their conceptual 
world and see if reality ‘really exists’ or what it ‘essentially is’’ (Danermark et al., 
2002, p.18). Consequently, claims of a one-to-one relationship between knowledge 
objects and the real object can never be validated. The argument for concept 
mediation is most clearly made by Sayer (1992) through the use of a simple 
example. The author explains that the sun was once ‘known’ to move across the sky 
however the sun did not change, our conceptualisation of it changed.  Thus, even 
the most fundamental of ‘scientific’ measurements, observation, is revealed to be 
concept mediated. 
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That access to reality is always concept mediated has a series of implications for 
the nature of critical realist theories. Since it is not possible to see if our knowledge 
is a direct representation of reality, the best that can be hoped for is knowledge that 
is practically adequate (Sayer, 1992) rather than some ‘ultimate’ or ‘final’ knowledge 
Danermark et al., 2002, p.23) representative of the ‘truth’ or the ‘facts’ about reality.  
Consequently, knowledge (concepts) and theory that articulates this knowledge, 
is better treated as metaphoric in nature. These metaphors can be improved (as 
illustrated above with the example of the sun) therefore the aim for theoretical 
progress using a critical realist approach is for epistemic gain (Sayer, 1992) rather 
than reaching some ‘final’ theory, discussed more fully later.  
In summary, theory in critical realism must always be treated as fallible and 
temporary in nature, and ‘can only be regarded as the best truth about reality we 
have for the moment’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p.23) and subject to improvement.  
 
3.2.6.2 Theory that is Generalisable but not Predictive 
To build a causal explanation in critical realism means focusing on the particular 
(Sayer, 1992) because the particulars reveal the details needed to specify a 
mechanism that brings about phenomena as well as the contextual conditions that 
trigger or counteract its operation. 
McGrath (1981) suggests that to emphasise the particular is to marginalise the 
general. Yet in the context of project management research Smyth and Morris 
(2007, p.433) claim that critical realism ‘addresses both the general and the 
particular’. This apparent conflict of opinion can be explained through clearer 
definition of the meaning of ‘general’, or more appropriately generalisability, which is 
not elucidated by Smyth and Morris (2007). 
There are two forms of generalisation which if confused with one another may 
lead to claims about generalisability that are inconsistent with critical realism and 
thus render findings invalid. The first sort of generalisability is ‘data generalizability’ 
Johnson and Harris, 2002, p.109) where data are generalised to other similar 
settings, also referred to as statistical generalizability. This is the type of 
generalisation associated with positivist approached where the aim is to identify 
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some empirically observed pattern in data that can be statistically inferred to be 
representative of the wider population from which the data was drawn.  
With a focus on the particulars of a situation (small ‘n’ sample) critical realism 
cannot justifiably claim statistical generalisation. This is because to secure statistical 
inference requires a large sample (large ‘n’) of data be explored from the target 
population. Instead, critical realism aims for the second sort of generalisation 
whereby it is theory, rather than data, that is generalised, referred to as ‘theory 
generalizability’ Johnson and Harris (2002, p.109) or analytic generalisation (Yin, 
2009). 
Generalisation of theory in critical realism is made possible by the assumption 
that mechanisms are ‘relatively stable structures’ which can be ‘invariant under 
certain transformations’, that is, they can continue to exist while their constituents 
undergo changes in attributes which are not relevant to their reproduction” (Sayer, 
1992, p.94).   
To transparently explain the concept of invariance in the context of project 
management and thus demonstrate how general claims can be made from studying 
the particulars of project overruns, the D&D mechanism from Eden et al. (2000) is 
re-examined (Figure 10 below). The D&D example has been selected because the 
authors explain that their model was informed by experiences of a small number of 
cases. Thus, although the authors did not specify their research paradigm to be 
critical realism, the D&D research is based upon a small ‘n’ study, typical of the sort 
needed to build causal explanations using a critical realist approach. 
 
Figure 10 A disruption and delay mechanism (Eden et al. 2000) 
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Examining Figure 10, it is conceivable that the constituents of the D&D 
mechanism such as staff will be present in other project settings, albeit that they 
might have different attributes to those staff of the research setting from which the 
D&D mechanism was revealed.  There may be, for example, a difference in staff 
age profile however this difference in attributes is not relevant to the reproduction of 
the D&D mechanism. Despite the different age profile, staff are still likely to become 
fatigued. Consequently, while the number of projects studied in order to reveal the 
intricate D&D mechanism was small, generalization of the mechanism (the theory) is 
possible to other settings due to invariance of its constituent parts. 
While critical realism offers the possibility of generalisation it must be 
emphasised that critical realism does not offer the predictive capacity of alternative 
realist approaches like positivism. Positivism predicts with some probabilistic 
certainty that patterns, and thus events, will be observed in other settings. As noted 
(section 3.2.5) in critical realism the relationship between identified mechanisms and 
their effects is contingent upon appropriate contextual conditions of the particular 
project setting from which the mechanisms were identified. As a consequence, to 
predict the effects in a new setting, the contextual conditions in these new settings 
would need to be similar to those of the setting where the mechanism was originally 
identified. Similarity of project contexts is of course possible but it is not predictable  
because projects are open systems therefore their context has infinite variety and 
randomness making prediction near impossible. Consequently, the ‘predictive’ 
claims of critical realism are limited to what mechanisms may do and only 
subsequently what they will do in any given situation (Sayer, 1992). 
In summary, while it can be asserted that critical realism has concern for the 
particular and the general, if methodological confusion is to be avoided it must be 
recognised that the type of general is different to the positivist sort. Instead, we need 
to re-orientate expectations toward a contribution to theory that is rich in terms of 
explanation and offers the possibility of analytic or theoretical generalisation. Such 
generalisation is consistent with a  view of projects being context dependent 
(Shenhar, 2001, Engwal, 2003), a view that takes cognisance of the fact that 
projects, while having aspects of similarity, also contain differences and thus 
universality of approach cannot simply be assumed 
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3.2.6.3 Theory that is Strong and of the Middle Range (Merton, 1968) 
The discussion thus far has revealed the characteristics of knowledge generated 
by a critical realist approach as well as those of an alternative realist paradigm, 
positivism. Reflecting upon these two paradigms it seemed to this author that the 
language of positivism - truth, permanence and prediction – were connotative of a 
strong form of knowledge. The language of critical realism on the other hand 
appeared more feeble in nature – fallible, impermanence and non-predictive.  This 
distinction raised a question in this authors mind about whether a critical realist 
contribution to project management theory can be thought of as being as strong as 
that of a positivist approach.  
Sutton and Staw (1995, p.387) describe that strong theory:  
‘delves into underlying processes so as to understand the systematic 
reasons for a particular occurrence or non-occurrence. It often burrows 
deeply into microprocessors, laterally into neighbouring concepts, or in an 
upward direction, tying itself to broader social phenomena……… It usually 
is laced with a set of convincing and logically interconnected arguments’.  
These are qualities that are synonymous with a critical realist explanation 
(described throughout this section) which suggests that critical realist contributions 
to theory, although less permanent and less predictive than those claimed by 
positivism, can be robust. Consequently, in adopting critical realism for the study of 
overruns in projects, it is argued that this study is in a good position to make a 
strong theoretical contribution to the field. 
As touched upon earlier, theories in critical realism are treated as ‘the best truth 
about reality we have for the moment’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p.23) and therefore 
the aim is to continually improve explanation of phenomena. Improvements might 
include reconceptualising theory as new concepts become available or revealing the 
operation of a previously identified mechanism in a new setting and thus extending 
theory. Theoretical progress for critical realism is, therefore, an on-going endeavour 
whereby theory is gradually improved or extended.  
This gradual progression of theory is representative of Wieck’s (1995b, p.385) 
notion of theory development through ‘interim struggles’, theory development that is 
incremental. Wieck (1995) suggests that this sort of theoretical progress is 
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consistent with Merton’s (1968) theories of the middle range rather than the grand 
theory associated with, for example, the positivist tradition. 
The PM literature has voiced middle range theories as being consistent with the 
domain of projects (Packendorff, 1995, Söderlund, 2004, Bredillet, 2013) but has not 
explicitly unified middle range theory with a critical realist methodology as a means 
of developing such theory in project management. Consequently, two conclusions 
are drawn. First, that the adoption of critical realism in this study has the potential to 
make a theoretical contribution that is consistent with the domain of projects. 
Second, that in unifying critical realism with middle range theory in the context of 
projects, that the thesis makes a modest contribution to the methodological 
knowledge base of project management. 
 
3.2.6.4 The ‘fit’ of a Critical Realist Contribution with Extant PM Research 
Throughout, this philosophy of research section has sought to distinguish critical 
realism from the alternative realist position of positivism on the grounds that 
positivism is unsuitable for the needs this research study inquiry. However, as noted 
earlier, project management research remains extensively positivist in orientation 
and this begs the question as to how an alternative (critical realist) contribution ‘fits’ 
within this positivist dominated landscape. This sub-section briefly attends to this 
issue which is then explored in greater depth in the proceeding section.  
It has been argued in the foregoing discussion is that the assumptions of 
positivism are unsuitable for the particular needs of this research study. This says 
nothing about the findings of positivist based research. Findings are generated from 
methods and, as will be shown later (page.81), the methods most often associated 
with positivism (such as survey) can form part of a critical realist approach to inquiry. 
The compatibility of methods is because, as noted earlier (page. 67), critical realism 
recognises that scientific explanation necessarily involves observation of patterns 
events. A reasonable deduction then is that the findings of positivist based research 
will also be compatible with those generated by a critical realist approach.   
This compatibility is examined in greater detail in the following section however 
for the moment it is anticipated that extant positivist based project management 
research will be enfolded into this inquiry.  Thus the author positions the contribution 
made by this research study, not as living separately from the wealth of positivist 
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research that has gone before it, but rather as offering theoretical progress moving 
forward from it. Conceptually the author sees the contribution, and those of critical 
realist led studies more broadly, as complementary with the existing project 
management knowledge base as illustrated in Figure 11 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Complementarity of critical realist contributions with extant positivist research 
 
3.2.7 Conclusions  
The foregoing discussion has sought to explain how the author’s choice of 
research philosophy, that of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 2008), was arrived at in 
light of possible alternatives. The two main varieties of research philosophy were 
introduced, realism and relativism. Comparison of the underlying ontological 
assumptions of realism and relativism revealed the assumptions of realism to be 
more compatible with the author’s understanding of projects (set out in Chapter 1) 
than those of relativism. Consequently, attention was focused on realist approaches 
to research. 
Reviewing the methodological literature, empiricism and critical realism were 
identified as the two Principal realist approaches to research. It was also found that 
empiricism underpins the positivist paradigm which is the dominant approach to 
research in project management. As a realist paradigm used extensively in 
researching projects, positivism was selected as a comparator to critical realism due 
to its contextual relevance to this research study.  
Mechanism based explanation of 
project overrun  
Positivist theories of 
project behaviour. 
Causal structures and 
processes 
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The remainder of the discussion focused on examining critical realism with 
comparison drawn with positivism as an alternative realist approaches to research. 
The examination found the epistemic assumptions and approach to explanation 
offered by critical realist to be more consistent with the needs of this research study 
than those offered by positivism.   
To provide a rounded assessment of critical realism, its limitations were 
explored. These included knowledge claims that are fallible and temporary nature as 
well as claims for generalizability that are based upon theoretical rather than 
statistical generalisation. It was put forward that these claims are consistent with the 
view in project management, that projects are context sensitive (Shenhar, 2001, 
Engwal, 2003) and which recognises that projects while being similar have 
differences. Moreover, it was argued that despite its perceived weaknesses, critical 
realist research can make a strong contribution to theories of project management 
and that the aim of critical realism is for middle range theory (Merton, 1968), a form 
of theory that has been called for by researchers in the project management domain 
(Packendorff, 1995, Söderlund, 2004, Bredillet, 2013) but yet unified with a critical 
realist methodology in the context of project management research. 
While diversity of methodologies within a field can lead to fragmentation of ideas 
and thus limit theoretical progress (Söderlund, 2012), it was shown that the adoption 
of critical realism offers the opportunity to develop new theoretical perspectives that 
can converge with the existing body of extant positivist-based research. 
Consequently, adopting a critical realist approach contributes to an agenda of 
theoretical progress rather than theoretical fragmentation. 
Also, through explanation of the author’s choice of paradigm, the section has 
sought to synchronise the reader’s methodological and theoretical expectations with 
those of the authors understanding of a critical realist methodology.  
In conclusion, rigorous examination of critical realism in this section has shown 
the paradigm to be compatible with the author’s understandings of projects and with 
the explanatory needs of this research study. Furthermore, critical realism has been 
shown to offer findings that can be convergent with those of the extant project 
management literature, even though extant research has largely adopted an 
alternative realist approach of positivism. Thus, critical realism offers theoretical 
progress by providing an approach to research that is different to but not separate 
from existing project management literature.  
80 
 
3.3 RESEARCH PROCEDURE  
The previous sub-section focused on the philosophy of research that will guide 
this study, that of critical realism. Selecting critical realism is the first of a number of 
individual methodological choices that will shape the overall approach to research 
for this study. Although the research approach is arrived at by making individual 
choices, the approach must be cohesive if the study is to be of academic standing. 
To achieve cohesion, the individual methodological choices must be logically 
compatible with one another and, therefore, a natural way to proceed in informing 
the next methodological choice (research design) is to revisit the critical realist 
literature and seek guidance on those designs that are compatible with the 
philosophy.  
Critical realism is flexible with regard to compatible research designs (and 
associated methods) because the complexity and variety of research aims that can 
be pursued is beyond the capabilities of a single approach to research (Sayer, 
1992).  This need for flexibility is consistent with the study of projects, for example 
Söderlund (2012, p.42) stresses that there is no ‘single best approach’ for studying 
projects. 
Although critical realism offers flexibility with regard to choice of research 
designs, the choices cannot be made ‘indiscriminately’ (Danermark et al., 2002, 
p.166). Critical realism aligns with McGrath’s (1981) view that all research designs 
(and associated methods) have associated strengths and weaknesses therefore 
designs must be selected in a logical fashion whereby they are applied to the types 
of research inquiry to which they are best suited. 
Critical realism identifies two types of research inquiry, the intensive procedure 
and the extensive procedure (Sayer, 1992) as illustrated in Figure 12. 
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 INTENSIVE EXTENSIVE 
Research question What produces a certain 
outcome and how does it 
produce this outcome? 
What are the regularities and  
common patterns of a particular 
population?  
Type of account 
produced 
Causal explanation of the 
production of certain events 
Descriptive representative 
generalisations, lacking in 
explanatory penetration 
Typical methods Study of individual agents in their 
contexts, interactive interviews, 
ethnography. Qualitative analysis 
Large-scale survey of population 
or representative sample, 
questionnaires, standardised 
interviews. Statistical analysis.  
Limitations Findings are unlikely to be 
‘representative’, ‘average’ and 
thus generalisable in a statistical 
sense 
Limited explanatory power 
   
Figure 12 Characteristics of intensive and extensive procedures                
 (adapted from Sayer 1992, p.20) 
 
The intensive procedure is concerned with revealing causal processes and is 
compatible with designs that are largely qualitative in nature (Sayer, 1992). The aim 
of an extensive procedure on the other hand is to discover ‘some of the common 
properties and general patterns of a population as whole’ (Sayer (1992, p.242) and 
therefore tends to adopt ‘quantitative data collecting and statistical analysis’ 
(Danermark et al., 2002, p.163).   
Of the two available procedures, the intensive procedure is logically consistent 
with the aim of this research study of revealing causal processes that bring about 
overrun in projects therefore an intensive procedure is pursued in this research 
study. Intensive studies focus on a ‘particular case or small number of cases’ 
(Sayer, 1992, p.243) and so attention is naturally directed toward the case study 
design as a logical next step for constructing the intensive procedure to the study of 
overrun in projects.  
Before proceeding to the case study, the extensive procedure is worthy of brief 
discussion. Earlier (page. 77), it was asserted in this thesis that a critical realist 
contribution can complement the existing body of largely positivist-oriented project 
management research. Brief examination of the extensive procedure and how it fits 
with an intensive procedure helps further illuminate the logic of this claim.  
As shown in Figure 12, the extensive procedure is to reveal general patterns 
across a population by using quantitative data from designs such as a large scale 
questionnaire survey (Sayer, 1992). The aim, and associated research designs, of 
the extensive procedure are synonymous with positivist-orientated research that 
dominates the PM domain (Smyth and Morris, 2007). Therefore a logical deduction 
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is that the findings of positivist-orientated project management research, research 
that is reflective of an extensive procedure, are also compatible with critical realism.   
Indeed, Danermark et al. (2002, p.166) suggests that extensive procedures can 
help researchers ‘get some idea of what empirical patterns are produced by a 
particular mechanism’. In other words, the patterns of concepts revealed by 
extensive research provide indication of underlying mechanisms at work. Knowing 
the patterns that are particular to a mechanism means researchers can look for that 
pattern within other research settings and where the pattern is discovered, deduce 
that the previously identified mechanism might be at work. To confirm whether the 
previously identified mechanism is at work, will require further intensive study within 
the new setting.  
Considering the above points in the context of this study, extensive procedures 
have been conducted in a wide variety of settings within project management 
research. If the intensive research study reported in this thesis document reveals 
concepts that are similar to those found in extensive project management research, 
then this may indicate that the identified mechanism is at work in other settings and 
consequently, that it might be generalised to these other settings. Thus, the 
proposed intensive study offers the possibility of convergence of findings with 
existing extensive project management research, ‘convergence, by methods that 
compensate for one another’s vulnerabilities’ (McGrath, 1981, p.190). The proposed 
intensive research study will, therefore, be different from the largely extensive 
studies of project management research but it will not be separate from the existing 
(and future) body of work. Rather the proposed intensive study is synergistic with 
extensive studies, providing deeper explanation of previously identified patterns and 
thus contributing to progress in the field of project management.  
In summary, the aim of this research study is to develop causal explanations of 
overruns in projects. The philosophy underpinning the research, critical realism, 
identifies two procedures for research, intensive and extensive. The intensive 
procedure is the logical choice for this study because its aim is the development of 
causal explanations. The extensive procedure on the other hand is better suited to 
revealing regularities in data than the deep causal explanations being sought here.  
Although both procedures are suited to quite different research aims, they have 
a synergistic relationship. For example, extensive studies describe the patterns of 
data associated with a particular causal mechanism. Intensive studies reveal the 
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details of the mechanism. Knowledge of mechanisms and the associated patterns 
they generate means mechanisms described from one setting can be postulated to 
exist in other settings where the same patterns are discovered. This synergistic 
relationship suggests that, in the context of this research study, convergence of 
insights is anticipated between this intensive critical realist study and the extant 
project management literature which has largely adopted designs and methods 
associated with an extensive procedure.  
 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN  
In order to reveal underlying causal processes, the intensive procedure focuses 
on a ‘particular case or small number of cases’ (Sayer, 1992, p.243). Thus a logical 
next step for the construction of the proposed intensive procedure is to examine the 
case study as a design for conducting inquiry. 
This section is opened with examination of the case study design before going 
on to examine two components that will comprise the design - research methods 
and research techniques. Figure 13 below is intended to provide the reader with an 
overview of the structure of this section as well as the underlying questions being 
attended to in each of its sub-sections and the intended contribution of each sub-
section to the thesis.  
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 Sub-Section Underlying Questions 
Being Attended to 
Intended Contribution of Sub-
Section to Thesis 
3.4.1 Case Study Design What is about the features 
of a case study design that 
make it suitable for 
intensive inquiry? 
 
 
Why are alternative 
designs such as the 
survey or experiment 
unsuitable for intensive 
inquiry? 
 
 
 
What type of case study 
will be applied? 
 
What number of cases will 
be studied and why? 
 
How will specific cases be 
selected for study from the 
available pool of cases? 
Demonstrate the logical 
consistency between an intensive 
research procedure and the 
features of a case study design. 
 
 
Provide the reader with 
confidence that selection of a 
case study design over alternative 
designs was an intentional choice 
and one that was informed by a 
rounded knowledge of 
methodological issues. 
 
Provide the reader with forward 
visibility of details of the design as 
well as build confidence in the 
researchers understanding of 
applying the case study design.  
3.4.2 Research Method What available methods of 
data collection are suitable 
for case study design? 
 
 
Why is the interview 
selected as the Principal 
data collection method and 
what type of interview is 
being pursued? 
 
Provide the reader with 
confidence that the researcher’s 
choice of methods is informed by 
a sophisticated understanding of 
methodological issues. 
 
Provide the reader with forward 
visibility of details of the design. 
 
 
3.4.3 Limitations of a 
Qualitative Case 
Study Design   
What are the limitations of 
the case study design and 
how will these be attended 
to within the study? 
 
Provide the reader with 
confidence that the choice of 
research design is an informed 
one, taken in full view of the 
designs limitations.  
 
Provide the reader with forward 
visibility of the steps that will be 
taken to mitigate the designs 
limitations.  
 
3.4.4 
Research 
Technique – Causal 
Mapping 
What is causal mapping? 
 
Which causal mapping 
technique in particular will 
be adopted and why? 
 
Why is a causal mapping 
technique being adopted 
over a traditional narrative 
technique? 
 
What are the limitations of 
the causal mapping 
technique being adopted 
and what impacts do they 
have on the proposed 
study? 
Provide the reader with forward 
visibility of the technique being 
used to elicit, record and analyse 
data within the case study design.  
 
Provide the reader with 
confidence that selecting a causal 
mapping technique over a 
narrative approach is an 
appropriate choice for this study.  
 
Demonstrate to the reader that 
the choice of technique is an 
informed on that has been made 
in full view of the techniques 
limitations. 
 
   .   
Figure 13 Structure of Research Design Section 
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3.4.1 Case Study Design 
In a case study design, the phenomenon being studied is examined within the 
context of the setting in which it is found. Furthermore, phenomena are studied in 
only a single or small number of settings. Focusing on a small number of settings 
and keeping phenomena in their context (Dul and Hak, 2008) are the features that 
distinguish the case study from other designs (such as the experiment or survey) 
and make it suitable for an intensive inquiry. Examining only a small number of 
settings creates the opportunity for an ‘in-depth understanding’ Creswell, 2008, 
p.98), and therefore explanation, of phenomena to be achieved. Detailed 
explanation is central to intensive inquiry in order to develop a causal explanation 
that reveals the ‘cogs and wheels’ of the causal process bringing about phenomena 
(Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). Moreover, a causal explanation must detail the 
contextual conditions that activate or counteract the identified mechanism.  
The survey design also studies phenomena in their context Dul and Hak, 2008 
however its reliance on quantitative data yields a cause-effect form of explanation. 
This sort of ‘shallow’ explanation was described previously as inconsistent with the 
needs of this research study (section 3.2.4). This is because a cause-effect 
explanation is not a causal explanation, one that describes the causal process 
bringing about phenomena.  
Returning to the case study, although it can make use of quantitative data 
(Stake, 1995), the ‘implicit companion’ of the design is qualitative data (Yin, 1981, 
p.58). As noted above, the case study creates the opportunity for detailed 
explanation to be achieved. This opportunity is exploited using qualitative data which 
are ‘particularly helpful in the generation of an intensive, detailed examination of the 
case’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.60). Qualitative data attend to questions of ‘what’, 
‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin, 2009). Yin, (2009, p.9) suggests   questions of ‘how and why’ 
are particularly helpful for elucidating rich explanation but are not easily attended to 
by quantitative means.  
As noted above, in a case study design phenomena are studied within the 
context in which they are found (Dul and Hak, 2008). No attempt is made to control 
the entities being studied or their environment. This is unlike other designs such as 
the experiment which place the phenomenon in a contrived setting and thus 
eliminate context. 
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Context is central to this research study for two reasons. The first reason has 
already been touched upon earlier (section 3.2.5) which is that a causal explanation 
must include insight into contextual conditions. The second reason is that there is 
growing recognition of the important role context plays in the management of 
projects. For example, empirical research (Engwal, 2003) has revealed projects 
failing’ because of contextual conditions even though the projects diligently followed 
espoused normative project management theories. Such research supports claims 
that the management of projects is contingent in nature (Shenhar, 2001), or in other 
words is context dependent.  
In summary, the case study design is concerned with asking ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions to develop rich explanations that can describe causal processes and how 
these processes interact with their context to bring about the phenomenon being 
studied. These qualities are synonymous with the research questions and 
underlying philosophy of this study as well as a recognition of the contingent nature 
of projects (Shenhar, 2001; Engwal, 2003) within the field of project management. 
Consequently, the case study is adopted in this research study as a design suitable 
for inquiry into the phenomenon of overruns in projects.  
  The discussion thus far has illuminated features of a case study design that are 
orientated toward the needs of the proposed study. However, a number of other 
choices concerning the design remain to be made. Choices must be made 
concerning what type of case study design will be implemented, the number of 
cases that will be examined and finally, how specific cases will be identified for study 
from the available pool of possible cases. For the purposes of replication it is 
important that the decisions arrived at are made transparent. The following 
discussion explores each of the foregoing choices in turn.  
There are two types of case study that can be conducted. One is to study a case 
at a particular time (cross-sectional), and the other is to conduct a longitudinal case 
study ‘studying the same single case at two or more different points in time.’ (Yin, 
2009, p.49). In theory, both types are available to the researcher. However, in 
practice, it is more likely that a cross sectional case study will be undertaken if the 
research is part of academic course work (Saunders, 2009, p.155). This is because 
longitudinal studies take up significant amounts of time and resource both of which 
are constrained during academic studies. Given the limited time and resources 
available to complete a PhD a cross sectional design was pursued in this study. 
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A second decision point concerns the number of cases to be studied. While 
studying a single case is justifiable (Flyvbjerg, 2011), the literature suggests that a 
multi-case approach improves the credibility of findings (Yin, 1981, 2009). Yin (2009, 
p.61) explains that analytic conclusions from two independent cases, ‘as with two 
experiments, will be more powerful than those coming from a single case’ thus 
improving credibility. For example, selecting (like for like cases) may help to confirm 
constructs and therefore strengthen theory. Whereas, selecting contrasting cases 
might serve to falsify (thus improve) parts of developed theory. The possibility of 
replication or contrast, both of which improve the credibility of findings, strongly 
suggest a multi-case approach as the way forward. Thus the aim of this study was 
to examine at least two case study projects. 
As noted above, only a small number of cases (projects) are examined in an 
intensive study therefore it is likely that not all of the case study projects that might 
be available for study will be studied. This begs the question - of the available pool 
of projects that could be studied, what logic will determine the small sample of 
projects that will be studied and comprise the multi-case design? ‘The traditional 
method of sampling is to identify a population then to select a random or stratified 
sample from that population’ (Voss et al., 2002, p.203). This method is, however, 
geared toward identifying patterns in data that can subsequently be statistically 
generalised to the population. As discussed previously (section 3.2.4) pattern 
identification and statistical generalisation are not the aims of this research study.  
The aims of this research study are to develop causal explanations (theory) and 
to generalise these explanations by means of theoretical generalisation rather than 
statistical generalisation. To pursue these aims, cases are selected on the basis of 
theoretical sampling. At the heart of theoretical sampling, is learning (Flyvbjerg, 
2011, Bryman and Bell,  2011). The basic premise is that researchers should 
‘choose cases where they expect learning will be greatest.’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011, 
p.60). Learning might take the form of developing explanation (theory) of 
phenomena. In this situation, the literature suggests selecting cases where the 
phenomenon is ‘transparently observable’  as a natural way to proceed (Pettigrew, 
1990, p.275) and that atypical or extreme cases in particular are a good place to 
start (Flybverg, 2011). 
Alternatively the aim of learning might be to ‘replicate or extend the emergent 
theory’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.537).  In this situtation replication logic is used to drive 
the process of case selection where  ‘Each case must be carefully selected so that it 
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either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting 
results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)’ (Yin, 2009, p. 54). 
Thus using replication logic, cases are selected on the basis of their similarity or 
contrast such as polar opposite types (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Selection of polar types is of particular interest to this researcher because the 
emphasis in project management research has largely been ‘failure’ based, as 
Packendorff observes (1995, p. 323) ‘It seems as though successful projects are in 
no need of evaluation’. Underpinning the focus on failure is an assumption that 
‘failures hold morals which successes cannot’ (Kharabanda and Pinto, 1996, p.4). 
This assumption may have some validity. However, even if the assumption were 
proven ‘true’, then all that could be justifiably said is that opportunities to learn from 
success are less significant and not insignificant.  Moreover, exploring success 
might make opportunities to learn more accessible to the researcher - as the popular 
saying goes ‘success has many fathers while failure is an orphan’.  In short, 
couching the research in terms of ‘failure’ could negatively affect field research by 
discouraging practitioner participation, for fear of ‘blows to self-esteem or “looking 
bad” to others’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.292) when being associated with 
failed projects. Thus participants might be more likely to openly share success than 
failure. Finally, exploring success alongside failure provides an opportunity for 
contrast therefore potentially shedding stronger light on opportunities to learn. On 
the basis of the foregoing, it strikes this researcher that to focus exclusively on 
failure is a lost opportunity on a variety of levels and, therefore, successful case 
study projects were pursued as part of the research design.   
To summarise thus far, the proposed research design for this study is a cross 
sectional case study.  The design will comprise at least two case studies in order to 
improve the credibility of findings. The specific cases will be selected by following 
theoretical sampling logic. In particular, cases that have experiences extreme or 
atypical levels of overrun will be sought. Moreover, it is intended that one of the case 
studies comprising the multi-case design will be a ‘successful’ project and thus 
provide contrast to those projects studied that experienced overruns.  
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3.4.2 Research Method 
In order to develop causal explanations from a qualitative case study, qualitative 
data will need to be collected. The three ‘most common means of qualitative data 
collection’ are documentation, non-participant observation, and interviews (Johnson 
and Harris, 2002, p.110).  
Regardless of which of the three data collection methods are used, resultant 
data can only ever provide the researcher with a mediated view of the phenomenon 
being studied. This is because, as discussed previously (section 3.2.6.1), data in a 
critical realist paradigm are always treated as representations of reality rather than 
reality itself.  Thus, each method must be thought of as providing a mediating lens 
through which the researcher gains visibility of phenomena (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14 Conceptual model of the lenses provided by data collection methods 
 
While all three lenses (methods) provide a mediated view of overruns, the extent 
of mediation is greater for some than it is for others. For those with greater 
mediation the view provided to the researcher is of lower fidelity, a lower degree of 
exactness, in its representation of the situation. Documents, for example, cannot be 
treated as ‘literal recordings of events that have taken place’ Yin (2009, p.103). 
Although they might be claimed to contain ‘the facts’, ‘facts’ can be subject to 
‘selective deposit’ and bias in their presentation (Pettigrew, 1990, p.277). This is 
because documents are written toward a specific agenda, perhaps a particular 
socio-political agenda. Using documents, the researcher is thus furnished with a 
view of the situation that is strongly mediated by the ‘selective deposits’ and biases 
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of the document author(s). Only data deemed important to the agenda are included, 
masking off other data and thus impairing the researcher’s view of the situation as 
illustrated in Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15 Potential masking effect of existing documentation 
 
The second method, non-participant observation, is also subject to significant 
mediation. This is because it provides a lens that is restricted to those data that are 
empirically observable.  Concepts (data) such as politics and history do not lend 
themselves to empirical observation but these have been shown in this thesis 
document to be central to understanding the situation of overruns. Consequently, 
non-participant observation provides a significantly mediated view of the situation 
that lacks the fidelity needed to gain a view of the situation that is comprehensive.  
The final method is that of interviewing. Interviewing can provide a view of 
situations that is much less mediated, and therefore of higher fidelity, than that of 
documentation or non-participant observation. A research interview creates 
conditions that are more conducive to understanding the situation rather than 
contributing to a particular socio-political agenda as might be the case with 
documentary evidence. With the scene set for understanding, data need not be 
restricted to what is socially or politically acceptable therefore creating a platform for 
participants to express more sensitive and broader ranging insights. The researcher 
thus has the potential to view the situation ‘warts and all’.  
Furthermore, interviews are not restricted, as non-participant observation is, to 
the use of empirically observable data. The interview participant has access to non-
empirical concepts (data) such as politics or social relations when articulating their 
understanding of the situation. Having this wide range of concepts (data) available 
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means the interviewer can be furnished with a view of reality that can be both wide 
angled, giving comprehensive coverage, and granular, providing nuanced insights.  
In summary, interviews provide a vantage point from which the researcher can 
gain a view of the situation that is both broad ranging in coverage and detailed in its 
rendering. The lens provided by interviews is thus high in fidelity and so can provide 
the researcher with a closer portrayal of the situation than can be achieved by 
documentation or non-participant observation methods. Using the interview the 
researcher can thus gain depth and subtlety of understanding of the situation being 
studied (Pettigrew, 1990). Consequently, interviews are recognised as ‘an essential 
source’ of data for the qualitative case study (Yin, 2009, p.108) and therefore are 
selected as the Principal data collection method for this study. 
As discussed above, all methods provide a mediating lens through which the 
researcher can view the situation being studied. While interviews can provide the 
best vantage point of the three methods, they too are subject to weaknesses of 
mediation. For example, participants may suffer recall bias or indeed present an 
intentionally bias point of view (Pettigrew, 1990).  
The ideal research design is to use all three methods and triangulate between 
them to improve accuracy of our vantage point by validating findings through 
convergent and contextual validity (Reason and Rowan, 1993). For example, non-
participant observation can allow for the researcher to observe the difference 
between what is said (in the interview) and what is practiced in reality. Similarly 
documents can provide a powerful comparator for data gathered from interviews 
that might serve to validate or falsify finding. Access to these other sources of data 
was pursued as part of the research design. 
The principal data collection method being used in this study is the interview. 
Referring to ‘the’ interview is suggestive of a single type when in fact, interviews are 
heterogeneous in nature. Interviews can be one of three different types - structured, 
unstructured or semi-structured (Johnson and Harris, 2002, Easterby-Smith et al. 
2008, Bryman and Bell, 2011). The following discussion examines all three types in 
order to clearly define which one is being used in this study.  
The decision as to which type of interview to pursue is a dilemma between 
flexibility of topics covered and consistency of topics across interviews (postmus, 
2013). For example, in a structured interview, data are elicited using a rigid question 
set that restrict interview data to very specific topics, characteristic of a 
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questionnaire survey ‘where there are short answers to questions and the 
interviewer simply ticks boxes’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008, p.127). Limiting the 
interview to specific topics maximises consistency of data between interview 
participants thus improving comparison between participant data. Such an approach 
is described by Yin (2009, p.107) as a survey interview  and uses the statistical 
techniques of the survey to reveal patterns in the data.  
While providing powerful comparative capability, the structured type of interview 
is not suited to the needs of this study. As discussed above, the reason for favouring 
interviews over other methods in this research study was to minimise the degree of 
mediation between the researcher and the situation being studied. A structured 
interview approach does not move the researcher toward this purpose because the 
structured question set acts as a mediating device, a filter.  
In a structured interview, there is no flexibility to move outside of the structured 
question set therefore ‘You only get the answers to the questions that you ask’ 
(Johnson and Harris, 2002, p.102). As such the interview questions act like 
apertures, narrow openings that only reveal parts of the situation that are ‘known’ to 
be of importance a priori, masking off other parts that do not feature in the question 
set (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16 Masking effect of rigidly structuring of interviews 
 
The researchers view is thus mediated, filtered, by the question set preventing 
them from gaining a rounded and comprehensive understanding of the situation 
from the participant’s perspective. Moreover, the interview questions are set a priori 
by the researcher. Therefore, the resultant data is potentially biased toward a 
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portrayal of the situation that is researcher determined rather than one that is 
participant determined and thus perhaps a closer representation of the situation.  
Postmus (2013, p.244) advises that if the researcher wants a comprehensive 
understanding of the participants perspective then the participant should be put ‘in 
charge of the interview process’ and encouraged to discuss ‘new and uncharted 
territory’. Using the second type of interview, the unstructured interview, provides a 
way forward in this regard. 
An unstructured interview has no a priori structure imposed upon it. The 
participant can take charge of the interview process and has complete freedom of 
expression and exploration. Thus in theory, resultant data could be both 
comprehensive and free of researcher bias since the interview has not been 
restricted in anyway by the researcher. This suggests a very low degree of 
mediation might be possible from an unstructured type of interview.  
However, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008, p.128) point out that ‘non-directive’ 
(unstructured) interviews are ‘likely to produce no clear picture in the mind of the 
interviewee of what questions or issues the interviewer is interested in, and in the 
mind of the interviewer, of what question the interviewee is answering!’  Thus a 
complete lack of structure in the interview is likely to result in both confusion and 
large quantities of redundant data. Both consequences serve to obscure the 
researcher’s view of the situation rather than improve it. 
A third and final type of interview is the semi-structured interview. Data elicitation 
is initiated using a small number of open questions at the beginning of the interview 
(Johnson and Harris, 2002). These initial questions orientate the participant toward 
the topic of interest therefore avoiding the confusion that can be caused by an 
interview that has no structure whatsoever. As noted, the initial questions are of an 
‘open’ style. Therefore, as well as bringing some structure to the interview, the initial 
questions also offer some freedom of expression by participants so that the 
participant is free to discuss the matter as they see it rather than be restricted to the 
concepts made available to them in a structured type of interview (Sands, 2013) .  
Moreover, open ended questions can ‘promote free association, which stimulates 
story-telling’ and allows the participant to ‘spontaneously proffer additional, often 
vital information’ (Sands, 2013, p.149) opening up lines of inquiry into the situation 
not thought of by the researcher prior to the interview. Answers to initial questions 
are used to generate follow up questions and responses to those questions used to 
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generate further questions, and so the process continues (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009). This approach allows the researcher to follow the participants logic of 
discussion rather than the other way around which is the case in a structured 
interview type.  
To summarise, a semi-structured interview provides some structure thus 
mitigating the weaknesses of an unstructured discussion. At the same time, semi-
structured interviewing also allows flexibility of topics to be covered. Flexibility allows 
participants to call upon wide ranging concepts (data) to explain the idiosyncrasies 
of their view, furnishing the researcher with a nuanced appreciation of the situation. 
Such an approach to interviewing is in fitting with what Yin (2009, p. 107) calls as an 
‘in-depth interview’. An in-depth interview can bring the researchers understandings 
closer to those of the participant in a way that is not achievable through either 
structured or unstructured interviewing because of their mediating effects. Gaining 
visibility of the situation that is as close as possible to that of the participant is 
central to this study. Consequently, the semi-structured interview type is being 
adopted.  
 
3.4.3 Limitations of the Qualitative Case Study Design  
The preceding discussion focused on the rationale for adopting the qualitative 
case study design over other approaches to research which has naturally led to 
emphasis of the strengths of the design. However, Yin (2009, p.3) advises that it is 
just as important to ‘openly acknowledge’ and understand the designs weaknesses, 
recognising that no approach to research is without limitation.   
Paying attention to the limitations of a selected research design is important in 
order to avoid the validity of research being brought into question. In a recent review 
of project management research, Smyth and Morris (2007) found that researchers, 
at times, made claims which were inconsistent with the underlying research design 
because of a lack of attention to methodological issues such as design limitations.  
Reading across the methodological literature, three potential flaws of a 
qualitative case study design are identified each of which is explored in this section: 
• A lack of rigour in the application of the design 
• Weaknesses brought about by the reliance on subjective data 
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• Perceived limitations relating to generalizability of findings from the design 
 
Lack of rigour in the application of the design 
Flyvbjerg (2011, p.302) suggests that case study research is ‘often held in low 
regard’. Perhaps a contributing factor in this perception is that, according to Yin 
(2009) the case study design is not always conducted with rigour. Empirical 
research by Jans and Dittrich (2008, p.27) corroborates this view and find that ‘many 
case studies suffer from a lack of scientific rigour’ suggests due to a lack of attention 
to the following issues: 
• Case selection criteria 
• Means of data collection 
• Methods of data analysis 
The discussion has already begun to attend to the first two these issues and it is 
the intention that all three will be explored in the data collection and analysis section. 
By making transparent the author’s choices with respect to the above issues the aim 
is to reinforce the rigour with which the study was conducted.   
Weaknesses brought about by a reliance on subjectivity 
A further limitation put toward a qualitative case study design is its reliance on 
subjective data, in particular how personal opinions or values can influence and thus 
bias data toward a particular agenda rather than reflecting the objective view. Bias 
can be introduced for example by the researcher through verification bias, the 
‘tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions’ (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p.302) 
or by ‘becoming ‘too much identified with the perspectives of particular informants’  
(Allan and Skinner, 1991, p.164). 
Although the discussion of bias in qualitative inquiry tends to be in relation to 
researcher induced bias, participants can also introduce bias. In an interview 
participants can be subject to ‘bias, poor recall or inaccurate articulation’ (Yin, 2009, 
p.109). Miles and Huberman (1994, p.56) encourage researchers to be as vigilant 
as possible for bias on the part of participants noting that “Informants themselves 
are selective too, sometimes deliberately, sometimes unwittingly. They may gloss 
over important parts of their behaviours and perceptions, and the researcher may 
not be aware of this.’ 
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Researchers have pointed out that bias is not a weakness of qualitative designs 
per se but rather a human condition  (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
As Greenberg and Baron, (2003, p.43) eloquently put it - “Computers may analyse 
information in an accurate, unbiased, tireless fashion, but the same cannot be said 
about human beings’. That bias is a human condition means other designs are just 
as susceptible to the condition as qualitative designs. For example, Flyvbjerg (2006) 
suggests that the survey can be susceptible to bias in the selection of variables 
chosen to be studied.   
Steps can, however, be taken to mitigate bias. Conformity bias can be mitigated 
by the researcher stating their preconceptions early in the process and consequently 
looking out for, and challenge them, if they begin to resonate in the data (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). By triangulating data between participants, the researcher can 
confirm the convergent validity of data (Reason and Rowan, 1993) thus mitigating 
the effects of becoming too identified with a particular participant. Finally, matters of 
bias, poor recall and inaccuracy of articulation from the participant perspective can 
be mitigated through careful selection of data elicitation techniques. These 
techniques are the subject of the following section (3.4.4) which examines 
techniques for elicitation, recording and analysis of data from a qualitative interview. 
A further issue concerning subjectivity is the issue of a double hermeneutic 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). In qualitative inquiry the researcher is interpreting the 
interpretations of the research participant. Thus, there are in effect two layers of 
mediation between the researcher and the ‘reality’ of what has taken place in the 
situation being studied (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17 Conceptual model of a double hermeneutic 
As Figure 17 illustrates, the participant has a mediated view of the situation and 
the researcher has a mediated view of the participants view. The best visibility of the 
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situation that the researcher can hope for is one that aligns as closely as possible to 
the participants view since, as discussed (section 3.2.6.1), this researcher’s 
underlying philosophical assumption is that the researcher has no direct access to 
the situation.   
The issue here is that the researcher might unknowingly misinterpret the 
meaning of the participant since there is no scientific means of the researcher 
getting inside the participants head to check that their views correspond to one 
another.  Thus questions might be raised as to how accurate the researchers view 
of the situation being studied actually is.  
Again, careful selection and application of research techniques play an important 
role in mitigating the double hermeneutic. Techniques that allow the researcher to 
validate their understandings with the participant will bring the researcher closer to 
the participant’s view of the situation. Furthermore, sophisticated research 
techniques that support the participant to make sense (Weick, 1995a) of the 
situation will help the participant (and thus researcher) get closer to the reality of the 
situation. These techniques are the subject of discussion in a later section (3.4.4).  
Limited generalizability of findings from the case study design 
Last but by no means least is a subject ‘on which a great deal of discussion has 
centred’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p.61) – the limited ability to generalise findings 
from a case study design. The basic contention is a simple one, that generalisation 
from a case study design is highly questionable because the number of instances 
studied is so small. This contention ‘is usually considered to be devastating to the 
case study as a scientific method’ particularly for those researchers examining a 
single case (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p.304). 
However, the contention is underpinned by two interrelated assumptions: 1) that 
‘case(s)’ represent a statistically relevant sample of a population because 2) the aim 
of research is statistical generalisation. Neither of these assumptions is true of 
qualitative case study research (Yin, 2009). 
As discussed previously (section 3.4.1), case studies are not selected on the 
basis of their ability to represent a wider population, they are selected on the basis 
of their ability to provide insight. In this way, cases are not ‘samples’ but rather 
should be treated in the same way as experiments where the aim is to ‘expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
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(statistical generalization)’ (Yin, 2009, p.15). Previously developed theory can be 
expanded through a process of replication in much the same way as repeating 
experiments. Through replication, the generalisation is gradually refined, providing 
‘not a new generalisation but a modified generalisation’ (Stake, 1995, p.7). 
Generalisation is therefore possible using the case study design but the 
‘generalization is not automatic’ (Tsang, 2014, p.44) in the way it is with research 
based upon representative samples.  
The characteristics of generalisation from case study research are completely 
consistent with those of the underlying philosophy of research in this study of project 
overruns. It was noted that theory in critical realism is progressed in an incremental 
fashion (section 3.2.6.3) and is therefore representative of Wieck’s (1995) notion of 
‘interim struggles’ and consequently Merton’s (1968) concept of middle range 
theory. The case study approach of gradually refining theory through replication in 
other settings resonates strongly with a view of theory as representing ‘interim 
struggles’. Moreover, the process by which theory can be generated from a case 
study (Eiesenhardt, 1989) adopts a grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). This approach is consistent with the process of retroduction used for 
revealing causal mechanisms in a critical realist paradigm. 
In conclusion, while the case study approach may be limited in its statistical 
generalisation, analytical generalisation means findings can be used in other 
settings. Moreover, the approach of analytic generalisation is completely consistent 
with the underlying philosophy of research in this study of project overruns. 
Therefore, despite its perceived weaknesses, the case study was found to be 
logically consistent with the needs of this research study. 
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3.4.4 Research Technique - Causal Mapping  
This section makes transparent the final element in the design of the proposed 
intensive research study of project overruns – the research technique. As discussed 
in the introduction to this chapter (section 3.0), research techniques are taken to 
mean the activities of elicitation, recording, and analysis of data. Attending to these 
activities, this research study adopts a casual mapping technique.  
Causal mapping is a valid research technique, as evidenced by its application in 
domains such as OR, strategy and project management (Williams, 1997, Maytoerna 
et al., 2004, Eden and Ackermann, 2006, Ekins et al., 2007, Ackermann and Eden, 
2011).  
Approaches to causal mapping and arguments for their use have evolved over a 
period of more than two decades (Eden, 1988). However, despite its longevity and 
validity, much of the project research adopting causal mapping is the work of just a 
small community (Williams, 1997, Maytorena, 2004, Edkins, 2007) therefore causal 
mapping remains a novel technique for research. Consequently, some discussion is 
warranted to elucidate the technique and bring attention to what it is that makes 
causal mapping suitable for the needs of this research study. Moreover, approaches 
to causal mapping abound, therefore some discussion is needed as to which 
approach is being adopted here.  
It is not the intention of this section to provide an exhaustive account of causal 
mapping techniques. There are already a number of texts that attend to this. 
Instead, the aim is to provide insight into the choice of causal mapping technique 
that has been made in this research study, the rationale underlying this choice and 
the implications of it. To attend to these matters this section is structured as follows: 
• Theoretical Roots of Causal Maps – brief insight is provided into the 
theoretical underpinnings of causal mapping in order to launch the 
discussion. 
• Available Approaches to Causal Mapping – approaches to causal 
mapping abound. This section provides a summary of available 
approaches and reveals they can be categorised as developing either 
idiographic or nomothetic maps. The two types are examined in light of 
the needs of this research study and it is argued that an idiographic 
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approach, in particular that of Eden et al, is the most appropriate way 
forward.  
• Causal Mapping Versus Narrative Approach – as discussed above, 
causal mapping is a novel research technique therefore for the purposes 
of methodological rigour comparison is drawn with a more typical 
approach.  
• Limitations of an Idiographic Causal Mapping– Outlining the 
limitations of an idiographic approach, this section continues a theme of 
this methodology chapter of providing a balanced view of the elements 
comprising the intensive approach to research.  
 
3.4.4.1 Theoretical Roots of Causal Maps  
Causal mapping is a form of cognitive map. The term ‘cognitive map’ is originally 
attributed to Tolman’s (1948) work in psychology where he used the concept of field 
theory which ‘asserts that individuals create fields or maps in order to understand 
and anticipate their environment’ (Jenkins, 1998, p.232). The term has since taken 
on the meaning used by Axelrod (1976) as a physical representation of a person’s 
beliefs and assertions. Cognitive maps are therefore a means of representing an 
individual’s view of reality (Eden, 1988). 
As noted earlier (section 3.4.3), this researcher’s objective is to get close to the 
understandings of interview participants, to synchronise the researchers knowledge 
with that of participants. Based upon the introductory discussion above, it seems 
reasonable to deduce that cognitive maps can better support synchronisation than a 
more typical approach of a transcription of the participant’s knowledge. The logic 
underpinning this deduction is simple. If a participant’s knowledge is contained in the 
format of a mentally held map, then eliciting and capturing data in a similar format 
provides a closer portrayal of participant knowledge than that of a transcription. The 
researcher is thus furnished with data that is more representative of participants 
knowledge and thus can better support them (the researcher) in synchronising with 
the participants view of the situation.  
Cognitive maps are constructed through the use of mapping techniques that aim 
‘to uncover important features of a person’s internal representations and to 
externalize them’ (Swan and Newell, 1998, p.125). A number of techniques are 
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available (Huff, 1990), the most common of which is probably mind mapping (Buzan 
and Buzan, 1993). While there are a variety of approaches to mapping they cannot 
be applied in an indiscriminate manner. As Fiol and Huff (1992, p.275)  notes - ‘as is 
the case with maps of the physical world, the helpfulness of a cognitive map 
depends on one’s ability to choose the right map or set of maps’. Careful review of 
cognitive mapping literature suggests a causal mapping approach is the ‘right’ 
choice for this study.  
A causal map is a directed graph, a network, that ‘incorporates concepts tied 
together by causality relations’ (Weick and Bougon, 1986, p.106) and therefore 
represents cognition ‘as a set of causal interactions’ (Jenkins, 1998, p.232). Figure 
18 below provides a synopsis of attributes of a causal mapping approach that are 
aligned to the objectives of this study and thus support the choice of causal mapping 
over alternatives.  
Study Objective Discussion of Causal Map Attribute  
To get as close as possible to the 
subjective understandings of 
participants. 
Knowledge is stored by humans in the form of maps, and in 
particular cause maps (Bougon et al, 1977) suggesting cause 
maps are a closer representation of knowledge than alternative 
maps such as influence diagrams.  
 
 
To reveal how and why overruns 
come about.  
Ambrosini and Bowman(2002) note that ‘causality provides a 
potentially higher level of procedural knowledge (how it works, 
and how to do it) than other sets of relationships’   
To reveal causal relationships in 
participant knowledge that might 
be used to describe the causal 
processes that can bring about 
overruns.  
Causal mapping is suited to situations where ‘it is specifically the 
subjective, causal element in the knowledge that is most 
research relevant’ (Laukkanen, 1998, p.171). The aim is to 
reveal causal processes. The graphical format of knowledge that 
is structured in a causal arrangement can support this aim in a 
way that is not possible with, for example, mind mapping where 
relationships between nodes are associative rather than causal.  
To study overruns in complex 
projects. 
Causal maps are ‘very valuable if the studied action domain or 
system of knowledge is extensive’ (Laukkanen, 1998, p.171). 
Complex projects can comprise innumerable stakeholders, 
social relationships, politics, and other factors. Therefore the 
knowledge domain is likely to be extensive. The graphical format 
of causal maps support understanding of this wide array of 
knowledge (Eden, 1992). 
To understand why projects fail to 
reach their intended goals of cost 
and time performance. 
Causal maps are goal orientated (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2002, p.22) therefore are aligned to the underlying hierarchical 
structure of a project which comprises activities in order to 
achieve objectives which in turn attend to achieving goals. Other 
approaches such as mind maps are not arranged in a 
hierarchical structure therefore are less representative portrayals 
of the situation.  
To conduct research that is 
rigorous and repeatable. 
Causal maps have formal guidelines for their development and 
analysis (Ackermann and Eden, 2010). The same is not true of 
other mapping techniques such as mind mapping. Guidelines 
provide a structured, documented, pathway that can support 
rigorous application of the technique as well as making the 
approach repeatable. Both rigour and repeatability are important 
to achieving quality research.  
Figure 18 Comparison of causal map characteristics with research objectives 
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With the field of view narrowed on to causal mapping, the next section examines 
available approaches to causal mapping. 
 
3.4.4.2 Available Approaches to Causal Mapping 
A review of the literature reveals approaches to elicitation, construction and 
analysis of causal mapping abound (Figure 19).  The approaches can be classified 
as belonging to one of two types - nomothetic or idiographic. Using this typology to 
classify the approaches in Figure 19 reveals that available approaches are 
nomothetic in nature with the single exception of Eden’s (1988) idiographic 
approach.  
In this study, an idiographic approach was chosen over nomothetic approaches. 
The following discussion reveals the logic that underpinned this choice. In order to 
set the scene, the discussion is opened with a synopsis of both nomothetic and 
idiographic approaches. The two approaches are then examined in detail revealing 
that nomothetic approaches aim for ‘law’ like findings and have reductionist 
tendencies, both of which are inconsistent with the needs of the proposed intensive 
critical realist research study of project overruns. Eden’s (1988) approach is also 
examined which is found to be consistent with the needs of this research study 
because of its ability to construct causal maps that are high fidelity portrayals of 
participant knowledge and thus help achieve a deeper form of understanding of 
phenomena than the ‘shallow’ form of nomothetic approaches. The discussion 
makes use of terms that have specific meaning within the modelling domain 
therefore for the avoidance of confusion the terms and their meaning is presented 
below: 
• Model - the entire causal map of a research participant.  
• Construct – a ‘node’ of a model, comprising a portion of text 
• Relationship – the links between nodes that hold the whole model together. 
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Figure 19 Approaches to causal mapping 
 Data 
Collection  
Setting 
Data Elicitation 
Type 
Data Elicitation 
Procedure 
Model 
Construction 
Data 
Preparation 
Model Data  Participant Model 
Analysis Comparison of Models 
Extent of 
Practical 
Guidance 
Nelson et al. 
(2000) Interview Semi-structured 
Broad opening 
questions 
Post data 
collection 
episode 
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Structure 
 
Manual 
- - 
 
Armstrong 
(2005) 
Interview 
Unstructured/ 
semi-structured/ 
structured 
- 
Post data 
collection 
episode 
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Content and 
structure 
 
Manual 
Content and 
structure 
 
Manual 
Sufficient 
 
Laukkanan 
(1988) 
Interview Semi-structured 
Discussion 
around ‘anchor 
points’ 
Post data 
collection 
episode 
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Content and 
structure 
 
Computer aided 
Content and 
structure 
 
Computer aided 
Limited 
 
Larsen and 
Niederman 
(2005) 
Interview Semi-structured 
Broad &  specific 
opening 
questions 
Post data 
collection 
episode 
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic - - - 
Jenkins and 
Johnson 
(2003) 
Group 
followed by 
interview 
Semi-structured 
& structured - 
Post data 
collection 
episode 
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Content and 
structure 
 
Computer aided 
Content and 
structure 
 
Computer aided 
- 
Bougon 
(1983) 
Group 
followed by 
interview 
Unstructured & 
structured 
Self-Q & limited 
pool 
During data 
collection 
episode 
- Standardised, nomothetic - - - 
Marcózy and 
Golberg 
(1995) 
Interview Semi-structured Limited pool 
During data 
collection 
episode   
Transcription 
and coding 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Structure 
 
Manual 
Structure 
 
Manual 
- 
Tegarden & 
Tegarden 
(2005) 
Group Semi-structured Framing Statement 
During data 
collection 
episode   
Coding of 
statements 
Standardised, 
nomothetic 
Structure 
 
Manual 
- - 
Eden 1988 Interview/ Group Semi-structured 
Broad opening 
questions 
followed by 
laddering 
During data 
collection 
episode 
- Particular, idiosyncratic 
Content and 
structure 
 
Computer aided 
Structural and 
content Extensive 
103 
 
104 
 
3.4.4.3 Synopsis of Idiographic and Nomothetic Approaches 
Eden (1988) and Eden and Ackermann (1998) approach to the development of 
idiographic causal maps has been systematically refined over more than 25 years 
(Eden, 1988, Ackermann et al., 2014) and is founded upon Kelly’s theory of 
personal constructs (Kelly, 1955). The aim of the approach is to develop a map that 
is a close portrayal of a participant’s knowledge, experience, and views, and thus 
represents a participant’s perception of a situation. These maps can be high fidelity 
and so provide the researcher with a deep understanding of the situation being 
studied.   
Nomothetic approaches on the other hand generate maps that can be compared 
through statistical analysis with the aim of revealing general patterns  (Laukkanan, 
1998) or laws in the data that apply to a larger population (indeed the prefix nomos 
means ‘law’). 
The differing aims of the two approaches naturally lead to alternative means of 
elicitation, construction and analysis. For example, when eliciting data using an 
idiographic approach, there is little a priori structure imposed by the researcher, only 
a small number of opening questions are prepared in advance of the interview 
(Eden, 1992, p.310). During the interview further data are elicited using a process of 
laddering (Baker, 2002) whereby the researcher continuously asks the participant to 
describe the consequences and explanations of their previous response using 
questions such as ‘why did that come about?’ or ‘what impact did that have?’. 
Consequently, new data are elicited and the laddering process begins again. Thus 
laddering provides a form of scaffolding (Vygotsky, 1978) with which the researcher 
can surface the views of the participant in a structured manner. However, rather 
than the structure being imposed a priori by the researcher, the interview is being 
designed ‘as it unfolds’ (Eden, 2004, p.685),  
Following the process of laddering down (to reveal explanations) or up (to reveal 
consequences), responses to the opening questions are continuously elaborated to 
reveal causal chains of argument that gradually emerge over the course of the 
interview, culminating to form a causal map. Revealing causal chains of argument 
elicits a deep form of knowledge that goes beyond superficial understandings to 
reveal the nuance of the situation (Spender and Eden, 1998).  
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Bryson et al. (2004, p.292) suggest that the choice of which initial data are 
explored first be ‘the interviewee’s choice’ therefore the structure of the interview 
(and thus data) can, in large part, be participant determined rather than researcher 
determined. The participant thus has significant freedom of response and as a 
consequence, causal mapping ‘has the capacity to produce very rich data’ (Brown, 
1992, p.294) that can give a comprehensive view of the situation from the participant 
perspective. Moreover, giving the participant control of the interview means ‘the 
subject expresses himself in ‘natural language’ and organizes his thoughts around a 
logic that is also generally referred to as ‘natural’ (Cossette and Audet, 1992, p.328). 
Capturing language and logic (causal chains) that is ‘natural’ to the participant in the 
causal map brings the map closer to a representation of participant thinking, their 
knowledge of the situation. Finally, laddering gives the model a reflexive 
characteristic as participants are driven toward thinking about ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
therefore the mapping experience help the participant make sense of the situation. 
Through the process just described, the researcher and participant are brought 
closer to a better understanding of the situation.  
By comparison, nomothetic approaches tend to adopt a more structured 
approach to data elicitation by using structured interview protocols of the sort 
described in section 3.4.2. These protocols can be as simple as ‘probing around a 
set of anchor topics’ (Laukkanan, 1998, p.176) or more sophisticated such as 
Larsen and Niederman’s (2005) elaborate 7 topic, 35 question protocol. The 
intention of both these protocols is to achieve the nomothetic aim of identifying 
patterns in the data by restricting elicited data to particular topics thus reducing 
variability and improve comparability between data to make the patterns more 
visible.   
The links in both nomothetic and idiographic maps are not deterministic (like a 
mathematical function), they identify what a thing ‘may’ do rather than what it will do 
and in this respect the technique is consistent with the underlying philosophy of 
research discussed earlier (Bryson et al. 2004). 
Nomothetic and idiographic approaches both adopt data coding as a means of 
managing voluminous data however their approaches are quite different. In the case 
of nomothetic approaches, data can be coded either by the researcher (Laukkanan, 
1998, Armstrong, 2005, Larsen and Niederman, 2005) or participants (Bougon, 
1983, Tegarden and Tegarden, 2005). Coding of data in nomothetic approaches are 
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geared toward data reduction in order to enable common patterns in large scale 
data to be revealed.  
By comparison, coding using an idiographic approach is geared toward retaining 
detail and thus meaning. This is because the aim of idiographic mapping is to get 
close to the participants understanding as possible therefore retention of details is 
necessary for the meaning of the participant to be accurately understood. 
Ackermann and Eden (2010) recommend that statements be 6-8 words in length, 
action oriented and may also include a contrasting pole to improve meaning. These 
guidelines help to manage voluminous data but at the same time retain meaning in 
the statements. This is in contrast to nomothetic approaches where aggressive 
reduction of data, sometimes to as little as one word, results in a loss of detail and 
thus meaning (see for example, Laukkanan, 1998). 
Idiographic approaches also differ from nomothetic approaches in how the 
causal maps are constructed. In an idiographic approach the causal map is 
constructed by the researcher during the data elicitation episode (Eden, 1992) rather 
than away from field as is the case in some nomothetic approaches (e.g. Armstrong, 
2005). Constructing the map during the episode allows for verification that the 
researcher has correctly understood both the content and logic (causality) of the 
participant as the map begins to emerge. As touched upon earlier this immediate 
feedback mechanism also allows the participant to check their understanding of the 
situation enabling a process of sense making (Weick, 1995) to take place, thus 
improving the maps representativeness of the situation being explored. (Eden and 
Ackermann, 1998)   
Finally, idiographic and nomothetic maps are subject to different approaches to 
analysis. As discussed, the aim of nomothetic mapping is pattern recognition 
therefore analysis tends to be of a statistical nature with some approaches offering 
software to support the process (Laukkanan, 1998). By comparison, the aim of 
analysis of idiographic maps is to improve understanding of the situation being 
studied by exploring the properties of the map (Eden et al., 1992). For example, one 
property that can be explored is to reveal ‘central’ (or ‘busy’) statements, identifiable 
by their having a high number of causal links connected to them which in turn 
suggests their salience to the situation being examined (Eden and Ackermann, 
1998). On identifying the structural importance of central statement, the content of 
the statement, as well as that of statements linking in and out of it, are examined to 
understand what it is about this statement that makes it so salient. Thus, analysis of 
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causal maps using an idiographic approach has concern for both structure 
(exploring the relationships between statements) and content (the statements 
comprising individual nodes). Idiographic models can be large, containing many 
hundreds of concepts. Thus while manual analysis of a model is possible, analysis 
is typically undertaken with the aid of computer software (Decision Explorer). 
The outcome of nomothetic and idiographic approaches are distinctly different 
maps. Figure 20 shows a typical nomothetic map and Figure 21 and example of an 
idiographic map. Both maps are explored in more detail in the following discussion 
 
 
Figure 20 Example of a nomothetic map from Laukkanan (1998, p.181)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buying Skills  
Profitability  
Buying capacity 
(Re-
arrangement) 
Cash flow 
Short-term 
credit 
Control systems 
Cash rebates 
Image 
Liquidity 
Inventories 
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Figure 21 Example of a idiographic map (Ackermann et al, 2014) 
 
3.4.4.4 Compatibility of Idiographic and Nomothetic Approaches with 
Research Needs 
Both nomothetic and idiographic approaches are valuable in their own right. 
Nomothetic approaches offer the possibility of large scale comparison thus revealing 
common properties of a population. An idiographic approach on the other hand 
offers a nuanced understanding of situations through maps that capture the 
idiosyncrasies of participant knowledge and thus are close portrayals of a 
participants view of the situation being studied. 
The aim for methods in this study is to synchronise researcher understandings 
with those of the participant. More specifically, the aim is to gain a nuanced 
appreciation of participant knowledge and thus the project overrun situation being 
explored. This aim leads the researcher toward the adoption of an idiographic 
approach over nomothetic approaches, since nomothetic approaches are concerned 
with pattern recognition rather than detailed understanding.  
To gain a nuanced appreciation of participant knowledge maps that can 
articulate the idiosyncrasies of participant knowledge are beneficial because they 
allow the researcher to gain a subtle understanding of the situation by providing a 
portrayal of participant knowledge that is rich in detail. 
Nomothetic approaches, however, dilute detail. Highly structured interviews 
constrict participant explanation to only variables determined a priori by the 
interviewer. These variables may be forcing the participant ‘to work within a set of 
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variables which is not central to their individual cognitions of a situation’ therefore 
preventing them from comprehensively describing their view of things and, 
importantly, preventing new insights being revealed that can ‘be at the core of why 
the situation is perceived as problematic’ (Eden, 2004, p.677). In short, restricting 
participant explanation pushes ‘the number of constructs elicited towards an 
interviewer determined level’ (Eden et al., 1992, p.312) rather than a level 
determined by the participant as necessary to explain the situation. Consequently, it 
is questionable whether the resultant map is a portrayal of the participant’s view of 
the situation and thus impairing the comprehensiveness of the researchers 
understanding of the situation. . 
Coding in nomothetic approaches also removes detail. As can be seen in Figure 
20, the coding of data can reduce constructs to just a few words. While the resultant 
coded maps are valuable for comparison, the aggressive reduction dilutes detail 
resulting in a loss of meaning creating ambiguity over what the map is articulating. 
For example, in Figure 20, it is not clear what ‘building capacity’ means; Whose 
capacity?, and capacity in what? The ambiguity leaves the researcher with a less 
accurate comprehension of the situation. While, the researcher might deduce 
meaning from the map, this might not be the meaning the participant had in mind. 
Thus researcher has a less accurate view of the situation  
The results of Eden and Ackermann’s (1998) idiographic approach with its open 
interview style, less aggressive data coding and thus preservation of meaning, is 
causal maps where ‘valuable richness and detail in individual cognition are not lost’ 
(Hodgkinson and Clarkson, 2005, p.54). In other words, maps that are detailed and 
comprehensive representations of participants idiosyncratic knowledge of situations 
(Figure 21) capturing participant knowledge in all its richness and complexity. Thus, 
idiographic maps are much closer portrayals of participant knowledge than those of 
nomothetic mapping, helping us achieve the goal of getting as close to participant 
understandings as possible.  
 
Construction and analysis 
As discussed, construction of the causal map in many of the nomothetic 
approaches takes place away from data elicitation. Using an idiographic approach 
on the other hand, the researcher constructs the map during elicitation. This carries 
with it a number of benefits which, like the rest of Eden and Ackermann’s (1998)    
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approach, contributes to maps that are accurate representations of participant 
knowledge. For example, maps can act as a ‘guiding, orienting and regulating 
instrument’ (Cosset and Audet, 1992, p.330) during data elicitation helping the 
researcher navigate a systematic exploration of the situation being explored , thus 
improving the researchers understanding of the participants world.  Moreover, as the 
map emerges during data elicitation participant validation is made possible.  Bryson 
et al. (2004, p.292) advise that the researcher continually ‘test’ whether the map 
accurately portrays the participant’s logic (and content) by regularly feeding back to 
them what has been captured. This allows the researcher to continually refine their 
understandings. These benefits are not brought to light if the map is constructed 
away from the field.  
Finally, data analysis procedures of an idiographic approach are geared toward 
understanding meaning (Ackermann and Eden, 2011) whereas nomothetic 
approaches are geared toward revealing patterns (Laukkanan, 1998) which is not 
the aim of this research. 
In summary, the choice of the two types of mapping (nomothetic and 
idiographic) boils down to much the same criteria as those presented in ‘interview 
structuring’ section. It is that there is a trade-off between ‘saliency, capturing the 
variables and relationships which accurately reflect the cognition of the individual, 
and comparability, ensuring that there is sufficient commonality between maps to 
make them meaningful comparisons’ (Jenkins, 1998, p.240). Since the aim of this 
research study is accurate reflection of the knowledge of individuals the author 
trades off the extent of comparability between maps.  
 
3.4.4.5 Limitations of an Idiographic Approach  
The main limitation levelled at an idiographic approach is the ‘trade-off’ of 
comparability between maps. For example, Hodgkinson and Clarkson (2005, p.54) 
suggest that ‘a major drawback’ of capturing idiographic data ‘is the problems this 
poses for comparative analysis purposes’. The main ‘problem’ is that unlike 
nomothetic approaches, idiographic data are not standardised therefore comparison 
between data is not as easily achieved as it is in nomothetic approaches.   
While not as easy as in nomothetic approaches, comparison of idiographic data 
is possible therefore to suggest idiographic data is a major drawback for 
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comparative analysis is too strong. Eden and Ackermann (1992, 1998, 2011), for 
example, have written extensively about comparison of idiographic maps using the 
Decision Explorer software to support analysis.  Clearly data will not be identical 
across idiographic maps (as it would be using a nomothetic approach where data 
has been standardised). However, this does not preclude comparison. The basic 
principle in comparing idiographic maps is that the researcher looks for content that 
is synonymous across maps thus revealing similarity. This is process is not so 
different to nomothetic approaches, only that identifying the similarity across maps is 
more resource intensive because the data has been not be standardised and is 
more voluminous than a nomothetic map. Thus, although comparison between 
idiographic maps is likely to be time consuming, idiographic data cannot be claimed 
to be a major drawback with respect to comparing maps.  
What is fairer to say is that, where the aim of research is statistical 
generalisation, idiographic approaches are perhaps not the best way to proceed. 
The high volume and low standardisation in data is likely to make for a very 
resource intensive comparative analysis. On the other hand, if the aim of research is 
to develop deep understandings, and from those understandings generate 
generalisable theory, then idiographic approaches are the way forward.   
 
3.4.4.6 Causal Mapping Vs Narrative Approach to Qualitative Interviews 
The discussion thus far has explored causal mapping as the technique being 
used for elicitation, capture and analysis of data from interviews. A more typical 
approach to interviewing revolves around data that is in a narrative format. There 
has been no comprehensive comparison drawn between causal mapping and 
narrative approaches within the methodological literature. However, reflection upon 
both approaches reveals a number of benefits of causal mapping, some of which 
have been touched upon above. 
As discussed earlier, the literature suggests participant knowledge is retained in 
the form of causal maps. Therefore, maps are arguably closer portrayals of 
participant knowledge than narrative format and can bring the researcher closer to 
participants understandings.  
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A benefit of the graphical format of a causal map is that the researcher can more 
readily interact with the data than is the case with a narrative format. As Miles and 
Huberman (1994, p.91) explain: 
 ‘unreduced text alone is a weak and cumbersome form of display...it is 
dispersed over many pages and is not easy to see as a whole. It is 
sequential rather than simultaneous, making it difficult to look at two or 
three variables at once ….It is usually poorly ordered, and it can get very 
bulky’.   
The picture painted above by Miles and Huberman (1994) is a form of data 
display that, while adequately capturing data, makes interaction with the captured 
data challenging.  
A causal map by comparison is a powerful device that actively supports and 
encourages the researcher (and the participant) to interact with the data while it is 
being elicited allowing reflection (Eden, 1992). The graphical format enables data to 
be examined in a holistic manner allowing features such as islands of data, holes in 
the data or under developed data to be readily detected and thus explored 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2010). For example, initial opening questions of an interview 
might generate a series of islands of data. The concise format of a map gives the 
researcher a holistic view of the data and can, almost at a glance, detect features 
such as islands. By comparison, the voluminous data involved in narrative 
communication makes detecting features such as islands of data far more 
challenging.  
Causal mapping is also a form of basic analysis of qualitative data (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), revealing the causal linkages between data. Therefore 
constructing a causal map enables both data collection and some basic data 
analysis to take place during an interview with the participant.  As discussed earlier, 
as the map emerges the interviewer regularly feeds back their comprehension of 
what the participant has told them in an aid to verify the accuracy of understanding 
(Bryson et al. 2004). This continual feeding back encourages two forms of analysis. 
Firstly, feedback encourages the participant to reflect on their initial articulation, 
allowing the participant to test the causal logic of their initial understandings (Eden, 
1992, Cosset and Audet, 1992) through mental simulation (Jenkins, 1998) 
supported by the map. This reflection might challenge their initial understandings 
helping them to make sense of the situation (Wieck, 1995), helping mitigating issues 
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such as recall bias and thus bringing the map to a closer portrayal of the situation 
being explored.  
Feedback also allows the participant to analyse, and thus validate, the 
researchers understanding of the causal logic (and content) they feel they have 
expressed. Thus a second form of analysis is provided whereby misinterpretation by 
the researcher can be detected and addressed thus improving the accuracy of the 
logic contained in the map as a reflection of the participant’s understandings.  This 
process of participant validation helps to mitigate the effects of a double 
hermeneutic identified earlier (page. 96) as being a weakness of a qualitative 
interview. 
Finally, researchers (Miles and Huberman, 1994, Ackermann and Eden, 2010) 
suggest that revealing causality from a narrative is challenging therefore to reveal 
causality with the participant during the interview is advantageous.   
To summarise, this thesis adopts a causal mapping approach, in particular that 
of Eden (1988), as part of a case study research design.  Barr et al. (1992, p.20) 
suggest that causal mapping ‘provides detailed, rigorously collected information 
about managerial thinking that is not typically found in case studies’. 
Returning briefly to a narrative approach, it does have at least one advantage 
over causal mapping which is ease of learning. Learning causal mapping is far from 
a trivial matter (Eden, 1995, Rosenhead, 2006). The basic issue is transferring the 
necessary skills from experts (who are often the developers of the technique) to the 
learner. As Keys (2006, p.827) notes it is the problem of ‘getting knowledge into 
novices’.  
Keys (2006, p.822) suggests there has been a general ‘lack of concern with the 
process by which individuals learn how to use such methods’. However, reading 
across the literature some strategies for learning causal mapping emerge. One 
strategy is ‘consultation with an experienced practitioner’ (Rosenhead and Mingers, 
2001, pxiv) or perhaps better still an ‘apprenticeship’ (Robinson, 2007) where the 
expert can transfer the ’craft skills‘ (Morrill, 2007, p.687) of applying the technique. 
However, Robinson (2007) notes that a major limitation to this strategy is that ‘there 
are so few teachers’ with whom a learner might gain an apprenticeship.   
The limitation of finding a mentor is not encountered in this study. This is 
because the researchers academic supervisor is expert in the field of causal 
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mapping technique in general (Ackermann, 2012), and in its application in the 
context of complex project behaviour in particular Ackermann et al. (2014). Thus an 
apprenticeship model of learning was pursued by this researcher.  
A second strategy for learning is through ‘practical, case-based experience, 
which encourages learning through reflection’ (Morrill, 2007, p.688). Although the 
author had little direct practical experience himself, during the PhD opportunities 
became available to support teaching of causal mapping therefore improving 
familiarity with the technique and gaining vicarious experience through students’ 
application of the technique. 
The final strategy identified to support learning is through the use of literature. 
By comparison to other developers (Bougon, 1983, Laukkanan, 1998, Armstrong, 
2005), Eden and Ackermann (1998) provide an extensive range of books and 
journal articles aimed directly at transferring the technique to others.  While 
academics (Rosenhead and Mingers (2001)) and practitioners (Morrill 2007, 
Robinson, 2007) agree that ‘reading about PSMs does not provide a sense of 
confidence about implementing them’, reading was used to complement the two 
other strategies of mentoring and practice described above. 
To summarise, based upon the foregoing arguments, the idiographic approach 
described by Eden (1988) and Ackermann and Eden (2011) was adopted favour of 
other causal mapping techniques because it was both theoretically desirable and 
practically feasible within the context of this study of overruns in projects. 
 
3.5 SUMMARY OF PART A – METHODOLOGY SECTION 
As discussed in the introduction, this section has sought to instil confidence in 
the reader that the approach to research was developed in a rigorous and thoughtful 
manner. To attend to this aim the section has made transparent the rationale 
underpinning the various elements of the overall approach to research. 
It has explored available philosophy’s revealing that the assumptions of critical 
realism align more closely with the needs of this study than those of alternative 
paradigms. In particular, critical realism’s aim for causal explanation was found to 
resonate with the research aims of understanding why and how project overruns can 
be brought into being. Furthermore, the section examined the implications for theory 
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of adopting a critical realist approach which provided the reader with forward 
visibility of what they can expect in terms of the nature of the contribution to theory 
as well as helping synchronise the reader with the author’s understanding of the 
paradigm. Moreover, it was argued that critical realism offers the possibility of 
findings that can be convergent with those of the extant project management 
literature, even though extant research has largely adopted an alternative realist 
approach of positivism.  
A comprehensive examination of various research designs was conducted. It 
was concluded that a qualitative case study design was more compatible than 
alternatives for pursuing explanations that attend to questions of why? and how? 
Subsequently it was argued that semi-structured interviews be the primary method 
of data collection supported by other methods such as documentation and 
observation wherever possible.  
Finally, the section examined causal mapping as the research technique that 
was adopted for the elicitation, recording, and analysis of data from interviews. It 
was argued that an idiographic approach to causal mapping offered the possibility of 
deep insights that took account of causality and that these characteristics are 
compatible with a critical realist aim of achieving causal explanation.  
Throughout, this section has sought to demonstrate that while the approach is 
derived from individual choices each choice is logically compatible with the others. 
Consequently, they form a cohesive approach to research that can generate 
credible findings that can be accepted into the extant body of research. Figure 22 
below illustrates how the various choices interlock to create a cohesive approach to 
research that attends to the research aims of this study of project overruns.   
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Figure 22 Model of research approach used in this study of overruns in projects 
 
Theory of Methods 
Critical Realism 
Research Procedure 
(strategy) 
Intensive  
Research Design 
Qualitative Case Study  
Research Methods 
Interviews 
  Research Technique 
Causal Mapping 
Research Aims 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Development of causal 
explanations detailing the 
process that can bring about 
overruns in projects 
Development of theory 
that is of the ‘middle 
range’ type   
Development of findings 
that can be analytically 
generalised 
Development of findings 
that can be 
complementary to existing 
PM knowledge 
Suited to revealing causal processes by focusing on a particular case 
or small number of cases 
Focus on a cross 
sectional rather than 
longitudinal design due 
to resource limitations 
Suited to providing an in-depth 
understanding of phenomena and 
so can reveal the ‘cogs and 
wheels’ of causal processes 
Examine at least 2 
case studies to 
improve credibility of 
findings 
Select polar types to 
improve likelihood of 
learning 
Adopt the interview as the 
principle data collection method 
to mitigate the effects of 
mediation  
Use secondary data to triangulate with 
interview data, recognising the limitations 
of these sources.   
Elicit and capture interview participant data in a causal format to improve visibility & 
understanding of causal processes that are at work  
Understand the causes of overruns in projects 
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3.6 PART B – APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter on research methodology, the 
chapter is split into two parts. Part A focused upon explaining the theory of methods 
(methodology) that underpins the approach to research in this study and examined 
the four aspects of research philosophy, research procedure (strategy), research 
design, research method, and research technique.  
In this second part of the chapter the practical application of the approach to 
research is examined. The section opens with back ground to the study before 
moving on to discussing data collection and data analysis activities.  
 
3.6.1 Background to the Research Study 
The research study was conducted in partnership with the UK branch of a multi-
national construction business. The name of the organisation as well as those of the 
case study projects and research participants have been anonymised to honour the 
confidentiality of those involved in the research. The organisation is hereon referred 
to as ‘BuildIt’. 
BuildIt’s involvement in the research stemmed from a longer term relationship 
between BuildIt and the researchers academic supervisor. Facilitated by this 
relationship, the researcher conducted an MSc dissertation project with BuildIt which 
explored factors affecting project ‘failure’. Failure in this instance was taken to mean 
projects that had not achieved their desired objectives, in particular their financial 
objectives. As part of its on-going business improvement activities, BuildIt conducted 
post-project reviews however it was felt that engaging the author of this thesis could 
provide the opportunity for fresh insights to be revealed.  
Subsequent to completion of the MSc project, BuildIt were keen to progress with 
a more detailed study, recognising that the MSc study was relatively short in 
duration and thus limited in its extensiveness. Consequently, BuildIt agreed their 
continued involvement with the researcher under the auspices of PhD research, 
renewing their commitment to provide access to suitable case study projects (by 
mutual agreement). 
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The organisational sponsor for the research was the Managing Director (MD) of 
BuildIt. Working with a sponsor at such a high level within the organisation provided 
validity to the research. The endorsement of the MD facilitated access to case study 
projects and research participants.  
The following section explains how data was collected from BuildIt, focusing in 
particular on the interview process and how case studies and participants were 
identified. 
 
3.6.2 Data Collection  
Strauss and Corbin (2008, p.300) suggest that for qualitative research findings 
to be credible it is important that there is ample detail and description of the 
research ‘so that readers feel that they were vicariously in the field’. To attend to this 
requirement this section describes in detail the data collection activities of the three 
phases of field work which comprised this study (Figure 23). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Conceptual model of the approach to research 
 
The research methodology literature suggests that, rather than being developed 
in a one off event at the beginning of research, a qualitative research design 
 
Data Collection Activity (interviews) 
Outputs: causal maps   
Findings including reflections on data collection 
process.   
Research cycle 
 Phase 0 - Trial 
  
Phase 1: Case Study 1 Phase 2: Case Study 2    
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emerges through a process of progressive refinement (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, 
Bryman and Bell, 2011). To support the process of refinement, reflective notes were 
made during each phase of the field work. The reflective notes captured the issues 
that were encountered during the field work, how these were addressed, the 
learning that was gained and how it informed future phases of field work. A synopsis 
of the reflective notes for each phase is included within this chapter, thereby 
providing the reader with further vicarious experience of the study (Strauss and 
Corbin, 2008). 
 
3.6.2.1 Pilot Phase 0 - Trialling the Methodology and Managing 
Stakeholders 
The reasons for conducting phase 0 of the research were twofold. The first 
concerned stakeholder management. In the period between the MSc project ending 
and PhD research beginning the Managing Director of BuildIt changed. Since the 
MD was the sponsor for the research this change was significant therefore it 
seemed to this researcher that an initial phase of work would be valuable for 
ensuring that the new MD and the researcher were on the ‘same page’ before 
launching in to an in-depth study of a particular case.  
The second reason for phase 0 was to trial the research design laid out in 
section 3.4, in particular using the causal mapping technique as part of the interview 
element of the design. Prior to undertaking PhD field work, the researcher had 
gained a nuanced understanding of the theory of causal mapping but had little 
practical experience of applying causal mapping in an interview situation.  
Given the centrality of causal mapping to the research design, the researcher 
believed that conducting trial interviews was a sensible way forward. It seemed to 
this researcher that high quality research findings from these first attempts at 
interviewing using causal mapping was an unlikely outcome given his lack of 
experience. Therefore, rather than examine a case study project (which could have 
led to a potentially wasted research opportunity), the locus of trail interviews was the 
general topic of overruns in projects. This kept the content, and thus experience, of 
the interview similar to that of an actual case study project. The learning gained from 
this experience is captured in the reflective notes associated with this phase of work 
(page.121).  
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In terms of identifying participants to interview, the researcher followed the 
advice of Lincoln and Guba (1985, p233) who suggest that researchers identify ‘in 
whatever way we can’ a few initial members of the group then snowball sample 
forward.  Armstrong (2005) points out that snowball sampling is valuable in 
situations when access to particular domain expertise is important but the 
researcher cannot easily identify the experts. This was the case for this researcher. 
The snowballing ‘technique asserts that those individuals closest to a domain 
are appropriate to define the experts of that domain) because they know one 
another’ (Armstrong, 2005, p.24. Thus having access to at least one member of the 
domain would provide access to other participants. Following this approach, the 
researcher sought advice from the MD of BuildIt on appropriate participants for 
phase 0. This led to the identification of a Major Projects Director (MPD), who in 
turn, facilitated connections with a Senior Project Manager and a Commercial 
Manager.  
As noted above, the locus of discussion for interviews was of a general nature 
rather than focusing on a particular case project. To elicit data from participants the 
interviews were opened with the following open question ‘can you tell me about what 
you see as the key issues that can bring about overruns in projects?’ This question 
led to a series of data being offered by the participants which were subsequently 
elaborated using the process of laddering described in section 3.4.4.2.   
Data was captured in the form of a hand written causal models. Reliance on 
hand written notes carried with it the benefits of narrative field notes over technology 
based data capture (such as the use of software or audio recording equipment). 
Benefits include being less threatening to participant than technology and not 
suffering from technical gremlins (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p.241). Moreover, as 
described in section 3.4.4.6, capturing the maps during the interview meant they 
could be verified and, where necessary, adapted to improve representativeness of 
the participant’s understandings.  
Interviews took place at a local BuildIt office with each participant interviewed on 
two separate occasions allowing further data capture but also verification of data 
that had been captured at the previous interview session.  
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3.6.2.2 Phase 0 Reflections 
Phase 0 provided valuable learning on a variety of fronts. For example, Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) advise that the researcher must pace the interview and keep it 
productive. Pacing during phase 0 interviews was a problem. The issue was over 
production of data which overwhelmed the researcher during the interview sessions.  
Participants were producing data so quickly, and moving around the topic area so 
frequently, that it became difficult for the researcher to capture the data in a 
coherent manner. This was evidenced in the resultant causal maps which, 
structurally, appeared as a series of small islands of material that had not been fully 
developed. These islands were indicative of the interviewee giving mention to a 
particular aspect then moving on to another aspect before the researcher had time 
to elaborate the island or understand how it fitted with other data that had already 
been elicited.  
Reflecting upon this experience revealed that the issue of over production was 
caused by the structure of the interview. As noted above, the opening question of 
the trial interviews was ‘can you tell me about what you see as the key issues that 
can bring about overruns in projects?’ This question led participants to rhyme off a 
series of issues that they felt pertinent to the question. The researcher then hurriedly 
attempted to capture all of these points at once, meanwhile however the participant 
had already begun to elaborate their points. This ultimately left the researcher 
overloaded with data and disoriented in terms of how to elaborate each of the issue 
that had been identified by the participant in a coherent manner.  
To tackle this data overload the opening question for the first case study project 
was refined to ‘can you tell me about what you see as the 3 or 4 key issues that you 
saw as influential in the outcome of the project?’ By bounding the opening question, 
the researcher could capture the 3 or 4 initially identified issues then elaborate upon 
them one by one. Once these initial issues had been explored, the researcher would 
then follow up by asking if there were other issues the participant felt were 
important. A further point of learning in this respect was the need to give visibility to 
the participant as to the structure of the interview and how it would unfold. For 
example, making clear that although the initial focus would be 3 or 4 issues, the 
intention was to explore all the issues that the participant felt were salient. This 
refined approach to opening interviews was subsequently adopted in the first case 
study.  
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A second point of learning from phase 0 concerned the matter of time allocated 
to each interview session. The researcher had asked participants for 1 hour of their 
time however more often than not interviews ran over this time. Reflecting upon 
phase 0, suggested that the main reason interviews ran over the allocated hour was 
because of what Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.270) refer to as the ‘initial moves’ of the 
interview whereby participants need time to ‘warm up’, ‘organise their head’ and get 
used to ‘talking to the interviewer’. The time spent on initial moves could be as much 
as 20 minutes of the interview session. This presented three points of refinement for 
the interview approach.  
Firstly, the interview process needed to be refined to include some ‘initial moves’ 
to support the participant in settling in to the interview session. To support this warm 
up Lincoln and Guba (1985) advise the use of ‘grand tour’ type questions such as 
‘what is a typical day like around here’ or ‘how did you happen to get into this line of 
work’. Secondly, the researcher would request longer time slots from participants to 
ensure that the interview was not cut short prematurely. However, this needed to be 
balanced with the third learning point from phase 0 interviews which was that by 1.5 
hours into an interview researcher fatigue had set in. Based upon the foregoing 
points, interviews would be brought to a close when one of the following points had 
been reached: 
• When interviewer fatigue set in 
• When a point of redundancy, or saturation (Ackermann and Eden, 2010) 
had been reached indicated by either the participant repeating material 
or being satisfied they had nothing further to add. 
• When the participant’s available time slot ran out.  
Interviewing participants twice ensured that by the end of the second interview, 
the point of saturation was the terminating point for the discussion rather than 
researcher fatigue or lack of participant time.   
One final point of reflection upon phase 0 is worthy of note which concerned the 
identification of case study 1. During phase 0 interviews, participants regularly made 
reference to ‘good’ practice as a means of drawing contrasting comparison with the 
issues they saw as influencing project overruns. All three participants of phase 0 
made reference to project A, when illustrating points of good practice. Thus project 
A emerged as a potential candidate case study that could be representative of a 
‘successful’ case as per the intended research design (described in section 3.4). 
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Although it was not the intention of phase 0 interviews to reveal potential case study 
projects, the approach aligns to Pettigrew’s (1990) strategy of using ‘planned 
opportunism’ to identify case studies whereby the researcher, with their goals in 
mind, keeps alert to opportunities for data collection.    
 
3.6.2.3 Case Study 1 (Phase 1) 
Pettigrew (1997, p.343) cautions that researchers ‘have no god given right to 
expect other people’s organisations to be their laboratories’. Consequently, 
(Pettigrew, 1990, p.279) advises that research is a ‘reciprocal activity’ between the 
researcher and the host organisation whereby researchers must give something 
back to their host organization in return for the time and data that they provide. 
Taking cognisance of the need for reciprocity, identification of case study projects 
needed to take place in agreement with BuildIt.  
Furnished with insight from phase 0, the researcher approached the Managing 
Director (MD) of BuildIt with the proposal that Project A could form one of the 
research case studies. Discussion with the MD revealed that project A was 
considered within the organisation to be a ‘bench mark’ for other projects and that 
they were keen to learn why Project A had been so successful and how this success 
could be transferred to other projects. Project A was a Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) project involving the design, build, financing, and operation of a large health 
care facility in the United Kingdom (UK) and was valued at over AUD$100 million2. 
Furthermore, the project had a large number of stakeholders including the client, 
end users, financiers and a facilities management provider. A more detailed 
description of the case is provided within the case study findings (page. 142). 
Based on the foregoing points, project A satisfied the ambitions of the research 
questions and research design which were to examine complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects; to investigate at least one ‘successful’ project; and for case 
study projects to be extreme or atypical.  
                                               
 
2 The precise value of the two case studies have been omitted in order to protect the 
identity of the projects  
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A further benefit of project A concerned trust between the researcher and 
participants. Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.256) suggest that ‘Respondents are much 
more likely to be both candid and forthcoming if they respect the inquirer and believe 
in his or her integrity’. Some of the participants of phase 0 were involved in Project A 
therefore trust had already begun to form with these participants who included the 
Managing Director, Project Director, Commercial Manager and Project Manager.  
Laukkanen (1998, p.172) advises that people’s knowledge is on finite areas in 
the real world, in other words that no one has complete visibility of everything. This 
raised the question in this researchers mind as to whether the four participants 
already identified were sufficient to gain a rounded view of the case study project. 
Ultimately the question was one of achieving requisite variety Ashby (1958). Thus 
the researcher felt that some means was needed of establishing whether requisite 
variety of perspectives could be achieved with the proposed participant list.  
To explore requisite variety, the participant list was examined from a variety of 
angles. First, the stages of the project lifecycle were examined to see what stages 
could be covered by the proposed participant perspectives (Figure 24). Since all 
participants had been involved in the project from beginning to end, the researcher 
felt that the proposed participant list offered good coverage in this respect. Next, the 
participant list was examined in terms of the hierarchy of the project (Figure 25), 
again the proposed list was found to provide good coverage. Lastly, the proposed 
list was examined in terms of the internal and external organisational perspectives. 
Here there was a gap because the four proposed participants were internal to 
BuildIt. The researcher felt there would be value in attempting to gain a perspective 
from outside of the organisation with which to complement the internal 
organisational perspectives and thus gain a comprehensive view of the project. 
Subsequent discussion with the Project Director facilitated access to the Director of 
the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) (a legal entity used to deliver the project) who 
could provide a perspective that was external to BuildIt and also spanned the 
organisational hierarchy as well as the project life cycle (Figure 24 Figure 26).  
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Project Life Cycle  
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Project Director 
Project Manager 
Managing Director 
Commercial Manager 
SPV Director 
Figure 24 Stages of project lifecycle represented by each participant 
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Project director 
Managing Director 
SPV Director 
Project Director 
Managing Director 
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Commercial Manager 
 
Figure 25 Levels of the organisation represented by each participant 
 
Internal/External Organisational Views 
Internal  External 
Project Director 
Project Manager 
Managing Director 
Commercial Manager 
 
SPV Director  
Figure 26 Internal and external organisational perspectives provided by participants 
 
The researcher also attempted to gain access to the end client for the project as 
another data source external to BuildIt. However, this was deemed inappropriate by 
BuildIt due to commercial sensitivities surrounding the project. Following the revised 
approach to interviewing participants (discussed earlier) the following participants of 
project A were interviewed: 
• Managing Director (BuildIt) 
• Project Director (BuildIt) 
• Project Manager (BuildIt) 
• Commercial Manager (BuildIt) 
• SPV Director (external to BuildIt) 
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3.6.2.4 Case Study 1 - Reflections 
The biggest challenge encountered during the course of case study 1 was 
accessing data. This was brought about in part by the researcher moving from the 
United Kingdom to Perth (Western Australia) but also because of internal 
organisational change taking place at BuildIt.  
The geographic distance of the researcher from the field meant there was a 
limited amount of time (due to costs) that could feasibly be spent on-site. Thus field 
interventions needed to be intensive periods of around 3 weeks in duration and 
forward planning was of paramount importance. Despite the researcher working with 
participant’s months in advance to schedule interviews, upon arrival in the UK 
interviews were subject to last minute change.  The major issue was organisational 
changes taking place at BuildIt which meant interviews were secondary to 
organisational priorities and thus were subject to change or cancellation at the last 
moment.  
While changes to schedule are to be expected in research, the frequency of 
change coupled with the fact that field visits were restricted to around 3 weeks in 
duration, put the number of planned interviews at risk. This risk suggested that a 
longer duration of field trip may need to be explored for case 2 if the risk of losing 
interviews was to be mitigated. To mitigate the issue in the current case, the 
researcher made himself available to participants at their earliest convenience and 
kept regular contact with participants to re-schedule interviews. As a consequence 
of these efforts, and despite the challenges of participants availability, all 
participants were interviewed twice with the exception of the Managing Director who 
was interviewed only once due to time restrictions.  
In terms of accessing other types of data, restricted access to the research site 
brought about by the researcher being located in Western Australia meant that 
opportunities for non-participant observation had to be foregone. Moreover, 
accessing secondary data was problematic. This may have been due to two 
compounding factors. Firstly, case study 1 was commercially sensitive which 
perhaps restricted sharing of data, and secondly, the pressures of organisational 
change priorities perhaps resulted in frequent requests for secondary data to be 
overlooked.   
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When making repeated requests for data, the researcher was acutely aware of a 
constant tension between what was theoretically desirable and what was practically 
feasible for the research. An incredibly fine line was being walked with respect to 
management of stakeholders. On the one hand secondary data would be highly 
valuable for the research however, on the other hand, repeatedly asking for access 
could have threatened the relationship that had been created between the 
researcher and BuildIt staff thus jeopardising access to primary sources of data 
which were of paramount importance.  
A final point of learning from case study 1 was the importance of researcher 
integrity. As noted earlier Lincoln and Guba (1985, p.256) suggest that 
‘Respondents are much more likely to be both candid and forthcoming if they 
respect the inquirer and believe in his or her integrity’. However, while the 
methodological literature recognises the importance of integrity in collecting data, 
little is said about how researchers can prepare themselves to demonstrate their 
integrity. Experience from case study 1 suggested that the researcher underwent 
implicit integrity tests from participants.  These tests may have been completely sub-
conscious but included inquiries by participants about who the other participants 
were in the study, with comments like ‘I don’t know who else you have been 
speaking to’ followed by a long pause. Alternatively participants inquired ‘I don’t 
know how what I’ve said fits with what ‘Steve’ has told you’ even through the 
researcher never revealed that he had spoken to ‘Steve’. These two forms of 
questions were subtle and in the ‘heat of the moment’ when the researcher was 
busy collecting data could have led to an auto-response, revealing the identity of 
other participants and bringing the integrity of the researcher into question. Thus it 
became clear that the researcher needed to be vigilant with respect to participant 
questions at all times.   
 
3.6.2.5 Case Study 2 (Phase 2) 
Following the completion of data collection for case study 1, a second case 
study was pursued with BuildIt. Lincoln and Guba, (1985, p.234) discuss the need 
for ‘orderly emergence’  of future cases rather than them being revealed in an ad 
hoc fashion. In order to support orderly emergence, the researcher looked to 
existing research participants for advice given they were all knowledgeable about 
the topic of overruns and were, by now, familiar with the aims of the research.  
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Initially, consideration was given to asking the most senior participant (the 
Managing Director) for candidate case study projects. However, the researcher felt 
that this approach might result a selection that was biased toward the interests of 
the MD. In order to mitigate this type of bias, all of the participants were asked to 
provide a list of suitable case studies. A case study selection matrix was developed 
to capture responses in an organised fashion and thus aid comparison between 
responses (Appendix A).  
The matrix canvassed participants for proposals of both ‘successful’ and 
‘unsuccessful’ projects. It is widely recognised within the PM literature that the term 
‘project success’ is difficult to define and depends upon the perspective from which 
the project is viewed (De Wit, 1988, Yu et al., 2005, Turner, 2009). Therefore, when 
using the term in the case selection matrix, no definition was provided to participants 
in the first instance, instead leaving participants to interpret the terms. The logic of 
this decision was that leaving the definition open might allow for intersubjectivity 
among participants to be revealed regarding the status of a project. The next case 
study project would, therefore, be selected on the basis of unanimous agreement 
across participants that the project has been ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’.  
Using the matrix, the responses were then triangulated across participants to 
reveal candidate projects. Given participants occupied various levels of 
organisational hierarchy, triangulated projects would offer more of an organisational 
view than rather than simply the view of ‘management’. 
Triangulating data across participant responses to the matrix revealed Project B 
as a potential candidate project that had experienced overruns. Again, as with case 
study 1, agreement was sought with the MD of BuildIt that Project B was suitable 
from an organisational perspective.  
Like the first case study, project B was a PFI project involving the design, build 
and operation of a large medical facility in the UK and was valued at over AUD$100 
million. The project also had a large number of stakeholders including the client, end 
users, financiers and a facilities management provider. However, project B was 
polar opposite to case study A in terms of its commercial performance – the project 
had experienced significant cost overrun during its operational phase. The similarity 
between the two projects but the contrasting outcomes offered the possibility of 
contrasting comparison of the two cases satisfying one of the research design 
requirements (section 3.4).  
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Based on the foregoing points, project B satisfied the ambitions of the research 
questions and research design which were to examine complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects; to investigate at least one project that had experienced 
overrun; and for case study projects to be extreme or atypical.  
Some of the staff that had been involved in case study 1 were also involved with 
case study 2 therefore the researcher had pre-established relationships with some 
participants of case study 2. These participants were the Managing Director, Project 
Director and Project Manager. While this initial list of participants could provide a 
range of views on case 2, the researcher felt there would be value in attempting to 
gain other perspectives based upon the coverage that had been achieved in case 
study 1 and thus widen the range of perspectives gathered. For example, two 
aspects that were missing from case study 2 but that had been covered in case 
study 1 were the early stages of the project (bid and design) and also a view from 
outside of BuildIt.  
The reason the early stages of case 2 were not covered by the Project Director 
(as was the situation in case 1) was because the current Project Director had not 
been involved in the early stages of the project.  To attend to this gap, the previous 
Project Director was frequently pursued by the researcher to participate in the 
research study. However, despite several attempts to secure an interview this was 
not possible. Again the significant organisational changes taken place at BuildIt 
were identified as playing a role. As an alternative, the Bid Director for case study 2 
was pursued and 2 interviews were successfully completed thus covering the early 
stages of the project’s life. 
The second aspect missing from the initial list of participants for case study 2 
was a perspective that was external to BuildIt. Consequently, through careful 
discussion with the Project Director of case study 2, access was facilitated to the 
business development director of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for the project 
(a legal entity used to deliver the project). Thus five participants were identified for 
participation in case study 2: 
• Managing Director (BuildIt) 
• Project Director (BuildIt) 
• Project Manager (BuildIt) 
• Business Development Director (BuildIt) 
• SPV Director (external) 
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The participant list ensured that the coverage of case study 2 was the same as 
that of case study 1 in terms of the project’s life cycle (Figure 27), the project’s 
organisational hierarchy (Figure 28), and proving views that were internal and 
external to BuildIt (Figure 29). 
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Figure 27 Stages of project lifecycle represented by each participant 
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Figure 28 Levels of the organisation represented by each participant 
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Figure 29 Internal and external organisational perspectives provided by participants 
 
Despite frequent requests by the researcher for access to company data on 
case B no secondary data was accessed. A full account of the possible reasons for 
this is discussed in the reflection notes of this case contained in the next section.  
Interviews for case study 2 followed the same format as those of case study 1 
whereby participants were interviewed on two occasions each lasting around one 
hour.  
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3.6.2.6 Case Study 2 – Reflections 
Like case study 1, the most significant challenge presented in case study 2 was 
accessing data however the situation had worsened significantly. Poor economic 
conditions coupled with significant organisational change taking place, meant staff at 
BuildIt were under enormous pressure attending to their ‘day job’, marginalising their 
ability to participate in the research study.  
As was the case with the first case study, the researcher was based in Western 
Australia while BuildIt was located in the UK. Despite the researcher working with 
participant’s months in advance to schedule interviews, upon arrival in the UK 
interviews were subject to last minute cancellation because of the aforementioned 
organisational context at BuildIt. Indeed, on at least two occasions the cancellation 
took place 10 minutes prior to the interview beginning. To mitigate the impact of 
cancellations the researcher made himself available to participants at their earliest 
convenience asking participants for only 24 hours’ notice and keeping in regular 
contact with participants to re-schedule. Whereas in case study 1, interviews took 
place locally (to the researchers field work base) the researcher opened up the 
location of interviews for case study 2 to be anywhere in the UK.  
Opening up availability to UK-wide carried with it its own issues. The literature 
emphasises the importance of a suitable meeting environment in which to conduct 
interviews (Ackermann and Eden, 2010, Bryman and Bell, 2011). However, on one 
occasion an interview needed to take place at a hotel where quiet space was 
limited. To mitigate the effects  of meeting in a public place (in particular the lack of 
privacy) the researcher visited the hotel the evening prior in order to establish a 
suitable meeting space so as to mitigate the effects on data collection.  
As a consequence of the above efforts, and despite the challenges of 
participants availability, all participants were interviewed twice with the exception of 
the Managing Director who was interviewed only once due to time restrictions.   
Accessing primary data for case study 2 had proven a monumental task. To 
illustrate, the intended duration of the field trip was around 3 weeks but in the end 
was extended to almost 9 weeks in order for the researcher to pursue all the 
participants. Accessing secondary data sources proved even more challenging. 
Despite numerous requests by the researcher for company data on case B, none 
was forth coming. The flux of organisational change coupled with staff being under 
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intense pressure presumably overwhelmed requests for data. Moreover, key 
stakeholders of the research at BuildIt (the Managing Director and Project Director) 
had moved on to other organisations creating further barriers to accessing 
secondary data sources post-field visits. 
Despite the absence of secondary data from BuildIt a rich and voluminous 
primary data set was collected for both case study 1 and case study 2. Thus the 
next step was to consider how this rich data could be analysed systematically, this is 
the focus of the next section. 
 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
This section describes the process of analysis that was followed to examine the 
case studies and arrive at research findings. Figure 30 below provides an overview 
of the process with the remainder of the section providing more detailed discussion.  
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Figure 30 Model of data analysis process 
 
As described previously (page. 120) the raw data for each case study comprised 
a series of idiographic causal models, each causal model capturing the data from 
interviewing an individual research participant. For example, in case study 1, five 
participants were interviewed producing five causal models.  
Raw causal model of a 
participant’s interview data  
Cluster like concepts in 
the causal model  
Label each cluster with a theme 
name describing cluster content  
Review and refine theme 
names  
Arrive at participant models 
presented in the form of themes 
Identify a theme (theme x) that is present 
in ‘n’ participant models 
Use the hierarchical structure of causal models to 
reveal themes related to theme x in ‘n’ 
participants models   
Arrive at an insight that theme x is related to 
theme y across ‘n’ participant data 
Reveal raw data of theme x and theme y for ‘n’ 
participants 
Compare raw data of ‘n’ participants  
Arrive at research findings that attend to 
questions of ‘why? How? and what?  
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Comparison of individual participant models was needed in order to identify 
elements of data that were salient to the case study and thus enable case study 
findings to be arrived at. However, as discussed (section 3.4.4.5), comparing 
idiographic models is not a trivial matter and are typical of qualitative data in 
general. To recap, the two principal reasons are that idiographic models do not 
contain standardised data (language) and the data is voluminous. The systemic 
effect of both of these issues is that it is difficult for the researcher to find their way 
around the data to identify ‘synonymous elements’ of participant data (Eden and 
Ackermann, 1998, p.195) in an efficient and systematic way. Eden et al (1992, 
p.310) suggest that this challenge is particularly true of large models of between 30-
120 nodes. The smallest model in this study was 90 nodes.  
To overcome this challenge, and following the guidance contained in the 
literature (Eden et al. 1992, Eden and Ackermann (1998), Bryson et al. 2004) 
participant models were examined in order to identify concepts (statements of text) 
‘that seem[ed] to fall together’ into bundles (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.248) or 
clusters (Eden and Ackermann (1998). This enabled the idiographic data of each 
participant to be fractured into ‘chunks’ of similar data, each ‘chunk’ being assigned 
a label that was representative of its content. Thus the process was akin to that of 
coding interview transcripts. Figure 31, illustrates a ‘chunk’ of data concerning (and 
thus labelled) ‘project objectives’.   
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
Figure 31 Project objectives 
 
The generation of labels, hereon referred to as themes, followed a grounded 
theory approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.198), in that themes emerged from 
the content (statements) of causal models rather than being determined a priori by 
the researcher. This process of ‘subsuming particulars into more general classes’ 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 256) allowed the researcher to move up what Miles 
and Huberman (1994, p.92) call the ‘abstraction ladder’ by enabling the raw data to 
be abstracted up to the level of themes. These themes (Appendix B) could then be 
used as sign posts to aspects of similarity between participant data thus enabling 
efficient comparison. 
To improve repeatability of the analytic process, themes were verified 
independently (in a similar way to testing for inter-coder reliability) revealing 77% 
level of agreement. While this score is lower than the suggested target of 90+% in 
some of the methodology literature (Miles and Huberman, 1994) it was felt by the 
author that this score was sufficient on the grounds that this research study was 
adopting an idiographic rather than nomothetic approach to causal mapping (section 
3.4.4.4). Using an idiographic approach, the themes were not the intended end unit 
of analysis but rather provided a helpful device for managing and navigating the 
voluminous raw data (which was the end unit of analysis).  Where a nomothetic 
approach to be adopted, on the other hand, the themes would be the end unit of 
analysis and consequently a higher inter-coder reliability score would be desirable.  
Project Objectives 
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To diverge briefly, the actual practicalities of applying theme labels to individual 
raw data were managed through the Decision Explorer (DE) software. DE is a 
bespoke tool designed to manage and analyse data in the form of causal maps. DE 
allows theme names to be created by the user (called ‘sets’) which can then be used 
as labels with which to tag each piece of raw data. Once the raw data has been 
labelled with a theme participant data can then be represented either as a causal 
map or as a list of themes (sets).  
Returning to the analysis of participant data, at the level of themes, participant 
data were fewer in number and more standardised (nomothetic) than in their raw 
format. Consequently, the themes could be used as sign posts to aspects of 
similarity between participant data thus enabling more efficient comparison than 
would be the case had comparison been attempted at the level of raw data.  So, for 
example, if the theme of ‘project objectives’ was identified in one participants model, 
that theme could easily be looked for in other participant models. This is illustrated 
conceptually in Figure 32 below. 
Theme Participant P1 Participant P2 Participant P ‘n’ 
Project objectives    
Delays    
Project design    
….    
….    
Figure 32 Identification of themes across participant data 
 
Identifying similarity of content across participants is useful, in and of itself, if for 
example the aim of research is to identify patterns or frequency of the sort discussed 
in section 3.2.4 of the methodology chapter. However, as discussed, the aim of this 
research was not about patterns but rather to reveal the causal mechanisms by 
which the phenomenon of overruns can be brought into being or in other words 
develop causal explanations that offer explanation of the phenomenon.  
As discussed in the methodology section, identifying relationships between 
concepts is a central component of explanation building. Corbin and Strauss (2008, 
p.198) echo this point suggesting that although ‘we break data apart [and] identify 
concepts to stand for the data’ in order to achieve explanation, ‘we also have to put 
it back together again by relating those concepts’ to one another. 
Thus, what was needed to progress analysis was a means of taking the 
participant data, which has been fractured into themes, and identifying relationships 
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between the themes that would allow data to be put back together to form 
explanations and thus reveal insights.  In the context of analysing transcripts, Corbin 
and Strauss (2008, p.198) suggest that ‘As analysts work with data, their minds 
automatically make connections because, after all, the connections come from the 
data’.    
In the case of analysing causal maps, however, the researcher does not have to 
rely on their minds to make the connections between concepts (in this case themes) 
because the causal connections are identified in the causal models. What was 
needed however was a means of exploring these connections. As discussed, 
(section 3.4.4.1), raw data represented in a causal map is hierarchically arranged. 
Since themes are representative of raw data, they too are in effect hierarchically 
arranged and so the structure of the causal models was put to use in revealing 
connections between themes. This was achieved by using the Decision Explorer 
(DE) software to reveal the themes that come ‘in’ to a particular theme or put 
another way, to reveal the themes that explain (the ‘ins’) another theme.  
Figure 33, provides a conceptual illustration of this step of analysis by continuing 
on with the example of the theme ‘project objectives’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Conceptual illustration of relationships between themes 
 
 
 
Participant P1 
Project objectives 
Delays 
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What Figure 33 shows is that using the hierarchical structure of causal maps, in 
combination with the DE software, can reveal the themes within a single participants 
data that are hierarchically sub-ordinate to the theme ‘project objectives’. This 
process can be followed for each participants data to reveal a similar picture for 
each participant as illustrated conceptually in Figure 34 below. 
 
Figure 34 Cross participant analysis of themes and relationships 
Although data at this stage of analysis is nomothetic in nature some insight is 
beginning to emerge. In the example above it is that ‘delay’ affects ‘project 
objectives’. Moreover the insight appears to be salient to the case study because it 
is identified in models of participant 1,2, ‘n’.  While this is a useful insight, it is more 
of a description than an explanation which attends to questions of what? how? and 
why?. Whetten (2002, p.46) suggests that ‘Descriptions, regardless of how detailed 
or insightful they are, may be considered conceptual contributions, but without an 
explanation for what is observed, they do not qualify as theoretical contributions’.  
To arrive at findings that could form the basis of a theoretical contribution, that 
is, a contribution to knowledge, the last step of analysis was to reveal the raw data 
beneath the insight (illustrated below) and thus arrive at explanation. In other words, 
to achieve a richer explanation, it was necessary to move down from the abstracted 
themes to the raw data. Miles and Huberman, (1994, p. 256) highlight that it is 
essential that the analysis process is capable of “find[ing] the referent”, the ‘concrete 
instance’ within raw data that was alluded to by a particular theme. The DE software 
again supports this activity since the raw data content beneath each theme can be 
revealed. Thus an audit trail from raw data to themes and themes to raw data is 
 
Participant P1 
Delays 
Project objectives Project objectives 
Delays Delays 
Project objectives 
  
Participant P2 Participant P ‘n’ 
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achieved. Figure 35 below illustrates the data that would be revealed from two 
participant’s models. 
 
Figure 35 Raw data for two participants with representative themes highlighted 
 
By revealing the raw data which the themes represent, the level of analysis is 
moved down from a high level descriptive insight that delay affects project 
objectives, to an explanatory finding that delays in attending to defects means part 
of the facility is left ‘unavailable’. As a consequence of unavailability, the client 
makes a deduction from their regular payment to BuildIt. This reduces the operating 
profit of the project from BuildIt’s perspective. This level of explanation attends to 
questions of what? How? and why? and thus helps attend to Whetten’s (2002) 
assertions above concerning the nature of a theoretical contribution to knowledge. 
 
Participant P1 Model 
 
    
  
Participant P2 Model 
Project Objectives Project Objectives 
Delays Delays 
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3.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The overarching goal for this study is to make a contribution to the academic 
body of knowledge within the field of project management. To achieve this goal, the 
contribution must be assessed as being of scientific quality. The three metrics most 
often used to assess quality in the methodological literature are validity, reliability 
and replication (Johnson and Harris, 2002). 
In order to attend to these metrics this chapter has set out a clear and full 
explanation of the approach to research used in this study. The chapter has 
explained the theory of methods (methodology) that underpins the approach, 
examining the aspects of research philosophy, research procedure (strategy), 
research design, research method and research techniques as well as explored the 
practical application of the approach to research, focusing on data collection and 
data analysis.  
The chapter which follows presents the findings drawn from the two case studies 
(project A and project B) examined in this study as well as a comparative analysis of 
the two cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY FINDINGS  
4.0 CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this section is to present the findings from the two case studies 
that were examined within the research study. The section presents the findings that 
were gained from each case study which are then compared in a cross case 
analysis to draw out overall research findings. In the next chapter the overall 
research findings are then examined in light of the extant literature to reveal the 
contributions to knowledge that they can make. Although literature is mainly 
examined within the next chapter, it is also called upon to support discussion within 
this chapter. 
The first section of this chapter presents the empirical findings of the first case 
study, project A. To help the reader in framing the findings, the section opens with 
some context to project A. In order to support comprehension of the findings, 
included within the context is a comprehensive discussion of the contract type (PFI) 
that was used to procure project A. The context section is then followed by a macro 
level view of how interviews with participants of project A unfolded. This information 
is provided to further support comprehension of the findings but also to reveal the 
logic behind the structure used to present them. The remaining sub-sections are 
dedicated to presenting the findings concluding with a section containing a summary 
of the findings.  
To summarise, the following section presents the empirical findings from the first 
case study (project A) and is structured as follows: 
• Context to Project A 
• Overview of Participant Interviews for Project A 
• Empirical Findings from Project A 
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4.1 CASE A FINDINGS 
4.1.1 Context to Project A  
Project A was a large medical facility that was contracted under a Private 
Finance Initiative(PFI) type of contract. PFI is one of a number of public private 
partnership models adopted by the UK Government (Bing et al., 2005a) as a means 
of increasing investment in public services by engaging the private sector in the 
provision of those services. Turner (2004, p.350) explains ‘Under this approach, a 
national government either works with the public sector or delegates responsibility to 
the private sector to design, construct, finance, operate and maintain infrastructure 
projects that would normally be the responsibility of national government working on 
its own’.  
Ive (2004, p.360) explains that PFI projects come in two forms - Concessions 
and DBFO (Design Build Finance Operate). In both, the private sector finances the 
assets required to provide the public service. However, where the two differ is in 
how those services are funded. To explain further, in a concession PFI the provider 
(the PFI company) obtains most of its revenues by charging end users for the use of 
the service. An example of this type of project is a toll road or toll bridge where end 
users are funding the service through payment of a toll. In a DBFO PFI, on the other 
hand, ‘the funding of the service remains public – proximately, government pays the 
PFI company and it is taxpayers, not users, who ultimately pay for the provision’ 
(Ive, 2004, p.360). Ive (2004, p.361) goes on to explain that in the majority of cases, 
the public sector ‘continues to provide final services to users (for example, education 
services, clinical services)….. while the PFI company provides intermediate or 
support services (some or all of the range of what can be described as facility 
management of FM services)’. Both of the projects examined within this thesis 
document were of the latter type of PFI projects - Design Build Finance Operate 
(DBFO).  
An important point here is that although most PFI projects involve provision of 
capital infrastructure they are in fact designed for the provision of a service to the 
public. In the more common design and build contract ‘the project’ from the 
provider’s perspective (i.e. the main contractor) comprises design and build activities 
therefore their responsibility (liability periods aside) largely comes to an end once 
the facility is handed over to the client. In a PFI project on the other hand ‘the 
project’ for the provider comprises not only the design and build activities but also 
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the operation of the facility once it is constructed. Responsibility for operation can 
span 25 to 40 years therefore in a PFI project the operational stage is of equal 
concern to the provider as the construction stage (which includes design). The 
concern for the operational phase is important to the case studies examined within 
this thesis document because the data for both cases focuses primarily on the 
operational phase of the projects.  
Many different types of services have been delivered using a PFI model 
including health care, roads and education (Bing et al., 2005b) and within health 
care the model has been used in a variety of project settings such as hospitals, 
homes for the elderly, staff accommodation, office blocks and community hospitals. 
In some instances this involves providing new capital infrastructure and in others the 
renovation of existing infrastructure and in others still, both renovation and new 
infrastructure. In the case of project A, the PFI model was being used within a health 
care setting to deliver an entirely new facility. 
A PFI project involves contracting of a consortium of private sector organisations 
to deliver a project to a public sector client. Each PFI project will have its own 
contractual nuances depending upon the requirements of the client however there 
are some common features which were also evident in Project A. Firstly, and as 
discussed above, the contract involved the private sector in design, build, finance 
and operation of the project. Thus the private sector was responsible for the design 
and construction of the facility but also its operation once handed over to the client 
(including building maintenance but also other services such as cleaning, catering 
and security). 
Secondly, the service was provided by a consortium of private organisations 
brought together within a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV is a legal entity 
that unifies the consortium partners and in which they are major shareholders 
(Turner, 2004). Akintoye and Chinyio (2005) provides a helpful model (Figure 36 
below) illustrating typical membership and arrangement of consortium partners and 
SPV.  
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Figure 36 Model of a typical PFI project structure from Akintoye, (2005) 
 
Similar to Akintoye’s (2005) model above, Project A comprised a construction 
company (Partner 1 in Figure 36 above), finance institutions, specialist consultants 
(e.g. health planners), and an FM company. Project A is examined from the 
perspective of the construction company referred to here on as BuildIt.  
A slight divergence is necessary at this point of the discussion to clarify terms 
that are used within this and remaining sections of the thesis document. During data 
collection for both case studies, the terms ‘BuildIt’, ‘provider’ and ‘service provider’ 
were used interchangeably by participants and, consequently, so too does this 
thesis document. The explanation for the synonymous use of the three terms is 
provided in the foregoing discussion which is that, although Figure 36 indicates it is 
the SPV who provides the service to the client, the members of the SPV (including 
BuildIt) are its major shareholders and, therefore, they are ostensibly providers of 
the service.    
Returning to the discussion of PFI projects, a third feature of PFI contracts is 
their long duration, 25 years in the case of project A. The duration reflects the point 
made earlier that PFI contracts are designed to deliver public services rather than 
public infrastructure only. Allied to the duration of the contract, is the duration of the 
liability period particularly for the construction company. For defects, and in 
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particular latent defects (those not discovered at completion), the liability period for 
the construction company can be many years in length and consequently, the 
construction company’s potential involvement in a project is far from finished at hand 
over to the client. The liability of the construction company in a PFI project is salient 
to both the case studies examined in this thesis document. This is because the two 
cases are examined from the perspective of the construction company and the focus 
of data (as discussed above) is largely the operational phase of the projects within 
which the liability period is pertinent.  
Lastly, and as touched upon earlier, within a PFI contract the service provider 
receives a regular (e.g. monthly) unitary payment from the client for providing the 
service. However, full payment is only made if the service is available and 
maintained at the agreed standard of service set out in the contract.  For example, if 
in Project A part of a facility were to experience a lack of water supply then that part 
of the facility would be rendered ‘unavailable’. Consequently, the client could 
penalise the provider for unavailability by withholding part or all of the payment for 
that unit of service. Similarly, if the client experiences poor quality, for example lower 
than specified ambient temperatures, then a similar process of deduction can be 
take place (Ive, 2004).  
Payments to the provider are managed through a payment mechanism which is 
a central component of a PFI contract. The payment mechanism (paymech) defines 
all of the details associated with payment of the provider, in particular expected 
availability and quality standards and associated penalties. The payment 
mechanism is thus the clients central management instrument of the service 
provider during the operational phase of the project in that penalties provide 
incentive to the provider to ensure that the service is available and to the specified 
standards and ensures that failure to meet those standards (defects) are remedied 
promptly (Ive, 2004). Payment of the provider during the operational phase of a PFI 
project is of central concern to this thesis document. This is because, as noted 
previously, the data of both projects focus on the phenomenon of cost overruns 
during the operational phase of the project’s. As will be discussed in detail later, 
paymech deductions are central to understanding operational cost overruns in both 
projects.  
In order to incentivise the provider, paymech deductions can be hugely punitive. 
For example, if an issue such as a faulty elevator is discovered within the facility (by 
the client or end user) this would be reported to the provider as a service failure or 
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defect. For every type of defect, the paymech system identifies associated 
conditions such as the window of time within which the service provider must 
resolve the defect. As shown below, beyond this window of time the provider would 
be incurring unaccounted for time (i.e. delay). For every unit of unaccounted for 
time, the payment mechanism defines a proportion of the payment that should be 
deducted (a paymech deduction) from the payment made to the provider. Since a 
deduction is made for every unit of unaccounted for time, paymech deductions 
accumulate the longer the defect remains unresolved thus the provider is 
incentivised to remedy the defect promptly. Furthermore, to ensure the provider’s 
response to reported failures is commensurate with the service needs of the client, 
the severity of deduction is linked to the service needs of the client. For example, 
the loss of lighting in a hospital surgical theatre would incur a far higher level of 
deduction than loss of lighting in a corridor.   
To summarise, project A was a large medical facility delivered under the 
auspices of a Private Finance Initiative(PFI) type contract which are designed to 
provide public services. The particular type of PFI was a Design Build Finance 
Operate (DBFO) contract whereby the private sector provider financed the capital 
assets of the facility and provided facilities management services. In return, the 
provider received a regular unitary payment from the public sector client for 
provision of the service, the payment being managed through a payment 
mechanism.  
In the case of project A, the private sector ‘provider’ comprised a fairly typical 
consortium of organisations including a construction company (BuildIt), finance 
institutions, specialist consultants and a facilities management company, all which 
were unified within a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). Also typical of PFI projects, 
project A involved the provider in both its construction (including design) phase and 
operational phase.  
 
4.1.2 Overview of Participant Interviews for Project A 
The following discussion provides a macro level view of how interviews with 
participants of Project A unfolded before examining the interview in detail. This 
information is provided to the reader to give further context to Project A but also to 
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reveal the framework that has been used to structure the presentation of insights 
drawn from the case study which are presented in the next section. 
Project A had been heralded by participants as a success. As one participant put 
it the team ‘achieved one of the most perfect jobs we’ve ever done’ with another 
participant suggesting that the project had become the ‘by-word for good delivery’ 
within BuildIt. Consequently, a natural locus of discussion by participants was 
explaining what, in their opinion, made Project A a success.  
To explain how success was achieved, participants described what actions were 
taken by the project team and why these actions were necessary. The latter 
revealed that the actions of the project team were aimed at mitigating a number of 
factors that they felt posed a risk to project success, in particular financial success.  
Participants of both the projects examined in this thesis highlighted that neither 
of the two projects suffered time or cost overruns during their construction phase. 
Consequently, the locus of discussion for cost overruns in this thesis is the 
operational phase of the projects. The project management literature suggests that 
success during the construction phase of a PFI project, at least in relation to 
schedule, is not unusual. Ive (2004, p.366), for example suggests that PFI projects 
‘have achieved an excellent track record of becoming operational at or before 
contracted date’. 
Focusing on the operational phase of the project, a particular concern of 
participants was the risk of delay in attending to defects reported by the client. As 
discussed above, in the event of a defect arising in the facility, the facility (or part 
thereof) could be deemed ‘unavailable’ under the terms of the payment mechanism. 
The provider has a set window of opportunity within which a defect must be 
remedied and the facility made available again. For each unit of time taken by the 
provider beyond this window, the client can deduct a proportion of the service 
payment to the provider and thus the project can begin to suffer operational cost 
overrun. 
Experiencing a high volume of reported defects was seen as an important cause 
of delay in attending to defects.  Participants provided a fine grained explanation of 
the issue of reported defects which revealed a variety of factors that could ‘trigger’ 
defects to be reported and thus contribute to there being high numbers of defects 
being reported. It is important to emphasise that in the context of Project A, the 
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triggers put forward by interview participants were potential triggers since they were 
not realised within project A.  
Further explaining the issue of high volumes of defects, participants revealed a 
variety of factors that they believed could have compounded the volume of reported 
defects. These compounding factors do not generate a defect but rather serve to 
worsen the number of defects that are reported and recorded.  
Within the context of project A, reported defects can be thought of as the trigger 
of delay. In short, if there was no defect to be remedied then no delay can be 
incurred in making the facility available (since without a defect it was presumably 
operating at specification and thus ‘available’). While reported defects cause delay, 
participants also identified a number of factors that can compound delay. Like the 
compounding factors discussed above, these factors do not trigger delay but rather 
serve to worsen the extent of delay.  
As discussed above, deductions from the regular payment made to the provider 
by the client is the immediate consequence of experiencing high volumes of defects 
and attendant delays in remedying those defects. However, discussion with 
participants also revealed that there were other potential consequences that could 
emerge as a result of high volumes of reported defects and attendant delays. Again 
it is important to note these were potential consequences since they were never 
actualised in the context of Project A.  
As noted throughout the foregoing discussion, the risks of high volumes of 
reported defects, delays and emergent consequences were never actualised in the 
context of Project A. Participants believed this was because of the counteractions 
taken by the project team to mitigate these risks.  
To summarise, in explaining the success of Project A participants touched upon 
the following aspects: 
• That a principal objective for the project’s success was to achieve its 
financial objectives 
• That a variety of factors could ‘trigger’ defects to be reported and that a high 
number of reported defects could result in delays in remedying defects thus 
putting project financial objectives at risk  
• That a variety of factors could compound the volume of defects which serve 
to worsen the number of defects that are recorded. 
149 
 
• That there are a number of factors that can compound delays in remedying 
reported defects. These compounding factors do not trigger delay but rather 
serve to worsen the extent of delay. 
• That there were other potential consequences, over and above the 
immediate deduction of payment that could emerge as a result of high 
volumes of reported defects and attendant delays. 
• Finally, that a number of actions were taken to counteract the risks of 
reported defects, delays, and emergent consequences. 
Using the points above provides a helpful structure for reporting of the empirical 
insights gained from Project A. Thus individual insights are presented under the 
following headings: 
• On project objectives  
• On triggering and compounding of defect reports  
• On factors compounding delays 
• Emergent consequences of experiencing high numbers of reports defects 
and attendant delays 
• Counteractions to undesirable project behaviour  
Prior to presenting the insights and findings their presentational format is briefly 
discussed in order to give the reader foresight of what they should expect in terms of 
their structure and content. 
 
4.1.3 Format of Individual Sections  
Each insight comprises the following three components - a label, a narrative, 
and an accompanying causal map with which to support the narrative. The format of 
the insight label is presented below: 
Insight 
A3  (Map A2)  
 Lack of end user knowledge about how to operate the building 
can trigger reported defects 
}  }  } 
1  2  3 
 
The first element of the label is a unique reference number (e.g. Insight A3). This 
identifies which case the insight belongs to (in the above example case A) and also 
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the number of the insight.  The purpose of the reference number is to ease cross 
referencing during discussion of findings. This is because the section presents the 
insights (and their resultant findings) individually. However, as alluded to in the 
introduction, and will become apparent during the following discussion, insights 
while offering their own unique contribution to understanding, are not mutually 
exclusive. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss insights in relation to one 
another so as to gain a holistic view and comprehensive understanding.  The 
reference number aids this cross referencing process.  
The second element of the insight label is a map reference (e.g. Map A2). As 
noted above, each insight will be accompanied by a causal map. The map is used to 
support the narrative discussion of each insight by providing an illustration of the 
insight at work using data drawn from the case study. The map reference in the 
insight label identifies which map the reader should refer to when reading the 
narrative of the insight.  
 In some cases, a single causal map is used to illustrate more than one insight. 
The purpose of presenting insights on a single map is (a) to avoid repeating material 
but more importantly (b) to provide the reader with a sense of the systemic nature of 
insights. Illustrating the systemicity of insights in a graphical form will provide the 
reader with an appreciation of how insights interact with one another to form 
systems that influence project behaviour.  
The final element of an insight label is the title of the insight, for example ‘design 
changes can trigger reported defects’, which identifies the focus of the insight. 
The narrative for each insight will provide some context to help support the 
reader in framing the insight. For example, in the insight above concerning reported 
defects and design changes, brief discussion will be given as to what is meant by 
‘reported defects’ and why they are relevant to exploring operational cost overruns 
in the project. The narrative will then go on to reveal how reported defects can be a 
consequence of design changes before proceeding to offer explanation from the 
data as to why design changes were necessary in the project. As discussed earlier, 
by answering how and why questions the analytic process moves toward findings 
that form the basis of a contribution to knowledge.  
To help make transparent the logic which supports the findings, reference is 
drawn to the content and structure of the causal map drawn out from the empirical 
data of the case. To support the reader in referring to the map, each statement on 
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the map is numbered. These numbers are then used within the narrative to guide 
the reader’s attention toward particular areas of the map. For example, in the 
following pieces of text - ‘design changes [1234]’ ‘reported defects [5678]’, the 
reader’s attention is drawn to concepts 1234 and 5678 on the accompanying causal 
model. In some cases, to gain comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to 
discuss many concepts and how they impact upon one another. Where this is the 
case, the narrative will contain this type of reference [1234 567813572468] 
which draws the reader’s attention toward a particular causal chain of concepts 
being discussed. Furthermore, since the causal map is drawn from the empirical 
data, the map gives line of sight from the findings back to the empirical data thus 
providing an audit trail for findings. 
As discussed in the introduction, the findings are used as the basis of 
contributions to knowledge through critical comparison with the extant literature in 
the following chapter. Although literature is mainly examined within the next chapter, 
it is also called upon to support discussion of the findings in this section. 
To conclude the presentation of the case findings of each case study a summary 
is presented in which key terms formatted in bold to highlight the findings drawn out 
from the case study and thus aid cross referencing later in the thesis document.  
 
4.1.4 A Systemic View of Project A 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, this thesis adopts a systemic 
modelling perspective of projects. One of the tenets of this approach is that to gain a 
full appreciation of project behaviour a holistic rather than a discrete view of projects 
is needed. In short, one must gain a view of the whole system that explains project 
behaviour, as well as its parts. 
As described earlier, the sections that follow report individual insights gained 
from project A. While each insight makes its own unique contribution to explaining 
the behaviour of the project, it focuses only on a ‘part’ of the system that explains 
project A’s behaviour. Focusing on the ‘parts’ is necessary so that they can be more 
fully explored and understood. However, focusing on the ‘parts’ means the reader is 
without a full appreciation of the whole system to which the ‘parts’ belong and which 
explains the behaviour of project A.  
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In order to attend to this gap, a model of the system that explains the behaviour 
of project A is presented (Map A1). It is not the intention that the reader be able to 
interrogate this model since, as discussed, each of its component parts will be 
examined in the forthcoming sections. Rather, the model is offered to provide the 
reader with a holistic view of the system, giving a fuller appreciation how the ‘parts’ 
of the system discussed in the following sections interlock to create a complex 
system that explains the behaviour of project A. 
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Map A1 A systemic view of project A 
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4.1.5 On Project Objectives 
Insight A1 (Map A2) Negative Project Objectives can Guide Project Actions 
Project A had been heralded by Built Right as a ‘success’ thus the aim of 
exploring project A was to understand the system of factors, including actions by the 
project team, that contributed to the project’s success.  
To gain some understanding of what actions contributed to success and why 
those actions were taken, the objectives of project A were examined. The project 
management literature suggests that project objectives play an important role in 
achieving project success because objectives help define what success is and, 
consequently, guide ‘appropriate courses of action’ toward the attainment of 
success (Ward et al, 1991, p.345). The literature also suggests that project 
objectives differ according to which stakeholder perspective the project is examined 
from (Bryde and Robinson, 2005, Turner, 2009f). Consequently, gaining insight into 
what interview participants saw as the objectives of project A could help in 
understanding of the actions that contributed to success and why those actions were 
taken. 
All five of the participants made reference to the profitability of the project 
suggesting that financial objectives were of central concern to the team. As one 
participant put it, avoiding paymech penalties was ‘the teams absolute focus’. As 
discussed previously, paymech penalties reduce the regular payment made to the 
provider during the project’s operational phase and consequently reduce the 
profitability of the project (from the provider’s perspective).  
Data from project A, illustrated in Map A1, suggests that a focus on avoiding  the 
undesirable outcome (paymech deductions) at least, in part, framed the actions of 
the project team in project A. Within the project management literature concerning 
project objectives, the tendency is to focus on aspirations to be achieved rather than 
those to be avoided. Expanding the search for literature concerning objectives to 
organisational strategy making revealed the concept of negative objectives which 
Ackermann and Eden (2011, p.118) described as ‘aspirations to be avoided’. The 
authors suggest, in the context of organisational strategy making, negative 
objectives can have just as strong an influence on organisational action as those of 
positive objectives (desirable outcomes). The insight above suggests that negative 
objectives can have a similar strong influence in a project management context. The 
tentative finding drawn from this insight is that when considering projects, 
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objectives (positive and negative) and their ramifications need to be fully 
explored in order to gain a broader appreciation of the actions that might be 
necessary to successfully delivery the project. Considering positive and 
negative objectives would enable actions to be considered in light of both types of 
objectives such that conflicts could be identified (e.g. an action which attends to a 
negative objective having an undesirable consequence on a positive objective). 
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Map A2 Negative objectives revealed by project A data 
 
Note : the negative symbol indicates a negative link and should be read as ‘A leads to [not] B’. For example, in the map above ‘avoid incurring paymech 
penalty deductions’ may lead to not ‘experience rising operating costs’.  
156 
153 
157 
 
4.1.6 On Triggering and Compounding of Defect Reports  
As discussed in the overview of participant interviews (section 4.1.2), 
participants described what, in their opinion, led to the success of Project A.  The 
previous section revealed that the objective of avoiding paymech deductions was 
believed by participants to be of importance in relation to project success. In 
explaining how success was achieved, participants focused on two issues. Firstly, 
they revealed the factors that they felt posed a risk to the objective of avoiding 
paymech deductions. Secondly, participants described the actions they took and 
believed mitigated the risks to the objective of avoiding paymech deductions. This 
section focuses on findings concerning the first issue – the factors participants felt 
posed a risk to the objective of avoiding paymech deductions.  
A fundamental risk which all of the participants touched upon was experiencing 
delay in resolving reported defects. As discussed (section 4.1.1), in a PFI project, if 
part of the facility experiences a defect then this can render that part ‘unavailable’ 
under the terms of the paymech system and the client can make deductions from 
the providers regular payment until such point as the facility is brought back up to 
specification making it ‘available’ again. Thus, as Map A3 shows, experiencing 
delays in resolving defects [19] can result in delays in making the facility ‘available’ 
(following a defect) and thus cause paymech deductions to be incurred [173] by the 
project. In short, the longer BuildIt took to attend to a defect the greater the 
deductions to their regular payment. As Ives (20xx) explains, the risk to the provider 
‘becomes a matter of preventing complete and minimizing partial nonavailability’ of 
the facility. 
Three of the participants  suggested that a potential contributing factor of delay 
was experiencing a high number of reported defects [174]. The participants 
suggested that reported defects can comprise ‘actual’ and ‘spurious’ defects and 
provided insights into the potential triggers of both types. ‘Spurious’ defects were 
explained as issues reported as being below specification but upon investigation by 
BuildIt were in fact within the boundaries of contractual obligations. ‘Actual’ defects, 
on the other hand, were reported issues that were indeed non-compliant with the 
contractual obligations. The potential triggers of defects are discussed in more depth 
next. Before doing so however it is important to clarify that the word potential is 
highlighted to emphasise that these triggers were not actually experienced in project 
A but rather were perceived risks that the project team took actions to mitigate 
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(discussed later in section 4.1.9). Throughout this section the word potential is 
emphasised where content is based upon what could have happened rather than 
what did happen.  
 
Insight A2 (Map A3) Subjective stakeholder assessments can trigger the generation of 
‘spurious’ defects  
As Map A3 shows, a potential factor that can trigger or generate a spurious 
defect to be reported [8] is stakeholders making subjective assessments of the 
facility [170]. Participants provided a series of examples that gave a more fine 
grained understanding of the nature of this potential trigger by revealing who these 
stakeholders might be and also why they might be making subjective assessments.  
One stakeholder is end users[7]. For example, end users might perceive the 
facility to be too hot or too cold and therefore report a defect when in fact upon 
investigation by BuildIt the facility is found to be operating at the specified 
temperature.  As shown in Map A3, one of the causes of this issue is that end users 
are not typically involved in the specification of the facility [157]. Consequently, in 
the case of the temperature example, they are potentially unaware of the 
temperatures that have been contractually specified and therefore base their 
assessment of the facility upon personal preference rather than what is specified 
contractually. A further factor that can compound this situation, and on its own cause 
end users to raise spurious defects, is end users lack of knowledge about the 
operation of the facilities systems [191].   
Modern buildings can be highly complex and comprise sophisticated systems to 
support their operation.  A lack of knowledge concerning how these systems operate 
can also lead to perceptions that there is a fault within the facility. To illustrate this 
point, one participant drew upon a previous experience which focused upon cooling 
and ventilation systems. Within modern buildings ventilation and cooling systems 
can be provided through sophisticated design of the building structure to create 
natural airflow within the building and/or by using technologies such as ‘chill beams’ 
(ceiling mounted devices that use pipes of water to cool areas of a facility using a 
process of convection). In both approaches there might be little or no physical 
indication to end users that ventilation and cooling is taking place. For example will 
be no air vents or ducts and perhaps no draughts to be felt therefore creating 
perceptions that there is no ventilation within the facility and thus causing a defect to 
be reported when in fact the system is operating as specified. This example, 
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perhaps compounds the earlier example concerning end users subjective 
assessments of the facility being too hot or cold. That is, the lack of visible indication 
that cooling is taking place might serve to support end user perceptions that the 
facility is indeed too hot and thus that there is a fault with the ventilation within the 
facility.  
A second stakeholder who might raise spurious defect reports is the FM 
provider. As shown in Map A3, the FM provider’s interest/objective is in minimising 
the maintenance cost of the facility [168]. Thus if the FM provider perceives that, for 
example, a piece of equipment will not last the specified time period [169] then they 
might claim that the equipment does not meet specification and thus raise a defect 
report.  
Finally, the third stakeholder who might raise spurious defects is the client. 
Similar to the FM provider, the client is making subjective assessments in terms of 
how the facility stands up against their understanding of the contract [164]. For 
example, the colour finish of walls might not match the client’s understanding of the 
colour specified in the contracts and therefore result in a defect report. An example 
provided by one participant suggests these defects, however, can be much less 
trivial in nature. They relayed one experience where the client perceived their facility 
to be too hot and thus pursued BuildIt to resolve the matter (by submitting a defect 
report). However, due to affordability issues at the design stage, the client had 
removed the cooling system opting instead to rely on natural air flow (i.e. opening 
the windows). Consequently, there was no defect to be remedied.  
The tentative findings that can be drawn from the insights above are that 
stakeholder interests and gaps in stakeholder knowledge can lead to 
stakeholder judgements about the facility that are subjective in nature causing 
spurious defects to be generated. Key stakeholders in this regard are end users, the 
FM company and the client.  
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Map A3  Subjective stakeholder assessments of the facility 
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Insight A3 (Map A4): Changes to stakeholder personnel can trigger the generation of 
‘spurious’ defects 
A further potential factor that can trigger or generate a spurious defect to be 
reported is changes to stakeholders, in particular changes to end user staff. As 
shown on Map A4, there was a high rate of turnover in the end user population of 
project A [194] and therefore project A might experience a regular flow of new staff 
into the facility who had no prior experience of it and thus no familiarity with its 
systems, operation and specification. Consequently, even if the gaps in end user 
knowledge discussed in the previous section were attended to with an existing 
cohort of end users, the arrival of new staff could cause these gaps to re-emerge 
and thus trigger further reporting of spurious defects [for example 1911708]. 
Contextual conditions were found to play a role with regard to a high rate of 
turnover of personnel. As one participant noted, in other types of projects such as 
schools the stakeholders (teachers and clients) are more stable than health care 
projects. 
The tentative finding drawn from the above insight is that changes of the 
client’s end user personnel can cause defects to be generated and that 
consideration of personnel change within other stakeholder groups (outside of 
BuildIt) might be valuable.  llustrated in Figure 37 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37 Conceptual model of changes to personnel across project stakeholder groups 
 
Project 
Project Outcomes 
 
Changes of 
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Map A4 Changes to stakeholder personnel 
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Insight A4 (Map A5) Inadequate maintenance of the facility can trigger the generation 
of ‘actual’ defects 
A further potential factor that can trigger or generate defects, this time ‘actual’ 
defects, is poor maintenance of the facility [186] caused by a gap in the skills of the 
team tasked with maintenance [179]. Intuitively, it would seem that this is a simple 
matter of acquiring appropriately skilled members for the maintenance team from 
the market place.  
However, Map A5 suggests that the reality could be much more challenging. 
What the data suggests is that acquiring skilled maintenance staff could be 
problematic [178] in relation to project A for two compounding reasons. Firstly, that 
the facility required such a high skill level [177]. To paraphrase one participant ‘you 
need much more than a janitor or caretaker to operate a facility like project A’.  The 
point being made here, and as shown on Map A5, was that project A comprised very 
sophisticated systems [176] and so required a group of highly skilled maintenance 
staff to support its operation. Secondly project A was a very large project [209] and 
consequently staff were required in very large numbers [180]. The compound effects 
of both these factors appears to be difficulty in finding maintenance staff with the 
right skills [178] in the numbers required for project A. This ‘difficulty’ implies a 
further factor is at work – a skills shortage in the market place.  
The tentative finding drawn from this insight is that the ability to maintain and 
re-commission the project can be affected by contextual conditions in particular 
those in the external environment (Figure 38) and consequently gaining 
understanding of the conditions surrounding a project is important because, as the 
example provided indicates, these can have significant influence over project 
outcomes.  
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Figure 38 Conceptual model of interaction between external environment conditions, the 
project and its outcomes  
 
Moreover, given the gestation period of PFI projects in particular (which can be 
years in length), understanding the context that might surround the project in future, 
and the implications of it, would be valuable such that actions might be taken in the 
present to tackle those implications. For example, in the case of a skills shortage in 
the market place is not quickly remedied and might require partnering with other 
organisations (such as local government skills agencies) to tackle the shortage.    
 
 
 
Project A 
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External Environment Contextual 
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Map A5 Deficiencies in facility maintenance 
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Insight A5 (Map A6) Reporting of spurious defects can compound high numbers of 
reported defects 
A further factor that could contribute to experiencing a high number of reported 
defects and resultant delays concerned the reporting of defects, in other words the 
administrative process of recording defects and subsequently alerting the relevant 
stakeholders. (This is as opposed to the previous section which focused upon the 
factors that could generate defects or in other words bring a defect into being).  
Map A6 shows that the scenario of experiencing a high number of defect reports 
[174] is compounded by reporting of both actual and spurious defects [171] (rather 
than only actual defects i.e. those defects that are legitimate breaches of contract). 
By recording spurious defects as well as actual defects, the number of defects to 
manage is inflated thus making the number worse than it otherwise could be had 
only the actual defects been recorded.  
As Map A6 shows, two reasons that spurious defects might be recorded are the 
FM Co not filtering out the spurious defects [159] and secondly stakeholders 
supporting one another’s claims about defects [1].   
In relation to the FM Co one potential reason they might not filter out spurious 
defects is that they are not fully aware of the contractual obligations associated with 
the facility. As a consequence, the FM Co might wrongly categorise some defects to 
be legitimate when in fact they are spurious. Recording  rather than filtering these 
spurious defects [159] in turn contributes to inflating the number of defect reports to 
manage [174].  
A second potential factor that could attribute to the inclusion of spurious defects 
in defect reports is stakeholders supporting one another’s claims[1], adding to the 
validity of the defect and thus its perceived legitimacy by stakeholders. For example, 
defects reported by end users might be supported (rather than opposed) by the 
client or FM provider. As illustrated on Map A6, the rationale for this support is that 
the defect might play to the Client or FM Co particular interests [155, 168]. To 
explain further, a defect reported by end users might require the replacement of an 
element of the facility (e.g. a piece of equipment or part of the building fabric) and 
thus increase the life span of that element. This outcome could be in the FM 
provider’s interests since they are responsible for the maintenance of the facility and 
therefore increasing the lifespan of an element might decrease the cost to the FM 
provider of maintaining the facility. If this is the case, the FM provider might support 
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the claim made by end users contributing to reporting of spurious and actual defects 
rather than only actual defects [171]. A further example comes from the client side 
who might side with end user opinions [155] so as to avoid exposure (e.g. having 
made poor design decisions). In both examples, the inclusion of spurious defects is 
driven by the fact that some stakeholders (FM Co or Client in the examples) stand to 
gain from their inclusion thus it is simply not in their interests to oppose end user 
claims about defects. 
The tentative findings drawn from this insight are that gaps in stakeholder 
knowledge, for example concerning contractual obligations, can compound the 
number of defects that are recorded and thus need to be managed. It also suggests 
that a further compounding factor’s is coalitions that form between stakeholders 
because of overlapping stakeholder interests. Consequently, the insight suggests 
that potential gaps in stakeholder knowledge need to be identified and managed and 
that the interests of individual stakeholders be understood so as to reveal potential 
coalitions that might form and impact upon the project.  
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Map A6 Defects reporting process 
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4.1.7 On Factors Compounding Delays 
To summarise thus far, there are a variety of potential factors that can cause 
defect reports to be generated. The multiplicity of factors can, in turn, contribute to a 
scenario of having a high number of defects to manage and thus experiencing 
resultant delay in making parts of the facility affected by defects available again.  
Reflecting upon the foregoing, defects can be thought of as a ‘trigger’ of delay in 
making the facility, or part thereof, available. To explain further, the absence of a 
reported defect signifies the absence of deterioration in the facility and, therefore, 
the facility can be assumed to be operating at specification and thus available. 
Consequently, no delay can be incurred in making the facility available. 
While reported defects might be a trigger of delay, three of the participants of 
project A identified that unaccounted for time in remedying (i.e. actually fixing a 
defect) could further compound the delay. This compounding effect does not trigger 
delay but rather serves to worsen the extent of delay. Participants provided a series 
of examples of factors that could attribute to the time spent remedying defects, 
these are discussed below.  
 
Insight A6 (Map A7) Unaccounted for time remedying  defects can compound delays.   
Before any action can be taken to remedy a defect it must be examined in order 
to determine its legitimacy  in relation to the contract [161]. PFI contracts are very 
detailed [202] in their content, undergoing intense interrogation [207] by the project’s 
stakeholders and thus consume a significant amount of stakeholders time. Given the 
level of detail contained in the contracts, in theory they should offer a rationalistic 
means of determining the legitimacy of a defect. In other words it should be a 
relatively simple matter of re-visiting the contract [167] to examine the specifications 
and determine if the defect is legitimate or not. However, what Map A7 suggests is 
that, in practice, the matter of determining the legitimacy of a defect can be much 
more involved and demanding. For example, as [166] suggests, it might be 
necessary to engage the supply chain for the supplier of the element of the facility 
that has experienced the defect to make an assessment of it. This assessment 
could introduce subjectivity and interpretation into the decision of whether the defect 
is legitimate or not, particularly if it is not in the interests of the supplier to take 
liability for the defect. This could then lead to a far more messy situation than the 
theory suggests which is to revisit the contracts and examine the specifications. 
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A further potential factor that could contribute to delay is determining the ‘owner’ 
of the defect. In order for remedial action to be taken, it must be identified who 
‘owns’ the defect [9] or in other words who is responsible for its resolution. Again in 
theory determining ownership should be a simple matter of re-visiting the contract to 
identify the responsible owner. However, like the situation described above, Map A6 
suggests that in practice determining ownership can be a much more untidy and 
less clean cut affair. The reason is contextual conditions surrounding the defect can 
introduce subjectivity into the assessment of responsibility making identification of a 
responsible owner a challenge. The example shown in Map A7 illustrates this point 
which is that if an asset experiences a defect and that asset has only recently been 
installed [218] then disagreement might ensue over who is responsible for resolving 
the defect [211]. For example, BuildIt (who is ultimately responsible for installation) 
might suggest that the defect is the responsibility of FM Co because the asset has 
not been maintained properly [198]. FM Co on the other hand might oppose this 
view, suggesting that, because the asset has only recently been installed, that the 
defect must belong to BuildIt [197].   
The final collection of factors that can contribute to delay in remedying reported 
defects concern the physical activities of conducting the remedy.  These include 
time taken to get materials [22] and staff [199] on site as well as the time to actually 
conduct the repair [31]. 
The tentative findings drawn from this insight are that delay in remedying defects 
can be the combined effect of simple logistical matters such as getting materials 
and more complex socio-political matters such as disagreement between 
stakeholders over defect ownership. The insight also suggests that, despite the level 
of detail contained within PFI contracts and the rigour with which they are 
developed, contextual conditions can mean that contracts are unable to provide a 
rationalistic means of determining legitimacy and ownership of defects. 
Consequently, contracts are not able to fully displace the need for social processes 
such as reaching agreements between stakeholders.  
171 
 
 
 
Map A7 Unaccounted for time in remedying defects can compound delays. 
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4.1.8 Emergent Consequences of High Numbers of Reported Defects and 
Attendant Delays  
Thus far the findings have focused upon the scenario of experiencing a high 
number of reported defects and has revealed the factors that can trigger and 
compound this scenario.  It has been shown that experiencing a high number of 
reported defects can contribute to delay in making the facility (or part thereof) 
available and that as a consequence the client can make a deduction from the 
provider’s regular payment. However, all of the participants of project A suggested 
that there are other potential consequences that could emerge, over and above 
incurring paymech deductions, that can emerge as a result of experiencing high 
numbers of reported defects and attendant delays. This section examines these 
emergent consequences.  
 
Insight A7 (Map A8) high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays can 
induce changes in client behaviour  
As shown in Map A8 one of the potential consequences of the compound effects 
of high numbers of reported defects [174] and attendant delays [19] is that it can 
have influence over the behaviour of the client toward BuildIt [185]. To explain 
further, the high numbers of reported defects coupled with experiencing delays in 
resolving those defects can cause the client to feel dissatisfied with the quality of 
service being delivered by BuildIt [213, 195] causing the client to become more 
adversarial rather than cooperative in its attitude toward BuildIt [185].  
That the cause of the clients dissatisfaction is the systemic effects of both the 
volume of defects [174] and attendant delays [19] is of interest because what it 
suggests is that attending to defects as soon as possible might help to offset the 
feelings of dissatisfaction by the client with the quality of the service. A comment 
from one participant takes the potency of this suggestion a step further. They 
suggested that ‘the client will think you are brilliant if you respond to issues quickly 
because the client feels they are receiving a good service’.  What this observation 
suggests is that if the provider resolves defects expediently then the client is likely to 
perceive that the service provided is good, even though the project might have 
experienced a number of defects.  
The tentative finding drawn from the above insight is that defects and resultant 
delays can cause the client to become adversarial toward BuildIt due to their 
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dissatisfaction with the quality of service. Moreover, while map A4 suggests that it is 
the number of defects and speed of response that can cause client dissatisfaction 
with quality, the client might use speed of response as a proxy measurement for 
quality. Therefore, quick response times could be used as a means of influencing 
the clients perceptions of quality toward ‘good quality service’ and thus mitigate 
the likelihood of them becoming adversarial in their attitude toward BuildIt.  
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Map A8 Changing client behaviour due to defect and delay situation 
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Insight A8 (Map A9) high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays can lead 
to a Loss of productivity at BuildIt 
As discussed previously, and illustrated on Map A9 one of the steps toward 
resolving a defect is to determine its legitimacy [160] in terms of contractual 
obligations.  This process might involve BuildIt staff attending the location of the 
defect [188] to make an assessment of it and, as discussed previously, might also 
require staff to re-visit the contract as well as engage the supply chain.   
However, typical of project management organisations once project A is in its 
operational phase (i.e. ‘complete’) BuildIt project staff are moved on to new 
assignments and are, therefore, no longer actively working on project A. To 
complete the activities mentioned above in relation to a defect experienced on 
project A, staff must stop working on their current assignments and turn their 
attention back to project A [189] resulting in a loss of productivity at BuildIt [187] 
because their projects are not being progressed. Furthermore, since staff will still be 
responsible for their current assignment as well as the defects of project A, project 
staff will be stretched across multiple projects. Consequently, they might be unable 
to attend to their current assignment as comprehensively as they would otherwise 
do potentially leading to issues on their current assignment now or in the future.  
The tentative finding drawn from this insight is that the consequences of 
experiencing defects on one project are not necessarily isolated to that project. 
Instead the effects of defects can be systemic, propagating across to other 
projects within the BuildIt organisation (as illustrated conceptually in Figure 39 
below).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39 Systemic effect of poor project performance on the wider organisation 
Defects experienced 
on project A 
BuildIt Internal Environment 
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Map A9 The effect of project defects on the wider BuildIt organisation 
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Insight A9 (Map A10) high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays can 
Increase complexity of rework 
A further knock on effect of experiencing delays in attending to reported defects 
is that it can increase the complexity of rework that needs to take place. To explain 
further, the occurrence of a defect which results in a water leak (the primary defect) 
could have the knock of effect of causing an electrical system to short circuit [217, 
18] thus creating a secondary defect [21]. The combination of these two defects 
increases the complexity of rework to be done [220] in tackling the primary defect.  
The increase in complexity of rework, could result in further systemic effects as 
highlighted by the feedback loop on Map A10 [220 16 14 19 217 21  
220]. To describe these effects further, the increase in complexity [5914] of rework 
means more time will be needed to remedy the defect situation [16, 14] than would 
be the case if it were only the primary defect to be resolved. This additional time 
might then cause delay in attending to other defects that have been reported [19] 
which, while unattended, might be causing secondary defects and so the loop could 
continue. Moreover, the occurrence of a secondary defect might only be discovered 
once the team tasked with remedying the primary defect arrive at the location. Thus 
the team may or may not be equipped to manage the secondary defect and if not 
then further delay might ensue.  
To explore the example above still further, a leak in one element of the facility 
might render that element unavailable and a deduction might be made from BuildIts 
regular payment. However, the occurrence of a secondary defect, such as a an 
electrical fault, could mean that other parts of the facility are without electrical power 
thus rendering multiple elements of the facility unavailable and creating a dramatic 
increase in the extent of the deduction to BuildIts regular payment. Thus, because of 
systemic effects, the cost associated with a primary defect can escalate 
dramatically.  
The tentative finding drawn from this insight is that delay in attending to reported 
defects can induce dynamic behaviour in the form of a vicious feedback loop 
involving re-work within the project and that behaviour can have significant 
consequences in terms of further delays and increasing operational costs to 
BuildIt.   
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Map A10 Increasing complexity of rework due to secondary defects 
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Insight A10 (Map A11) Defects and Attendant Delays can translate into long term 
business risk  
A further potential consequence of experiencing defects and attendant delays is 
that they can translate into long term business risk to BuildIt. In short, project A was 
a large public medical facility being funded by tax payers and as such would attract 
significant media and public interest. News of issues (such as defects and delays) 
could, therefore, travel fast and reach a wide audience damaging BuildIts reputation 
for delivery of these types of projects [212]. Within the audience might be potential 
future clients of BuildIt. Map A4 suggests that having a good reputation is important 
for securing future work with clients [20], a point supported by the literature (Watt, 
2009, 2010). Therefore, damage to reputation could have the consequence of 
impairing BuildIts ability to secure future projects [207]..   
The above discussion further supports the finding of Insight A8 which is that the 
effects of defects and attendant delays are not isolated to within the boundaries of 
the project but rather they have systemic effects that can be felt at the organisation 
level. However, unlike Insight A8, the systemic effects described above are not 
contained within the boundaries of the organisation. In Insight A8 the effect of 
defects and attendant delays in project A was to reduce the productivity of BuiltIt. 
Reduced productivity is an issue that is internal to BuildIt and which it presumably 
could have significant influence over. However, the systemic effect of damaged 
reputation described in this Insight A10 extend beyond the boundaries of BuildIt into 
the external environment and, consequently, BuildIt would have much less influence 
over the management of these effects.  
Furthermore, map A4 suggests that the effect of damage to reputation can be 
enduring, indicated to be some 3 to 5 years in length [207]. Perhaps the foregoing 
discussion concerning the influence BuildIt has in repairing its reputation once it is 
damaged goes some way toward explaining why the duration is so long. 
(literature?). Regardless of the reasoning for the duration, it’s length warrants 
significant attention because the inability to secure a future pipelines of work could 
pose a risk to the entire business enterprise. 
The tentative findings drawn from this insight are that the consequences of 
experiencing defects on a project are not contained within the boundaries of the 
project nor are they necessarily contained to within the boundaries of the 
organisation tasked with managing it. Instead the effects of defects and attendant 
delays can be systemic, propagating out into the external environment 
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(illustrated conceptually in Figure 40) damaging, for example, reputation 
negatively affecting BuildIt from securing future projects like project A. Furthermore, 
once consequences such as damage to reputation are experienced they can take a 
long time to repair potentially meaning that poor performance on a project can be 
business affecting in terms of the long term performance, and perhaps survival, of 
the business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40 Systemic effects of poor project performance propagate up to the organisational 
environment and out to the external environment 
BuildIt Internal Environment 
Defects experienced 
on project A 
BuildIt External Environment 
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Map A11 Long term business risk of poor project performance 
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4.1.9 Counteractions to Undesirable Project Behaviour 
The previous sections revealed the following: 
• Experiencing delays in attending to reported defects can result in the 
client making deductions from BuildIts regular payment (referred to as 
paymech deductions). Consequently this increases BuildIt’s operating 
costs for the facility beyond the estimated value and so the project would 
experience a cost overrun. 
• Experiencing a high number of reported defects could contribute to 
experiencing delays in attending to defects. 
• There are a variety of factors that can trigger and compound high 
numbers of defect reports and thus contribute to experiencing a high 
number of reported defects. 
• There are also factors that can compound delay in attending to 
reported defects. 
• Finally, there are a series of other potential consequences, over and 
above incurring paymech deductions, that could emerge as a result of 
experiencing high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays.  
 
As discussed in the introduction (and emphasised throughout the preceding 
sections) the triggers, compounding factors and emergent consequences that have 
been discussed thus far were potential factors that could have affected project A. 
That is to say, these factors were not actually experienced in project A but rather 
were perceived risks that the project team took counteractions actions to mitigate. 
This section examines those counteractions.  
 
Insight A11 (Map A12) Attending to gaps in stakeholder knowledge can mitigate 
factors affecting a high number of reported defects. 
Map A11 illustrates the factors affecting a high number of reported defects 
(highlighted) as well as the counteractions the project team employed to mitigate 
these factors. The triggers are captured below (underlined) along with 
accompanying discussion of the counteractions taken by the project team and 
references to map A6 to illustrate the effects of counter actions.  
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[159] lack of filtering of spurious defects by FM Co 
To counter act this issue the project team had frequent discussions with FM Co 
in order to ensure that they (FM Co) were aware of the contractual obligations and, 
consequently, their responsibilities in terms of filtering spurious defects from the 
reported defects. [165] 
[164] assessment of the facility by the client against their understanding of the 
contract. 
To counteract this trigger, the project team set about educating the client about 
the operation of the building thus furnishing the client with more fine grained 
knowledge about the facility rather than leaving them only with the contract to work 
from [183]. This involved running workshops [184] to explain the operation of the 
facility as well as to describe how the facility attended to contractual requirements 
set out by the client.   
[7] end users  assess the facility against their personal expectations 
Similar to the previous counteraction, workshops [184] were run to furnish end 
users with more information about the facility and thus aid their understanding of it. 
The findings revealed that the project team were aware that one risk was that end 
users might find the facility too hot/cold and that this might generate a defect report. 
Having the workshop allowed BuildIt to tackle this risk by informing end users what 
temperature the facility would operate at and why this temperature was selected 
(because it was stipulated in the service contract).   
Workshops also allowed end users to feedback immediately to BuildIt aspects 
which they considered to be flaws in the facility. These perceptions of flaws could 
then be dealt with immediately by BuildIt either by explaining why a particular 
element of the facility was designed as it was or, if in fact it was a defect, resolve it 
before it became a reported defect.   
[191] end users are not knowledgeable about how to operate the facility 
Again, the counteraction to this trigger was to engage and educate end users 
[183] about the facility. Yet again, workshops [184] played an important role in 
furnishing end users with information about how the facility operated. The findings 
revealed that the project team were aware that one risk was that end users might 
perceive there to be a lack of ventilation within the facility due to the absence of 
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physical indicators associated with mechanised ventilation (e.g. ventilation ducts) 
and that this might generate a defect report. Workshops provided means for BuildIt 
to explain how the ventilation system differed from traditional systems that users 
might be more familiar with and also explain how the system operated and perhaps 
even reasons why the system was selected (for example, one system may be 
cheaper to operate thus lowering the cost to the client).  
Recognising the complexity of the facility and thus the amount of information end 
users would need to take on board during the workshop setting, BuildIt 
complemented the workshop with other means of sharing information about the 
facility with end users. For example, a basic user guide was created for staff 
covering all of the essential systems that they might come into contact with and 
need to use. [193]. 
The consequence of the workshops and user guides was that end users were 
far more informed about the facility thus helping to mitigate the reporting of spurious 
defects. 
[179] maintenance staff who do not fully understand how the building systems 
operate 
To counteract this trigger, the project team set about sharing their knowledge 
and experience of the facility [221, 81] with the FM Co [182]. The rationale was 
simple and was that, in constructing the facility and installing and commissioning its 
systems the BuildIt team had an intimate knowledge of the facility [175] that FM Co 
would not initially have the benefit of. Thus to address this gap in knowledge the 
project team partnered with members of the FM Co team [221] for a period of 6-9 
months to help ensure that the FM Co was equipped with the knowledge it needed 
to operate and maintain the facility within the obligations of the contract.  
Looking across all of the counteractions reveals that they have in common a 
concern for knowledge sharing among project stakeholders, in particular, BuildIt 
sharing knowledge with the other stakeholders involved within the project including 
the FM Co, end users and the client. Since all of these counteractions worked to 
good effect on project A, the tentative finding drawn from the above is that 
knowledge sharing among project stakeholders makes an important contribution to 
mitigating reported defects. 
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Map A12 Counter actions (green) to attend to gaps in stakeholder knowledge (boxes0 to mitigate high numbers of reported defects 
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Insight A12 (Map A13) Attending to gaps in stakeholder knowledge can mitigate 
factors that can compound high numbers of reported 
defects. 
As discussed earlier (Insight A5), reporting of both spurious and actual defects 
could serve to compound a scenario of experiencing a high number of reported 
defects. This was because inclusion of spurious defects made the number of 
reported defects worse than it otherwise could be (had it only included actual 
defects). Two contributing factors were identified. 
• [159] the possibility of FM Co not filtering out spurious defects and 
• [1] experiencing stakeholders supporting one another’s claims because 
they play to particular stakeholder interests. 
As Map A12 above shows, only one counteraction was explicitly identified within 
project A data concerning the above factors [165] and this was to attend to the first 
of the factors [159] the possibility of FM Co not filtering out spurious defects. The 
counteraction taken by the project team was to share their understanding of 
contractual obligations with FM Co in order to ensure that they (FM Co) were aware 
of the contractual obligations concerning the facility and, consequently, their 
responsibilities in terms of filtering spurious defects from the reported defects.  
However, reflecting upon the counteractions of Insight A11 it is conceivable that 
these too could have had an effect on the compounding factors described above. 
Their potential points of influence are illustrated on Map A13 using bold causal links 
(to distinguish these links as researcher additions) and described in more detail 
below: 
• As noted above, the data suggests that educating end users about the 
facility can mitigate the possibility of spurious defects being reported. 
However, this action also, in part, mitigates the need to filter spurious defects 
[159] as show by the links: 183  155 and 183  163. For example, if end 
users raise fewer spurious defects by virtue of being better informed then 
there will be less occasions when stakeholders side with one another’s 
opinions [155, 163] and thus less likelihood of spurious defects being 
reported. 
• It was revealed earlier in this section that the FM Co, in pursuing its business 
interest of minimising maintenance costs [168], might perceive elements of 
the facility to be below specification and thus might generate spurious 
defects being reported. However, if the project team shared knowledge with 
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the FM Co about the facility [182] as discussed in the table above, then it is 
conceivable that FM Co would be better informed about the durability of 
equipment installed and thus perhaps negate their perceptions about the 
equipment [169] and so prevent a spurious defect report. 
What this insight suggests is that the effects of counteractions can be systemic. 
That is, they can have influence on multiple parts of the system (rather than simply 
an individual aspect). For example, as discussed above and illustrated on Map A13 
it can be seen that actions designed to mitigate the triggers of defect reports such as 
engaging and educating end users [183] could also conceivably mitigate factors that 
can compound a high number of reported defects (such as [155] and [163]) since 
the compounding factors depend upon defects being raised in the first place. 
Moreover, on Map A13 it can be seen that the action [183] potentially attends to 5 of 
the factors that can contribute to experiencing a high number of reported defects 
[191, 7, 164, 163, 155] suggesting that this is a potent action.  
Given counteractions can affect more than one factor within the system, a 
tentative finding drawn from this insight is that a systemic view of counteractions 
could be valuable. A systemic view would allow the effects of counteractions on 
the parts as well as the whole to be examined and enable identification of 
those actions that might be most potent (i.e. influence multiple aspects of the 
system) so that resources can be directed toward these. Furthermore, a systemic 
view of counteractions would allow potentially unwanted consequences to be 
identified.  
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Map A13 Further implicit influences (bold arrows) of knowledge sharing with stakeholders 
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Insight A13 (Map A14) Minimising response times to help mitigate delay in attending 
to reported defects.  
As well as taking actions to mitigate the triggers of reported defects, the project 
team also identified a series of counteractions to mitigate factors that could 
compound delays in attending to those defects (shown in Map A14). A brief 
description of how the counteractions attended to the factors (underlined) is 
provided below. 
Encounter disagreements over who is responsible for a defect [211] 
One of the causes of delay that was discussed earlier was that there could be 
disagreement between the project partners (for example BuildIt and the FM Co) 
surrounding who was actually responsible for resolving the defect. Rather than 
manage this dispute while the defect lay unattended (and contributed to paymech 
deductions) a policy of ‘fix first argue later was adopted’ [12]. In essence, the policy 
was that the defect would be resolved by whomever was best placed to tackle it the 
time it was reported following which the discussion over who should have be 
responsible for it (and the cost of repair) would take place and costs settled. 
Incur unaccounted for time getting staff onsite [199] 
The standard practice within BuildIt was that staff responsible for tackling 
reported defects were based off-site of the project (project A). Consequently, when a 
defect was reported, time would be needed simply to get staff to the location of 
project A. During this time delays in attending to the defect would be accruing and 
thus paymech deductions rising. In order to attend to this issue, BuildIt placed staff 
members on site so that they would be on hand as soon as a defect was reported 
[11] thus avoiding delay in their arrival to the defect location [199]. 
Incur unaccounted for time getting materials on site [22] 
As discussed earlier, a further potential source of delay in attending to defects 
was delay in getting materials on site to remedy a reported defect [22]. One of the 
issue that could compound this situation was that some components needed for 
repairs had long lead times [10] therefore creating a risk of delay in repairing defects 
that needed those types of components. To mitigate this risk, critical spares were 
purchased in advance [13]. ‘Critical’ was assessed based upon how important that 
spare was to the operation of the facility. For example, a spare component for an 
elevator would be ‘critical’. 
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Creating secondary defects [21] 
The counteractions described above were aimed at minimising the time needed 
to actually remedy a defect i.e. the process of resolving a defect. A further step the 
team took was to have regular defects management meetings [200]. These 
meetings helped the team with early detection of defects and discussing how those 
defects might be resolved. For example, as noted earlier BuildIt undertook 
workshops with end users and clients design to share information with those 
stakeholders about the facility. However, the workshops also provided BuildIt with 
early visibility of potential defects through feedback from end users and clients. 
These early warning signs could then be fed back into the defects management 
meeting for discussion and remedial action to be taken.  
Vicious feedback loop [14 19 217 21 220 16 14] 
The counteractions above help to break the vicious feedback loop that can come 
about due to delay in attending to defects. They break the chain of concepts that 
comprise the feedback loop in two ways. Firstly, they mitigate the time needed to 
attend (remedy) the defect [14] and secondly they reduce the amount of time 
defects go undetected therefore reducing the possibility of secondary defects being 
created [21]. 
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Map A14 Minimising response times to mitigate delay in attending to defects 
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Insight A14 (Map A15) Joint problem solving among project stakeholders to help 
mitigate delays  
As well as revealing the counteractions that were taken on project A, the 
process that underpinned the identification and operationalising of these 
counteractions was also revealed – a process of joint problem solving among project 
stakeholders, in particular BuildIt, FM Co and members of the SPV senior staff – 
through a brain storming session [210] 
What the brain storming session did was provide a forum for stakeholders to 
surface potential risks as well as jointly explore and agree potential mitigating 
actions. Consequently, as illustrated in Map A15, the session played a central role in 
identifying and operationalising the counteractions taken by the project team. For 
example, it was through this brain storming process that the risks associated with 
the existing defects management process [219] was identified and as a result the 
counteractions [12, 11, 13, 200] described previously were undertaken.  
The counteractions that emanated from the brain storming session are its most 
noticeable consequences. However, Map A15 suggests that the session also 
appears to have had more subtle effects concerning the social processes taking 
place between the stakeholders involved in it. These subtle effects manifest 
themselves most obviously in concept [215] which concerns the establishment of the 
‘ethos’ of the project team in terms of how they would work to manage defects. This 
concept suggests that the brain storming session was an enabler for, and helped 
engender, common values, beliefs and understandings among the stakeholders – a 
willingness to work together.  
The effects of this ethos are important and systemic. For example, while the 
brain storming session revealed the risk of disagreement between stakeholders over 
defect ownership, without ethos of working together the policy of ‘fix first argue later’ 
might not have been agreed to [21512]. Equally while it might have been valuable 
to have regular defects management meetings [219], without the ethos partners 
might have been less likely to have been open about issues [206] therefore making 
the meetings less potent in their ability to detect potential defects [208].   
The construction industry is well documented within the literature as being 
notoriously adversarial in nature. Moreover, because the paymech system in PFI is 
designed to incentivise the provider to resolve defects quickly, there is tremendous 
emphasis on urgency when defects do occur.  In effect there is a paymech clock 
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ticking while defects are unresolved and consequently managers are under 
significant pressure to make quick decisions. Nutt’s (1999) research on decision 
making shows, that putting managers under pressure engenders behaviours that 
focus on ‘who is responsible’ and invoke ‘defensiveness’. Thus it seems the inherent 
behaviours within the industry and the conditions created by a paymech system the 
scene in project A was pre-set to adversary. However, it appears that the ethos of 
working together generated by the brain storming session mitigated potential 
tendencies for partners to be adversarial in their relationship with one another and 
yielded benefits to the project.  
In summary, it seems that while the primary purpose of the brain storming 
session was to elicit and manage risks, the session also played a role in managing 
the social processes among the partners in a way that changed the way partners 
behaved toward risks (and perhaps toward one another) in a way that had lasting 
positive effects on the project. 
The previous paragraph begs the question – how was the social process of 
arriving at agreements and shared understandings managed during the brain 
storming session? There was no formal process of managing these processes 
within the brain storming session and nor was there a formal process of risk 
elicitation. In essence, the structure of the session was very fluid and involved staff 
simply ‘pitching in’ their thoughts.  
Furthermore, there was already a foundational level of shared values and 
understandings between some of the participants of the brain storming session prior 
to its inception in particular the values of ‘shared responsibility’ [214] and taking a 
‘bigger picture approach’ [201]. Thus, project A perhaps benefited from sheer 
serendipity of bringing a particular collection of stakeholders together who already 
held at least a basic set of common beliefs. However, as noted above, the project 
management literature suggests that serendipity cannot be relied upon as the 
likelihood is that adversary will be more common.  
 The tentative findings drawn from the above insight is that joint problem solving 
sessions such as brain storming can provide two important functions. Firstly they 
can provide means of revealing and mitigating risks to the project and secondly, 
they can help to support social processes taking place within the project, 
processes that change the way people behave toward risks (and perhaps 
toward one another) in a way that can have lasting positive effects on the project. 
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Furthermore, given the importance of both these functions to the project, bringing 
formal structure to sessions such as brain storming could help in proactively 
managing these functions increase their performance.  
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Map A15 Brainstorming and its impacts (green). Counteractions (bordered) 
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4.1.10 Summary of Findings from Case A  
Chapter 2 (page. 55) set out the following research aim for this study: 
• To identify the factors, and the relationships between them, that describe 
a system of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects.   
Insights gleaned from analysis of case study A, described in the preceding 
sections, have taken steps toward tentative findings that attend to the above aim as 
well as revealing actions that can mitigate overruns.  This section provides a 
summary of those findings. 
Data from project A revealed that, from BuildIt’s perspective, the project’s 
financial objectives were of central concern. It was found that the literature 
suggests objectives play a fundamental role in guiding actions for their attainment 
(Ward et al 1991) and that in project A actions were being guided by attention to a 
‘negative objective’ (Ackermann and Eden, 2011) of avoiding paymech 
deductions. The tentative finding that was drawn was that when considering 
projects, objectives (positive and negative) and their ramifications need to be 
fully explored in order to gain a broader appreciation of the actions that might 
be necessary to successfully delivery the project. Considering positive and 
negative objectives would also enable actions to be considered in light of both types 
of objectives such that conflicts could be identified (e.g. an action which attends to a 
negative objective having an undesirable consequence on a positive objective). 
It was also found that delay in making the facility available following a defect 
report was the main risk of incurring payment deductions and, consequently, to the 
project experiencing overrun in operating costs. The nature of ‘delay’ in project A 
was found to be different to the typical use of the term in the project management 
literature. Typically delay is concerned with delay to project completion whereas in 
project A the term referred to delay in bringing the facility back up to specification 
following the occurrence of a defect during the project’s operational phase.  
Data from project A provided means of unpacking the delay risk, revealing that 
reported defects can trigger delay in making the facility ‘available’, in particular 
experiencing a high number of defects.   
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 It was found that defects can comprise ‘spurious’  and ‘actual’ defects, and 
that there were a number of factors that can generate or compound reports of 
defects. One factor was stakeholders making subjective judgements about the 
facility which can generate spurious defects. The cause of subjective judgments 
was found to be gaps in stakeholder knowledge. For example, gaps in end user 
knowledge concerning the temperature specifications or technical operation of the 
facility could cause end users to report defects that were in fact spurious. Similarly 
the client might report a defect that is spurious because of a gap in their knowledge 
concerning their understanding of the specifications contained in the contracts.  
A second factor that could generate spurious defects was found to be changes 
in end user staff. These changes were found to be frequent in the context of 
project A and could cause knowledge gaps (discussed above) to re-emerge 
resulting in further defects being reported. Due to the frequency of staff changes it 
was also suggested that attending to end user knowledge gaps would require on 
going attention.  
Stakeholder interests were also found to play a role in reporting of defects. For 
example, it is in the interest of the FM Co to minimise ongoing operating costs 
therefore if the FM Co perceives a piece of equipment will not last the specified time 
period then they may claim that the equipment does not meet specification and thus 
raise a defect report. A similar situation was revealed in the case of the client and 
suggested that it was important to be aware of the coalitions that can occur among 
stakeholders and their interests. Furthermore, the FM Co example alludes to 
systemic interaction of factors. If it is assumed that the piece of equipment installed 
is designed to specification then the reporting of a spurious defect by the FM Co can 
be thought of as the systemic effect of both the stakeholder’s interests and a 
gap in the stakeholder’s knowledge.  Thus, if the gap in knowledge was attended 
to i.e. the FM Co was made aware of the technical specifications this would mitigate 
the defect report being raised.  
A final factor in relation to spurious defects concerned the process of recording 
defects. It was found that gaps in stakeholder knowledge, for example in FM Co 
concerning contractual obligations, can compound the number of spurious defects 
that are recorded and thus need to be managed. It was also found that coalitions 
can form between stakeholders because of overlapping stakeholder interests 
can compound the number of spurious defects reported. Consequently, it was 
suggested that gaps in stakeholder knowledge need to be identified and managed 
198 
 
and that the interests of individual stakeholders be understood so as to reveal 
potential coalitions that might form and impact upon the project.  
The discussion thus far has focused on ‘spurious’ defects. However, project A 
data suggests that a factor that could trigger ‘actual’ defects was inadequate 
maintenance of the facility. It was found that conditions in the external 
environment were a potential risk in this regard, in particular skills shortages in 
the market place. The importance of contextual conditions is discussed in greater 
detail below.  
Although the trigger of delay was defects, data from project A suggested that 
there were factors that could compound delay. In particular these were time taken to 
determine the legitimacy of defects; and time spent determining the ownership of 
defects both of which could lead to incurring unaccounted for time in remedying 
defects. 
As touched upon above, contextual conditions were found to be important 
with respect to defects and delays (illustrated in Figure 41 below). For example, a 
potential risk factor that could generate defects was inadequate resourcing of the 
FM team tasked with managing defects. The data tentatively suggests that an 
external environmental condition of skills shortages in the market place could 
make it potentially difficult for the FM Co to find highly trained FM staff in the 
numbers needed for a project the scale of project A. however with regard to skills 
shortages it was suggested that understanding of the conditions surrounding a 
project is important because, as the preceding example indicates, these can have 
significant influence over project outcomes. Moreover, given the gestation period of 
PFI projects (which can be years in length), understanding the context that might 
surround the project in future, and the implications of it, would be valuable such that 
actions might be taken in the present to tackle those implications. For example, in 
the case of a skills shortage in the market place this is not quickly remedied and 
might require partnering with other organisations (such as local government skills 
agencies) to tackle the shortage.    
A further finding was that determining the legitimacy of defects could lead to a 
drop in productivity at BuildIt because construction staff needed to return to the 
project. The reason staff needed to ‘return’ was an internal environmental 
condition of human resource policies within BuildIt (and norms of project based 
organisations more generally) whereby staff are moved on to new projects following 
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the completion of a project. Also, determining ownership of defects was identified 
above to be another potential risk factor that could compound delays.  Determining 
ownership of defects, in theory, should be a matter of referring to the contracts but 
this approach was found to be made problematic by the contextual conditions 
surrounding the occurrence of the defect. Changes to end user staff (discussed 
above) were found to be the consequence of an internal environmental condition 
within the client organisation whereby there was high rate of turnover in the end user 
staff population. Moreover data from project A also suggests that the 
consequences of reported defects and delays does not end at the boundaries of 
the organisation but rather they can propagate into the organisations external 
environment. For example, it was found that one of the consequences of 
experiencing defects and attendant delays on project A is that it might damage 
BuildIts reputation within the market place for delivery of projects of this type. It was 
found that the effects of this damage can be significant by limiting thier ability to 
secure future work and that this outcome can have a long lasting effect (many years 
in length) on the business.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41 Conceptual illustration of interacting project contexts 
 
BuildIt Internal Environment 
Project X Project Y Project Z 
BuildIt External Environment 
Project A 
Project A outcomes 
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A further finding from project A data was that factors affecting overruns can 
induce dynamic project behaviours. For example, as discussed above, defects 
trigger delay however it was found that delay in attending to defects could cause 
secondary defects thus increasing the complexity of rework which was shown to 
further contribute to delays (illustrated in Figure 42 below). A reasonable deduction 
to make here is that defects should be attended to immediately upon their being 
reported however the systemic nature of the factors influencing overruns comes to 
the fore. This is because, as noted earlier, one of the factors that causes delay is a 
shortage of staff caused by the external environmental conditions of a shortage 
of skilled staff in the market place therefore making attending to delays quickly 
potentially problematic. 
 
Figure 42 Dynamic behaviour induced due to delay in remedying defects 
  
Finally, the issue of being able to attend to defects quickly was found to be 
important in relation to managing the client stakeholder. It was noted that if a 
project experiences high numbers of defects and attendant delays this can induce 
the client to adopt an aggressive posture toward BuildIt. However, it was found 
that this situation can be mitigated if defects are fixed promptly.  
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4.2 CASE B FINDINGS 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to report on the findings from the second case 
study examined in this research, project B. The section opens with brief context to 
the project which is then followed by a macro level view of how interviews with 
participants of project B unfolded. This information is provided to the reader to give 
further context to Project B but also to reveal the logic behind the structure used to 
present the insights drawn from the case study. The remaining sections present the 
findings from project B concluding with a section containing a summary of the 
findings.  
 
4.2.2 Context to Project B 
Project B was a similar to project A in that it was a large public medical facility 
procured under a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contractual arrangement to design, 
construct, operate and maintain the facility. Unlike project A, however, which had 
been heralded as a ‘success’ by BuildIt, project B had been identified by BuildIt as 
having experienced cost overruns during the operational phase of the facility. Thus 
project B provided an opportunity for polar comparison (Pettigrew, 1990) with project 
A.   
 
4.2.3 Overview of Interviews 
The main focus of participants concerning overruns in project B was the 
operational phase of the project in which costs had exceeded their estimated values 
and thus had jeopardised the financial objectives of the project.   
Again, like project A, delays in bringing the facility back up to specification 
following a reported defect were the driver for rising costs. As discussed in section 
4.1.1, in a PFI contract the provider has a set window of opportunity within which a 
defect must be remedied. For each unit of time taken by the provider beyond this 
window, the client can deduct a proportion of the service payment to the provider. 
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Consequently, delays encountered in attending to defects puts the financial 
objectives of the project from the providers perspective at risk.  
Unpacking the issue of delay, participants revealed that reported defects, in 
particular experiencing a high number of reported defects, was the cause of delay. 
In short, if there was no defect to be remedied then there could be no delay in 
bringing the facility back up to specification. Participants revealed a variety of factors 
that could trigger or generate defects reports including design decisions, end user 
perceptions, stakeholder interests and changes to project stakeholders. Participants 
also revealed a number of contextual conditions that were thought to be have 
contributed to triggers of defects and thus influenced the project’s behaviour.  
Although reports of defects were the trigger of delay, like project A, project B 
suggested that there were a series of factors that could compound delay. These 
included inadequate resource capacity and capability in the team tasked with 
managing defects.  
Like project A, participants revealed ‘Knock-on effects’ of experiencing high 
numbers of reported defects and attendant delays in project B. These knock on 
effects were over and above experiencing the cost overruns and revealed that 
factors affecting overruns can induce dynamic project behaviours.  
Finally, participant interviews revealed the counteractions that were taken to 
tackle the system of factors described above.  
Using the points above the structure of reporting empirical insights gained from 
project B is as follows: 
• On project objectives  
• On triggering and compounding of defect reports  
• On factors compounding Delays 
• Emergent consequences of experiencing high numbers of reported defects 
and attendant delays 
• Counteractions to undesirable project behaviour  
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4.2.4 Empirical Findings from Project B 
This section presents the insights and resultant findings that were gained from 
project B using the process of analysis described in detail in section 3.7. 
 
4.2.5 A Systemic View of Project B 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, this thesis adopts a systemic 
modelling perspective of projects. One of the tenets of this approach is that to gain a 
full appreciation of project behaviour a holistic rather than a discrete view of projects 
is needed. In short, one must gain a view of the whole system that explains project 
behaviour, as well as its parts. 
As described earlier, the sections that follow report individual insights gained 
from project A. While each insight makes its own unique contribution to explaining 
the behaviour of the project, it focuses only on a ‘part’ of the system that explains 
project A’s behaviour. Focusing on the ‘parts’ is necessary so that they can be more 
fully explored and understood. However, focusing on the ‘parts’ means the reader is 
without a full appreciation of the whole system to which the ‘parts’ belong and which 
explains the behaviour of project B.  
In order to attend to this gap, a model of the system that explains the behaviour 
of project B is presented (Map B1). It is not the intention that the reader be able to 
interrogate this model since, as discussed, each of its component parts will be 
examined in the forthcoming sections. Rather, the model is offered to provide the 
reader with a holistic view of the system, giving a fuller appreciation how the ‘parts’ 
of the system discussed in the following sections interlock to create a complex 
system that explains the behaviour of project B. 
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Map B1 A systemic view of project B 
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4.2.6 On Project Objectives  
Insight B1 (Map B2) positive and negative objectives influence project behaviour 
As noted in the introduction to this section, project B had experienced cost 
overrun during its operational phase. Consequently the aim of exploring project B 
was to understand the factors that contributed to the project outcome of cost 
overrun.  
As discussed in the first case study introduced in the findings of project A, the 
literature suggests that objectives play a fundamental role in achieving project 
outcomes because objectives guide the actions of project actors (Ward, 1991, 
p.345). Consequently, gaining insight into the objectives that might have driven 
actions within project B and contributed to the outcome of project overruns would be 
valuable.  The literature suggests that to gain this understanding, the objectives 
must be seen from the perspective of those involved because project objectives 
differ according to which stakeholder perspective the project is examined from 
(Bryde and Robinson, 2005, Turner, 2009). Map B2 illustrates the project objectives 
that were revealed from the participants of project B. 
As can be seen from Map B2, like project A financial objectives were of central 
concern in project B. However, unlike project A, three of the participants in project B 
also cited needing to significantly reduce the construction cost of the project [2202] 
as a central objective in the project. 
As shown on map B1, the client of project B had received a number of initial bids 
that were unaffordable within their available budget [6239]. Consequently, the client 
requested bidders to submit proposals for a revised design that addressed their 
financial requirements [2348].  In order to meet the clients cost constraint, and thus 
win the project, BuildIt needed to produce a revised bid with construction costs that 
were significantly reduced from their original submission [2202].  
As the insights in the next section will show, the pursuit of cost reductions in 
project B in order to win the project was one of the contributing factors in project B 
experiencing overrun in its operational costs. The tentative finding being pointed to 
here is that, when considering projects, objectives (positive and negative) and 
their ramifications need to be fully explored.  
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Map B2 Positive and negative objectives revealed by project B data 
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4.2.7 On the Triggers of Defect Reports  
The previous section highlighted that one of the objectives of project B was to 
avoid paymech deductions as this would cause cost overruns in the operating phase 
of the project. Given project B experienced operational cost overruns this objective 
was not achieved.  
Four of the participants of project B suggested that a key reason why the 
objective of avoiding paymech deductions was not achieved was because the 
project experienced a high number of reported defects [1569] which in turn caused 
delays in remedying defects [2] and ultimately delay in making those parts of the 
facility that had experienced defects available again [3]. Consequently, paymech 
deductions were incurred by the project [4] and it began to experience operational 
cost overruns.  
The participants suggested that the high number of reported defects comprised 
‘actual’ and ‘spurious’ defects (the distinction between the two types has been 
discussed in (section 4.1.6, page. 157) and provided insights into what triggered 
both these type of defects in project B. The triggers of defects are discussed in more 
depth below.  
 
Insight B2 (Map B3): Design changes can trigger the generation of defects  
As discussed in the preceding section, (and illustrated on Map B3) the client of 
project B had received a number of initial bids that were unaffordable [6239] within 
the fiscal constriants imposed by central government and consequently requested 
bidders to submit proposals for a revised design that could meet their finanical 
constraints [2348].  
To meet the client’s financial constraints, the construction costs of BuildIts initial 
bid had to be reduced significantly [2202]. In order to achieve the cost reductions 
BuildIt undertook changes to the design of the facilty, in particular the reduction of 
design specification [2242] and the adoption of new materials [3269]. As shown on 
Map B3, these changes contributed to BuildIt successfully winning the project.  
However, as also shown on Map B3, during the operational phase of project B, 
these design changes manifested themselves as triggers of defect reports. The 
reduction in design speficification [2242], for example, meant that defects 
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experienced in one part of the facilty were felt else where in the facility. To illustrate, 
repairing a faulty electrical unit in one part of the facility for example in a room [2310] 
would require the electrical supply to be isolated. However, with a reduced design 
specification of the system, isolating the supply to the room might mean having to 
shut down whole systems [8], isolating the supply to all rooms in that area of the 
facility. Consequently, all rooms would be without electrical supply (rather than just 
the one with the defect) causing a high number of defect reports to be raised [1] and 
rendering  multiple rooms ‘unavailable’ within the terms of the paymech system.  
A further step taken to meet the clients cost needs was the adoption of new 
materials [3269] that were less expensive to install [3269]. As can be seen from Map 
B3, the adoption of new materials in the design [3269] was not, in and of itself, a 
trigger of defects being reported. Rather the data suggests that it was the adoption 
of the new materials [3269] combined with commissioning and maintenance 
procedures not being followed [3219]. Commissioning and maintenance is 
discussed in detail in the next insight however, in short, the use of new materials led 
to a gap in knowledge concerning the maintenance of these materials [3293] within 
the team tasked with maintenance. The combined effects of new materials and 
maintenance issues led to systemic material failures [2309] and consequently a high 
number of defect reports being experienced [1].  
The tentative findings drawn from this insight thus far are that design changes, 
in particular the adoption of new materials, can create a gap in the knowledge of 
the FM Co concerning the maintenance and re-comissioning procedures of 
these new materials leading to inadeqaute maintenance and thus defects. 
Furthermore, should a defect occur during the operation of the facilty, then design 
changes (like reduced specification) can have a multiplicative effect on the cost 
associated with repairing the defect. In summary, design changes that help to 
meet construction cost objectives can place operational cost objectives in 
jeopordy.  
As discussed above, the driver for reducing the cost of the design in project B 
was the need to meet the clients cost constraints. However participants also 
suggested there were a multitude of other conditions at work which were thought to 
have had contributed an overly aggressive emphasis on construction cost reduction. 
Map B4 illustrates these contextual factors which are discussed below. 
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What Map B4 illustrates is an interplay between external contextual conditions, 
internal contextual conditions and the influence these conditions had on the actions 
of the project team. In terms of external conditions, for example, the data indicates 
that there is an expectation that the business will grow revenues and profits year on 
year [2436], an expectation which is driven by market economic conditions, in 
particular shareholder expectations concerning revenue and profit growth [2438]. 
These conditions that are compounded by a further condition of buoyancy in the 
market place at the time of project B [2227], served to fuel an internal expectation of 
enhanced returns on project investments [2218] and the need to return x% from 
project B [2224]. 
Moreover the perceived need to grow revenues/profits [2436] appears to 
contribute to other internal conditions such as the use of performance management 
of staff that is focused upon winning new projects [2302] as well as creating 
expectations on management staff that they need to win new business to justify their 
position[2505]. The compound effects are to compel management to win new 
projects [2506] contributing to a perception by management that securing project B 
was a number one business priority [2569]. 
Adding to the perception that securing project B was a business priority [2569] 
are a number of other factors. First, that significant cost’s had already been incurred 
by BuildIt to reach the position of the revised bid stage [2441]. The costs associated 
with a PFI procurement exercise can be substantial therefore having incurred 
significant sunk cost this served to further fuel the need to win the project so that the 
costs were not sunk. As noted above, the market expectation of a commercial 
business like BuildIt is to grow revenues/profts [2436]. This factor coupled with the 
fact that project B was very large scale [2203] and therefore presented significant 
revenue/profit opportunities further compounded the perception that the project was 
a priority to secure. A further factor that is relevant is the sense of optimism within 
BuildIt concerning their ability to deliver this type of project [2495]. In short, BuildIt 
had significant past experience of delivering projects of a similar type to project B 
[2607, 2440, 2228] therefore there was no reason to believe that they could not 
successfully deliver project B. A final factor that contributed to the perception of the 
project being a business priority was that securing project B could contribute to 
growth in reputation of BuildIt for this type of project[2211].  As noted in case A, 
track record plays an important role in securing future projects.  
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Based upon the above discussion it seems that the project team were under 
significant pressure (from multiple sources) to win project B [2569] and also to 
achieve the expected return on investment[2224].  As shown on Map B4, this 
pressure contributed to focusing staff decisions on the pursuit of short term cost 
savings [2407] rather than adopting a longer term view on decision making that took 
account of the entire life time of the project. As a  consequence, it was believed by 
participants that this may have led to an over emphasis on cost reduction [2201], an 
emphasis which informed design change decisions such as reducing the facility 
specification [2242] and adopting new materials [3269].  
What Map B4 also shows is that the external pressure of needing to reduce 
construction costs to meet the client’s financial objectives [2348] was acting in 
unison with the internal pressures described above. Consequently, it was the 
systemic effect of these pressures that drove a strong emphasis on construction 
cost reduction rather than only the need to meet the clients cost requirements.  
In summary, while a focus on construction cost reduction was triggered by client 
need other factors were at work. In particular, external conditions such as the need 
to return shareholder value created internal conditions at BuildIt that include 
pressure on management staff to win new work and pressure concerning 
expectations about the value of profit margins. These pressures further drive 
decision making toward achieving the lowest construction cost to attain the short 
term objectives of securing the project and achieving profit expectations. The focus 
on cost reduction was therefore strong because of the systemic effect of the 
foregoing pressures.  
A strong focus on reducing the construction cost of the facility, perhaps diverted 
attention away from gaining a fuller appreciation of the longer term implications of 
cost reduction decisions, in particular their impact upon the operation of the facility 
therefore contributing to the operational cost overrun situation.  
The tentative findings drawn from the above are that: 
• External contextual conditions such as shareholder expectations for 
growing revenue/profits that are compounded by buoyancy in the market 
place influenced internal contextual conditions at BuildIt (Figure 43).  
• Internal conditions can include expectations of the need to grow 
revenues and profits year on year within the business; organisational 
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culture that compels management to win new projects to ‘justify their 
existence’ [2525] compounded by performance management systems that 
are geared to drive management toward winning new work. Furthermore, 
strong past experience of successfully delivering similar projects creating 
optimism bias. 
• The above internal conditions draw staff attention toward short term 
objectives of securing work and achieving expected profit margins and as a 
consequence cost reduction can become a focus.  
• Where attention is already focused on cost reduction due to the need to 
meet a client’s cost constraints, the above conditions can serve to compound 
this focus. The systemic effect can be an overemphasis on construction 
cost reduction to achieve short term objectives (winning work and 
construction profits) which can marginalise longer term concerns about the 
operation of the facility. Particularly in PFI, operational concerns are of 
importance to the provider because, as discussed (page. 142), it is the 
provider not the client that is responsible for the facilities operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43 The interaction of contextual conditions and the project environment
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Map B3 The impacts of design changes to meet client cost objectives 
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Map B4 The influence of contextual conditions on project behaviour 
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Insight B3 (Map B5) Inadequate commissioning and maintenance can trigger the 
generation of ‘actual’ defects 
As touched upon above, and can be seen from Map B5, the compound effect of 
using new materials and the procedures for commissioning and maintenance of the 
new materials not being followed properly were believed to have caused systemic 
materials failures. Project B data provides deeper insight into the issue of 
commissioning and maintenance procedures. In order to fully explore this insight, 
the commissioning and maintenance trigger [3219] identified on Map B5 is 
reproduced on Map B6. 
Map B6 offers explanations as to the causes of commissioning and maintenance 
procedures not being adequately followed. What it shows is that two contextual 
conditions were at work. First that BuildIt had secured a number of major projects in 
quick succession at the time of project B [2228] and second that human resource 
structure within the organisation [6294] meant that the organisation relied on a small 
fixed number of ‘best people’ [2229]. The compound effect of these conditions was 
to create high demand for management staff on project B to be involved in other 
projects within the business[2260]. The consequences of this demand were two fold. 
Firstly, management staff were stretched across multiple projects [6359] and 
therefore were unable to dedicate adequate time to ensure that commissioning 
processes were conducted ‘properly’ [2484 2254]. Secondly, management staff 
were moved off the project prematurely [2259]. These staff had been involved in the 
project for a number of years and therefore had significant knowledge about it. 
However, by being moved on to new projects, these staff were not on hand to share 
their knowledge with other stakeholders, in particular the FM Co, to ensure they had 
adequate understanding of the facility and its systems [3239] thus creating a 
knowledge gap. The compound effect of management staff being unable to 
adequately supervise commissioning and to share knowledge with those 
maintaining the facility was believed to have led to inadequate commissioning and 
maintenance and, consequently, the occurrence of defects on project B.  
The tentative finding drawn from the above insight is that contextual conditions 
including operational success and human resource policies can have significant 
effect on the ability to commission and maintain projects like project B (Figure 44 
below). 
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Figure 44 Conceptual model of interaction between external environment conditions, the 
project and its outcomes 
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Map B5 The effects of deficiencies in re-commissioning and maintenance procedures 
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Map B6 Causes of deficiencies in facility commissioning and maintenance 
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Insight B4 (Map B7): Subjective stakeholder assessments can trigger the generation 
of ‘spurious’ defects. 
A further trigger that generated reported defects in project B, in particular 
spurious defects was stakeholders making subjective assessments about the facility 
[2459]. The nature of this trigger was discussed at length in case study A (page. 
158) however project B provides additional insight, in particular relating to end user 
and client perceptions about the value for money of PFI projects [4467]. Project B 
provided two examples of what can drive this questioning of value for money. The 
first example concerns replacement costs, in particular the cost of replacing a bulb 
[4469]. The costs associated with bulb replacement will include the cost of the bulb 
($10) but also costs associated with sourcing, delivery, fitting and any necessary 
servicing ($70). Therefore, the total cost of replacement might be $80. However, 
what the data from project B suggests is that stakeholders only include the cost of 
the bulb ($10) in their estimation of replacement cost and consequently can perceive 
the value of $80 to replace a bulb as lacking in value for money.  
The second example is that media attention concerning the value for money of 
PFI projects in general [2604] can also affect end user and client perceptions about 
value for money [4467]. For example, news in the press concerning poor value for 
money being experienced on PFI projects similar to project B can fuel end user and 
client perceptions of poor value for money.  This negative perception can cause end 
users and clients to be very critical of, and thus find fault with [2603], the project 
leading to spurious defects being generated.  
The tentative finding that can be drawn from the insight above is that gaps in 
stakeholder knowledge concerning the costs associated with maintaining the 
facility can lead to negative stakeholder perceptions and spurious defects being 
reported. A further contributing factor in this regard is an external condition of 
negative media concerning PFI projects which can further fuel negative 
perceptions and thus affecting the project.  Key stakeholders in this regard are end 
users and the client.  
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Map B7 The effects of subjective stakeholder assessments of the facility 
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Insight B5 (Map B8) Stakeholder interests can trigger reported defects 
Data from proejct B also suggests that a further trigger of defects being reported 
is stakeholder interests. This trigger was also identified in project A and concerns 
defects being reported because stakeholders are, legitimately, working to protect 
their interests. However, project B provides further insight. It is that if the defect 
occurs during the construction liability period [2461]. then this, in essence, creates 
an incentive for the FM Co to pursue BuildIt to attend to the defect in the first 
instance. The logic here is quite simple, to resolve a reported defect would cost the 
FM Co money, therefore, it is worthwhile for the FM Co in the first instance to pursue 
BuildIt to resolve the defect rather than resolve it immediately themselves. 
The tentative finding drawn from this insight is that stakeholder interests can 
cause defects to be generated and therefore must be understood and, where 
possible, managed during the operational phase of a PFI project.  
 
Insight B6 (Map B8) Changes to stakeholder personnel can trigger reported defects 
Data from project B suggests that a further trigger of defects being reported 
were changes to stakeholder personnel. Project A also revealed this trigger however 
project B data provides additional insight into its nature. In particular data from 
project B also suggests that personnel changes at the FM Co [2552] and also the 
client [5274] can result in further reports of defects. In essence, new stakeholder 
personnel joining the project can cause gaps in knowledge to re-emerge. For 
example, there might be defects that have been raised and agreed as resolved in 
the past between the predecessors of the client representatives and FM Co.  
However, the new client representative or FM Co personnel might not be aware of 
these agreements, or perhaps might not concur with them, thus causing new reports 
of defects to be raised.  
Project A also identified that changes in personnel can generate defects, in 
particular the end user group, however the tentative finding drawn from the above 
insight is that a broader perspective on changes of personnel that considers 
change within other stakeholder groups include FM Co and Client might be 
valuable.   Based upon this finding the conceptual model presented in project A can 
be extended to the following (Figure 45). 
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Figure 45 Conceptual model of changes to personnel across project stakeholder groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Project 
Changes of 
personnel within  
BuildIt  (e.g. 
Project 
Manager) 
Project Outcomes 
 
Changes of 
personnel within 
client end user 
group 
Changes of 
personnel within 
FM Co 
Changes of client 
representative  
222 
 
 
Map B8 The effects of stakeholder interests and changes to stakeholder personnel 
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4.2.8 On Factors Compounding Delay  
The two preceding sections revealed triggers of defects being reported during 
the operational phase of project B and also revealed the contextual conditions that 
might have contributed to bringing about those triggers. As discussed, defects can 
cause parts of the facility to be rendered ‘unavailable’ under the terms of the 
paymech system. Consequently, delay in making the facility available again results 
in deductions being made by the client from the provider’s (BuildIt) regular payment 
and thus rising operating costs of the facility from the perspective of BuildIt and its 
partners.  
While reported defects might be the trigger of delay, two of the participants also 
identified factors that compounded the delay experienced on project B. These 
compounding factors do not trigger delay but rather can serve to worsen the extent 
of delay. These are explored below: 
 
Insight B1 (Map B9): Resource capacity of FM staff can compound delays in attending 
to reported defects 
The first compounding factor [3286] is a simple matter of resource capacity. In 
particular, the number of staff within the FM team tasked with co-ordinating defect 
reports being too small to cope with the volume of defects being reported. As a 
consequence, delay ensues in attending to defects. Project A data provided some 
insight into why the resource capacity of the FM team might be limited which was 
that skills shortages in the market place coupled with the complexity and scale of 
projects like project B, could make it potentially difficult to find highly trained FM staff 
in the numbers needed. 
 
Insight B2 (Map B9) Resource capability of FM staff can compound delays in 
attending to reported defects 
The second compounding factor [2742] concerned the capability of FM staff, in 
particular, their knowledge concerning the management of defect issues. For 
example, Map B9 illustrates that gaps in knowledge have two consequences. Firstly, 
time is incurred in gaining the knowledge needed to repair the non-compliant aspect 
[3305]. Secondly, there is a gap in knowledge concerning the contractual obligations 
of the consortium. In this example, the gap in knowledge concerns what constitutes 
224 
 
resolution of a defect in the eyes of the contract. As Map B9 suggests [2462] 
implementing a temporary repair for some defects could constitute resolution and 
therefore prevent further delay in making the facility available again. However, 
without this nuanced understanding of the contract the FM team pursued a 
permanent solution that took longer to implement, serving to extend the time delay 
in making the facility available again leading to rising paymech deductions. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that the premature transition of construction staff to new 
projects (discussed earlier) can also contribute to the gap in FM Cos knowledge 
relating to the management of defects.  
As Map B9 shows the capacity and capability of FM staff have a compounding 
effect on delay.  
The tentative findings from the two insights above are that the capability and 
capacity of staff tasked with managing defect situations can result in delay in 
attending to defects. In relation to capability, delays are incurred while gaps in 
knowledge are filled such that remedial action can be taken. Furthermore, gaps in 
knowledge concerning contractual arrangements can lead to lost opportunities 
to resolve defects quickly.  
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Map B9  Factors compounding delays in repairing defect issues 
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4.2.9 Emergent Consequences of High Numbers of Reported Defects and 
Attendant Delays 
Thus far the findings have focused upon the causes of high numbers of defects 
experienced during project B. It has also been shown that experiencing a high 
number of reported defects contributed to delay in making the facility (or part 
thereof) available and, as a consequence, through the paymech system the client 
made deductions from BuildIt’s regular payment.  
Three of the participants of project B also suggested that there were other 
consequences, over and above incurring paymech deductions, that emerged as a 
result of experiencing high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays. This 
section examines these emergent consequences.  
 
Insight B7 (Map B10) high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays can lead 
to a loss of the client’s trust in BuildIt and the Project 
As shown in Map B10 the compounding effect of experiencing high numbers of 
reported defects [1] and attendant delays [3] is that it can lead to a loss of client faith 
or trust in BuildIt and the project [2717].  To explain further, delays in making the 
facility available again following a defect report [3] are perceived by the client as the 
provider (BuildIt) not taking ownership and responsibility for the reported defects 
[2711]. As a consequence, this erodes the clients trust in BuildIt that they will 
adequately manage defects.  
The high numbers of reported defects [1] also serves to erode client trust 
[124472294]. The value of project B was very high and therefore client 
expectations about quality were equally high. Indeed the client’s expectation was for  
‘5 start quality’ [2447]. When that quality expectation is not met, the client feels that 
they are paying for a 5 star level of quality but only receiving 3 star and as a 
consequence they perceive that quality has been compromised by the provider 
(BuildIt). 
The systemic effect of a perceived lack of ownership by the provider of reported 
defects coupled with the perception that quality has been compromised, eroded the 
clients trust in BuildIt and the facility [2717]. 
As a consequence of eroded trust, client feels they need to take control of the 
situation [2726] (rather than leave it to the provider). This sees client behaviour 
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move to, as one participant put it ‘attack mode’ [2542] or as another participant put it 
one of ‘do not let them [BuildIt] get away with it [defects and delays]’. A similar 
scenario to this was touched upon in project A data which suggested that 
experiencing defects and delays can cause the client’s behaviour toward BuildIt to 
change, to become more adversarial than co-operative. Project B data (Map B10), 
however, provides further insight into what the consequences of that change in 
behaviour can be. 
What Map B10 suggests is that in this new mode of behaviour the client 
proactively seeks out non-compliant issues [2546] (defects), for example by bringing 
in external consultants to conduct audits of the facility [2545] or siding with the views 
of other stakeholders who are raising issues [2553]. As a consequence, new areas 
of non-compliance (defects) are revealed [2546], adding to the volume of defects 
that have been reported [1] which serves to further substantiate the clients original 
perception that quality has been compromised. Consequently a vicious feedback 
loop is generated (labelled feedback loop 1 – defect ownership on Map B10). 
Furthermore, the additional defects to deal with [1] cause further delay [2, 3] 
which in turn serves to substantiate the clients original perception that the provider is 
not taking ownership of the issues [2711].  Consequently a second feedback loop is 
generated (labelled on Map B10 as feedback loop 2 – quality of facility).  
The systemic effects of  both feedback loops is to further erode the clients trust 
in BuildIt and the facility [2717] and so these vicious feedback loops continue 
creating a situation that participants described as an ‘operational situation that is out 
of control rather than being managed’ and that can never get back to a ‘managable 
state’. This sense of being ‘out of control’ when feedback behaviour is present in 
projects is echoed within the project management literature which suggests that 
such dynamic behaviours are often incredibly difficult to recover from (Ackermann et 
al 2014, Cooper, 1994; Williams 1995).  
Map B10 suggests that reducing the number of reported defects can bring the 
situation described above back under control because this breaks both feedback 
loops (1 and 2). Thus reducing the number of defects should be the focus of 
managerial action in the first instance. However, Map B10 also suggests that 
improving the response times to remedying defects might help to maintain client 
trust and thus potentially mitigate the effects of both feedback loops. To explain 
further, erosion of client trust is the compounding effect of both delay and high 
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volumes of reported defects.  Therefore, responding to defects quickly (thus 
reducing delays) might serve to maintain client trust. If client trust is maintained then 
this breaks both feedback loops.  This action is substantiated by project A data 
which made a similar finding. There is also logic that supports this action. 
Fundamentally, the client’s interest is in using the facility therefore the more the 
facility is available the better. If defects are resolved quickly then this will contribute 
to ensuring the facility is available therefore satisfying the client’s interest.  
A further suggestion made by one of the participants was that better 
management of the client during the defect situation could have been valuable.  The 
meaning of ‘better’ was not expanded upon by the participant however the author 
reflected upon the suggestion which generated some ideas on what ‘better’ 
management of the client could entail. For example, in relation to delays in attending 
to reported defects, if it is assumed that, contrary to the perceptions of the client, 
BuildIt were taking ownership of reported defects and were working hard to resolve 
them, then perhaps helping the client understand more about the situation by 
informing them of the measures and resources that the BuildIt was putting in place 
to tackle the high volumes of reports could have helped maintain the clients trust in 
BuildIt that they were taking full responsibility for the situation and working on it. 
Furthermore, earlier Insight B4 suggested that reported defects comprise of both 
actual and spurious defects. However, if the client only sees reported defect 
numbers then it may be valuable to furnish the client with information about the 
number of actual defects in order to help mitigate perceptions of poor quality. As a 
further step, if it is assumed that actual defects are of varying degrees of severity, 
then furnishing the client with information on the degree of severity could also help 
to allay perceptions of poor quality. 
The tentative findings drawn from this insight are that defects and resultant 
delays can induce dynamic behaviour in the form of vicious feedback loops 
within the project. A central node in these feedback loops is the erosion of the 
client trust in the provider and the facility. Erosion of trust can cause a shift in 
the client’s role in the project from a passive mode, where the provider (BuildIt) is 
given relative freedom to manage the operations of the project, to an active mode 
where the client takes a much more proactive role, in particular in seeking out 
defective aspects of the facility. Consequently, dynamic behaviour (feedback loops) 
is generated causing a situation that is out of control. 
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A further tentative finding is that to bring this situation back under control 
tackling the number of defects should be the first priority of the provider (in this 
case BuildIt) as this will help reduce delays in attending to defects as well as 
meeting client quality expectations thus breaking the feedback loops described 
above. A second action that can break one of the feedback loops (feedback loop 1 – 
defect ownership) and potentially mitigate the other (feedback 2 – quality of facility) 
is to improve response times in remedying defects.  Lastly, improved 
stakeholder management of the client could also contribute to maintaining the 
clients trust in BuildIt and the facility.  
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Map B10  Dynamic project behaviour triggered by a loss of client trust in BuildIt and the project 
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Insight B8 (Map B11) high numbers of reported defects and attendant delays can 
negatively affect BuildIt’s organisational objectives  
 
Thus far the discussion of findings from project B has focused attention at the 
level of the project. However, experiencing a high number of reported defects and 
attendant delays within the project was found to have damaging consequences at 
the organisational level of BuildIt. These consequences, discussed below, ultimately 
manifest themselves in BuildIt experiencing difficulty in securing future projects.  
As Map B11 shows one of the consequences is that poor operational 
performance [2584] on project B (in terms defects and delays) damages BuildIt’s 
reputation in the market place concerning their ability to deliver large projects like 
project B[2588]. In particular the damage concerns BuildIt’s reputation from the 
perspective of two key stakeholders – future clients and future financiers.  
This damage of reputation can be seen to generate three feedback loops. 
• Feedback loop 1 suggests that damage to BuildIt’s reputation might 
mean they are less likely to receive invitations from future clients for 
large projects therefore preventing them from securing future large 
projects. 
• Feedback loop 2 suggests that, even if BuildIt are invited by a future 
client to bid for a large project, they might find difficulty in securing the 
position of preferred bidder therefore preventing them winning the 
project. This is because the data suggests trust plays a role in the clients 
selection of a preferred bidder [5266] and damage to reputation is likely 
to negatively affect client trust [2255 14].   
• Feedback loop 3 suggests that damage to BuildIt’s reputation might 
mean they less able to secure finances from financial markets that are 
necessary to secure a large PFI project like project B. 
Map B11 shows that to secure future projects both clients [2247, 3259] and 
financiers [2830] are needed and, therefore, losing reputation with either stakeholder 
can prevent BuildIt securing future projects. Without securing projects BuildIt would 
be unable to maintain or grow its track record in delivering projects like project B, in 
effect, further erode their reputation [2588] and thus a vicious feedback loop is 
sustained. 
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A second consequence of poor performance on project B (in terms of defects 
and delays) is that BuildIt do not realise the potential profits of the project [2319]. 
Consequently, this might mean funds are not available to bid for new projects. PFI 
projects are hugely expensive therefore availability of significant funds is important. 
A final consequence is that, in order to better manage the defect and delay 
situation on project B, BuildIt brought management staff back to the project [2729]. 
As discussed earlier, one of the roles of management staff is to secure new 
business however by being re-assigned to project B they were unable to perform 
this task therefore limiting BuildIt’s ability to secure future work.  
One further issue shown on Map B11 that is worthy of note with respect to the 
above discussion is the liability period associated with PFI projects. The liability 
period for defects in a PFI projects can be many years in length [3256] meaning 
clients can pursue BuildIt long after practical completion of the project[3231]. One 
participant cited an example project where the client had pursued BuildIt 6 years 
after construction completion. What this suggest is that the system of consequences 
described above can potentially emerge long after the project has been complete in 
terms of construction and therefore they present long term risks to the business. As 
one participant put it, these projects can ‘come back to bite you’. 
The tentative findings drawn from the above insights are that poor operational 
performance on a project (in terms of defects and delays) can affect the BuildIt 
organisation as a whole. For example, staff needing to return to the project and 
reduced operating profits from the project mean BuildIt has less resources 
available to bid for future work. Furthermore, poor operational performance on 
projects can cause damage to the providers (BuildIt) reputation, and damage to 
reputation can be a central node in generating and sustaining vicious 
feedback dynamics that can further prevent BuildIt from securing future large 
projects.  In short, the consequences of project risks such as experiencing 
defects and delays can extend beyond the boundaries of the project itself. They 
can penetrate up in to the organisational level (in terms of reduced organisational 
profits) and out into the external environment (in terms of damage to reputation) 
thus project risks can translate into business risks.  It appears that the membrane 
between the project and the organisation is highly permeable. That is, while the 
organisation can affect the project, it appears that the project can have significant 
effect on the organisation.   
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Finally while PFI projects may be valuable to the provider (BuildIt) in terms of 
providing a long term revenue stream, the length of the liability period associated 
with these projects means the above risks can be triggered long after the project has 
been complete in terms of construction. Consequently, PFI projects introduce long 
term risks into the on-going operations of the organisation (BuildIt) that if actualised 
can result in these projects being business affecting long after they have passed 
practical completion.   
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Map B11 The dynamics of project risk and long term future business risk 
Feedback loop 1  
Feedback loop 2  
Feedback loop 3  
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4.2.10 Counteractions to Undesirable Project Behaviour 
The preceding sections focused upon revealing the systems of factors that 
brought about operational cost overrun in project B. However, two of the participants 
suggested that actions were taken by BuildIt in order to mitigate the overruns. These 
actions and their consequences are explored below.  
 
Insight B9 (Map B12) Counteractions to cost overrun can induce undesirable 
consequences  
The actions taken by BuildIt are shown on Map B12. As Map B12 shows, the 
actions were directed at three issues. Firstly to win back the faith of the client [6], 
secondly to reduce the number of defect reports [1] and third to reduce delays in 
attending to defects [2]. The actions and intended consequences are discussed in 
more detail below 
One action that was taken was to implement project enhancements [2723] to 
improve the project’s resilience, for example upgrading materials or equipment. The 
consequences of this action were multiple. First, the improved resilience mitigated 
further defects [27231]. Second, it demonstrated to the client that BuildIt were 
taking full ownership of defects thus negating the clients perception that BuildIt were 
avoiding ownership [27232711]. Third, the gesture of implementing the 
enhancements was believed to have helped re-instate the clients faith in BuildIt and 
the project [2723 6]. As can be seen from Map B12, this action had a powerful 
systemic effect on tackling the feedback loop identified in Insight B8. This is 
because it tackles three nodes in the loop concerning volume of defects [1], client 
perception concerning defect ownership [2711] and client trust [2717]. By tackling 
these two nodes, the feedback loop can be weakened or completely removed. 
However, implementing project enhancements was very expensive and 
therefore, while the action had positive effects; it also carried a significant negative 
consequence of increasing the operating cost of the facility to BuildIt [2319].  
A second action that was taken was to bring back some of BuildIt’s best 
management staff to the project [2729]. The consequences of this action were also 
multiple. Firstly, this action helped to improve how defects were being managed, 
reducing the time taken to attend to defects [27292]. Second, the gesture of 
putting their [BuildIt] best people on the project was also believed to have helped re-
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instate the clients faith in BuildIt and the project [2723 6]. Like the action of 
implementing project enhancements, bringing back high calibre staff can be seen 
from Map B12 to have had a powerful systemic effect on tackling the feedback loop 
identified in Insight B8. This is because it tackles two nodes in the loop concerning 
delays [2] and client trust [6]. By tackling these two nodes, the feedback loop can be 
weakened or completely removed. However, this action also has a negative 
consequence for BuildIt which was touched upon earlier. It is that by bringing 
management staff back to a project these staff are unable to pursue new project 
opportunities for BuildIt. 
Third, BuildIt also assigned an executive level member of their management 
team to the project to oversee proceedings, further demonstrating to the client their 
commitment to taking ownership of the defect situation [2711] and helping to re-
instate the clients faith in BuildIt [6]. 
A further subtle counteraction that was taken was to adopt a subservient attitude 
toward the client [2713]. The sense here was that whatever the client needed they 
would get. This behaviour improved relations with the client [27136] however, like 
the actions discussion above, it also contributed to a negative consequence. The 
systemic effect of subservient behaviour [2713] coupled with BuildIt not meeting the 
contractual obligations (in terms of availability performance) [2594] was to change 
the nature of the power base between the two stakeholders [2719]. As one 
participant put it, the client had BuildIt ‘over a barrel’ and they (BuildIt) were ‘on the 
back foot’. The impact of this ‘change in power base’ was to further empower the 
client enabling them to pursue their interests (i.e. having a facility that was of 5 star 
quality). As a result, the client adopted opportunistic behaviour [2720]. As one 
participant put it, the client attempted to ‘drive the horse and cart through the door’, 
for example, identifying yet other aspects of the facility they felt warranted attention 
[2721].  In order to continue reparing their relations with the client these additional 
aspects were attended to by BuildIt resulting in further rising of operating costs 
[27202319].   
The tentative finding drawn from the above insight is that reactive counteractions 
to tackle dynamic behaviour can be costly and make the financial position of the 
project significantly worse before it gets better. This cost tentatively brings into 
question whether proactively attending to factors that can trigger this dynamic 
behaviour (defects and resultant delays) might be less costly than trying to recover 
from it. The costs of dealing with this (feedback) ramification included the financial 
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cost of implementing project enhancements, opportunity costs associated with 
bringing back staff, costs associated with assigning executive level management, 
not to mention the potential reputational costs. Some a priori assessment of these 
costs would seem prudent so that an informed judgement can be made.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
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Map B12 Counteractions (highlighted) to recover the dynamic behaviour caused by the client’s loss of trust 
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4.2.11 Summary of Findings from Case B 
Chapter 2 (page. 55).set out the following research aim for this study: 
• To identify the factors, and the relationships between them, that describe 
a system of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects, in 
particular PFI projects. 
Insights gleaned from analysis of case study B, described in the preceding 
sections, have taken steps toward tentative findings that attend to the above aim as 
well as revealing the consequences of actions taken by BuildIt to mitigate the extent 
of cost overruns.  This section provides a summary of those findings. 
Data from project B revealed that, from BuildIt’s perspective, project B had in 
common with project A the ambition to avoid the ‘negative objective’ (Ackermann 
and Eden, 2011, p.118) of incurring paymech deductions during the operational 
phase. However, unlike project A, project B a further objective was cited by 
participants as salient which was the need to significantly reduce the construction 
cost of project B due to client financial constraints. 
As has been discussed in the previous sections, the pursuit of construction cost 
reductions in project B was one of the contributing factors in the project experiencing 
operational cost overrun. The tentative finding that was drawn was that, when 
considering projects, objectives (positive and negative) and their 
ramifications need to be fully explored.  
It was found that defects can comprise ‘spurious’  and ‘actual’ defects, and 
that there were a number of factors that can generate defects.   One factor was 
design changes.  It was found that defects can comprise ‘spurious’  and ‘actual’ 
defects, and that there were a number of factors that can generate defects.   One 
factor was design changes. It was found that in order to reduce construction costs 
(discussed above) BuildIt undertook some design changes. It was subsequently 
found that these design changes, in particular the adoption of new materials, 
combined with commissioning and maintenance procedures not being 
adequately followed led to systemic material failures and consequently a high 
number of defects experienced on project B. Furthermore, it was found that in the 
event of a defect occuring, design changes, in particular reduced specification can 
have a multiplicative effect on the cost associated with repairing the defect. In 
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summary, design changes that helped to meet construction cost objectives 
placed operational cost objectives in jeopordy. 
A further factor was stakeholders making subjective judgements about the 
facility which generated spurious defects.  Gaps in stakeholder knowledge, in 
particular end users and clients, concerning the costs associated with maintaining 
the facility were found to fuel negative stakeholder perceptions concerning value 
for money. These negative perceptions were believed to cause stakeholders to 
become critical of and find fault with the facility and thus generate spurious 
defects. 
A further factor found to generate defects for BuildIt to manage was stakeholder 
interests, in particular the FM Co. It was found that if the defect occurred during the 
construction liability period then this, in essence, created an incentive for the FM Co 
to pursue BuildIt to attend to the defect in the first instance (whether BuildIt was 
responsible or not). The logic here was that to resolve a reported defect would cost 
the FM Co money, therefore, it is worthwhile for the FM Co in the first instance to 
pursue BuildIt to resolve the defect rather than resolve it immediately themselves. 
Data from project B suggests that a further trigger of defects being reported was 
changes to stakeholder personnel. Project A also revealed this trigger however 
project B data provided additional findings into its nature. In particular data from 
project B also suggested that personnel changes at the FM Co and also the client 
can result in further reports of defects. In essence, new stakeholder personnel 
joining the project can cause gaps in knowledge to re-emerge. For example, there 
might be defects that have been raised and agreed as resolved in the past between 
the predecessors of the client representatives and FM Co.  However, the new client 
representative or FM Co personnel might not be aware of these agreements, or 
perhaps might not concur with them, thus causing new reports of defects to be 
raised.  
It was also found that contextual conditions had important influence on the 
above triggers of defects. For example it was found that the external conditions of 
shareholder expectations for growing revenue/profits coupled with buoyancy in 
the market place, fuelled internal contextual conditions at BuildIt such as 
expectations of the need to grow revenues and profits year on year within the 
business; organisational culture that compelled management to win new projects 
to ‘justify their existence’; use of performance management systems that were 
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geared to drive management towards winning new work. Furthermore, strong past 
experience of successfully delivering similar projects created optimism bias. 
These internal conditions were found to have drawn staff attention toward short 
term objectives of securing work and achieving profit expected profit margins and 
as a consequence cost reduction became ‘the’ focus. However, as discussed 
above attention was already focused on cost reduction due to the need to meet 
a client’s cost constraints, therefore the preceding conditions served to compound 
this focus, the systemic effect of which was an overemphasis on construction 
cost reduction to achieve shot term objectives (winning work and construction 
profits) which marginalised longer term concerns about the operation of the facility in 
particular the implications of design changes.  
Internal contextual conditions were also found to play an important role the 
commissioning and maintenance of the facility. It was found that BuildIt had enjoyed 
operational success in terms of securing a number of major projects in quick 
succession at the time of project B. It was also found that the human resource 
structure within the organisation meant that the organisation relied on a small fixed 
number of ‘best people’. The compound effect of these internal conditions was 
to create high demand for management staff on project B to be involved in 
other projects within the business, the consequences of which were two fold.  
Firstly, management staff were stretched across multiple projects and therefore 
unable to dedicate adequate time to ensure that commissioning processes were 
conducted ‘properly’. Secondly, management staff were moved off the project 
prematurely and were, therefore, not on hand to share their knowledge about the 
facility with other stakeholders, in particular with the FM Co, to ensure they had 
adequate understanding of the facility and its systems [3239] thus creating a 
knowledge gap. The compound effect of management staff being unable to 
adequately supervise commissioning and to share knowledge with those 
maintaining the facility was believed to have led to inadequate commissioning and 
maintenance and, consequently, the occurrence of defects on project B.  
External contextual conditions were also found to contribute to subjective 
stakeholder assessments of the facility (described above). In particular the external 
condition of negative media coverage concerning PFI projects was found to 
further fuel negative perceptions of project B causing end users and clients to be 
critical of and find fault with project B, leading to spurious defects being 
generated. 
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Although the trigger of delay was defects, data from project B suggested that 
there were factors that could compound delay. In particular these were the 
capability and capacity of staff tasked with managing defect situations. In relation 
to capability, time spent attending to gaps in knowledge so that actions to remedy 
defects could be taken incurred delay. Furthermore, gaps in knowledge 
concerning contractual arrangements led to lost opportunities to resolve 
defects quickly.  
A further finding from project B data was that factors affecting overruns can 
induce dynamic project behaviours. In particular, defects and resultant delays 
was found to induce vicious feedback loops. A central factor in this feedback 
behaviour was the erosion of the client trust in the provider and the facility.  It 
was found that this feedback loop sees a shift in the client’s role in the project 
from a passive mode to an active mode whereby the client actively pursues 
defects which causes further defects and delays. A further finding was that to bring 
this situation back under control tackling the number of defects should be the 
first priority of BuildIt as this will help reduce delays in attending to defects as well 
as meeting client quality expectations thus breaking the feedback loops described 
above. A second action that can break one of the feedback loops (feedback loop 1 – 
defect ownership) and potentially mitigate the other (feedback 2 – quality of facility) 
is to improve response times in remedying defects.  Lastly, improved 
stakeholder management of the client could also contribute to maintaining the 
clients trust in BuildIt and the facility.  
A further factor that was central to feedback dynamics was damage to BuildIt’s 
reputation caused by poor operational performance on project B (in terms of 
defects and delays).  Damage to reputation was found to be a central node in 
generating and sustaining vicious feedback dynamics that can prevent BuildIt 
from securing future large projects and consequently can affect the BuildIt 
organisation as a whole. 
Poor operational performance on project B was found to affect the BuildIt 
organisation in other ways. For example, staff needing to return to the project and 
reduced operating profits from the project (due to paymech deductions for delays) 
means BuildIt has less resources available to bid for future work. 
The summary finding drawn from the above points was that the consequences 
of project risks such as experiencing defects and delays can extend beyond the 
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boundaries of the project itself. They can penetrate up in to the organisational 
level (in terms of reduced organisational profits and tying up human resources) and 
out into the external environment (in terms of damage to reputation). The project 
risks can translate into business risks.  It appears that the membrane between 
the project and the organisation is highly permeable. That is, while the 
organisation can affect the project, it appears that the project can have significant 
effect on the organisation.   
Finally, data from project B provided insight into the actions that were taken by 
BuildIt to mitigate the extent of operational cost overruns. In particular, these actions 
attended to the dynamic behaviour described above. The finding drawn was that 
reactive counteractions to tackle dynamic behaviour can be costly and make 
the financial position of the project significantly worse before it gets better. The 
costs of dealing with this (feedback) ramification included the financial cost of 
implementing project enhancements, opportunity costs associated with bringing 
back staff, costs associated with assigning executive level management, not to 
mention the potential reputational costs. These costs bring into question 
whether prevention rather than correction of the factors that can trigger dynamic 
behaviour (defects and resultant delays) might be less costly. Some a priori 
assessment of these costs by BuildIt would seem prudent so that an informed 
judgement can be made.  
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4.3 COMPARISON OF CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
The preceding sections presented the findings drawn out from each of the case 
study projects. This section focuses on comparison of the two case studies to draw 
out overall research findings. The process of comparison follows guidance from Yin 
(2003) who suggests that cases be compared using replication logic. Replication 
logic has two forms. One is literal replication where a finding from one case is found 
to be replicated within another case. The second type of replication is analytic 
replication which is where findings might be different between cases however this 
difference can be explained theoretically.  
Recognising that the reader may wish to refer back to the case study findings for 
more detail, page references are included during the following comparison.  
 
4.3.1 The Nature of Cost Overrun 
A common finding in the two case study projects was that neither suffered time 
or cost overrun during their construction phase. Instead the locus of discussion for 
cost overrun centred upon the operational phase of the two projects. 
Both project’s (page.157 and page.207) revealed that operational cost 
overruns experienced by the provider (BuildIt) can be the result of incurring 
deductions to their regular operational payment from the client. These deductions, 
referred to as paymech deductions, are brought about due to the facility (or part 
thereof) becoming ‘unavailable’ under the terms of the payment mechanism. The 
cause of unavailability was found in both cases to be the occurrence of defects.  
Experiencing a high number of defects, in particular, can trigger delay in remedying 
defects thus increasing the likelihood of the facility being ‘unavailable’ and paymech 
deductions being made. In short, the finding from both projects was that a very 
superficial explanation of operational cost overrun is described by the causal chain 
of events in Figure 46 below.  
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Figure 46 Superficial explanation of operational cost overrun 
 
4.3.2 Emergent Consequences of Defects and Resultant Delays 
In both case A and case B it was observed that the simple chain of events in 
Figure 46 above can induce much more complex dynamic project behaviour, in 
particular feedback loops. A feedback loop identified in project A (page. 177) was a 
vicious feedback loop involving the occurrence of re-work in the project, 
illustrated below in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47 Vicious feedback loop involving re-work 
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Although the re-work feedback loop was not identified in the data of project B, 
two of the elements that are central to the loop (high volumes of defects and 
resultant delays) were found in project B. Consequently, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that this loop could have presented itself in project B and therefore analytic 
replication of this feedback loop  is argued for. 
A feedback loop identified in project B (page. 228) that was high volumes of 
defects and resultant delays was a vicious feedback loop involving erosion of the 
client’s trust in BuildIt and the facility (Figure 48).  
 
Figure 48 Vicious feedback loop involving erosion of client trust 
 
As illustrated in Figure 48, it was found that the erosion of client trust, induces a 
change in the client’s behaviour from passive to active, the latter being where the 
client takes a much more proactive role in the management of the project’s 
operations.  
Although this feedback loop was not identified in project A, elements that were 
central to its activation in project B (high volumes of defects and resultant delays) 
were identified in project A (page. 172) suggesting that this feedback loop could 
have presented itself. One reason the loop did not appear in project A was the 
counteractions taken by the project team to minimise defects and delays. On the 
basis of the foregoing evidence, analytic replication of the erosion of trust feedback 
loop is argued for in project A.  
experience project 
operating cost overrun  
project experiences 
high volumes of 
reported defects 
 
erosion of client trust in 
BuildIt & the project 
Client moves to 
active mgt mode r/t 
passive   
The Project Setting 
incur delay in making facility 
available following a defect 
Incur paymech deductions  
 Trust 
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The erosion of trust feedback loop and re-work feedback loop which are both 
induced by defects and resultant delays were found to have strong effects at the 
project level by exacerbating the cost overrun situation.  
However, project B findings (page. 232) suggested that poor project 
performance (in terms of defects and resultant delays) can induce dynamic 
feedback outside the boundaries of the project (Figure 49). In short, poor project 
performance can trigger damage to Buildit’s reputation for delivery of projects like 
project B which in turn acts as a barrier to BuildIt securing future projects of a similar 
type. Difficulty in securing future projects causes damage at the organisational 
level in terms of reduced profitability. 
 
Figure 49 Vicious feedback loop involving damage to reputation  
 
Although the reputation feedback loop is not identified in project A, concepts that 
are central to its activation, in particular reputation and its role in securing future 
projects were identified in project A data (page. 179). This suggests that the 
feedback loop could have presented itself in project A. The absence however can be 
explained by the fact that project A was a success and did not encounter defects 
and delays. Indeed reversing the logic of the feedback loops identified above would 
suggest that project A served to improve BuildIt’s reputational position. Based upon 
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the foregoing points, analytic replication of the reputation feedback loops is argued 
for in project A. 
The overarching finding drawn from the above points is that the consequences 
of project risks such as experiencing defects and delays can extend beyond the 
boundaries of the project itself. They can penetrate up in to the organisational 
level (in terms of reduced organisational profits) and out into the external 
environment (in terms of damage to reputation). As a consequence, project risks 
can translate into business risks that can affect the ongoing operations of BuildIt.  It 
appears that the membrane between the project and the organisation is highly 
permeable. That is, while the organisation can affect the project, it appears that the 
project can have significant effect on the organisation.   
Following the principles of a critical realist approach to research set out in 
Chapter 3:, the aim in both case studies was to get beneath the chain of events 
described above in Figure 46 Figure 49 to understand how these events were 
brought into being. In both cases a series of factors were revealed that can have 
influence, these are explored next. 
 
4.3.3 Triggers of Operational Cost Overrun 
4.3.3.1 Design Changes 
Case study B (page. 207) found that design changes can lead to defects being 
experienced in the operational phase of the project. Firstly, reduced design 
specification meant that to resolve a defect in one area involved shutting down 
entire systems therefore making other areas unavailable and increasing the number 
of defect reports. Secondly, design changes brought about the use of alternative 
materials which in combination with inadequate commissioning (discussed next), 
was found to be a potential trigger of defects being generated.  
Design change did not appear in case study A data however this absence can 
be explained. In case study B, the reason design changes were undertaken was to 
reduce construction costs in order to satisfy the client’s financial constraints. In case 
study A there was no evidence that such cost reduction was necessary. However, 
had it been necessary, then it seems reasonable to suggest that the effects 
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observed in case study B could have been observed on case study A and therefore 
analytic replication is argued for.   
 
4.3.3.2 Commissioning and Maintenance 
The issue of inadequate commissioning and maintenance was found to be 
literally replicated in both case studies. In project A (page. 163), this was found to be 
a risk that never materialised whereas in project B the risk came to fruition. In both 
cases a reason for inadequate maintenance was found to be the skill base of the FM 
Co. In project A, this risk was mitigated by BuildIt keeping some of its construction 
staff onsite for 6-9 months to share with the FM Co their experience of the facility 
and its systems.   
In project B, on the other hand, the risk associated with the activities of 
commissioning and maintenance came to fruition and was believed by participants 
to have played a role in causing defects (page. 214). High demand for BuildIt 
construction staff to move on to, or get involved in, other projects was found to 
influence both activities. In terms of maintenance, the demand caused construction 
staff to be moved off the project and therefore, unlike in project A, they were not 
available to share their experience of the facility and its systems with FM Co staff. In 
terms of commissioning, demand for management staff to be involved in other 
projects meant they were stretched across multiple projects meaning they had less 
time to dedicate to project B and ensure activities like commissioning were 
adequately undertaken.  
As touched upon above, the combined effect of design change (in particular 
using new materials) combined with inadequate commissioning and/or maintenance 
were believed to have triggered systemic material failures (defects).   
 
4.3.3.3 Gaps in Stakeholder Knowledge 
In both case A (page. 161) and case B (page. 220) gaps in stakeholder 
knowledge, in particular end users and the client, were also found to generate 
defects. Gaps in knowledge included end users lacking knowledge about the 
technologies being used in the facility and thus perceiving them not to be operating 
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properly. Gaps in client knowledge concerning their understanding of what they had 
specified within the contract was a further source of defects being reported.  
A further gap concerned end user and client knowledge about the costs 
associated with maintaining the facility. It was found that this could lead to negative 
stakeholder perceptions concerning value for money, causing stakeholders to be 
critical of, and finding fault with the facility, resulting in defect reports.  
All of these gaps in knowledge were found to generate ‘spurious’ defects. These 
were defects that were reported by stakeholders but upon investigation by BuildIt 
were found not to breach any of the contractual arrangements. None the less, these 
defects still contributed to a high number of reported defects and resultant delays. 
Gaps in knowledge were also found to play a role in the reporting of defects, in 
other words the administrative process of recording defects and subsequently 
alerting the relevant stakeholders. In particular, it was found that the FM Co might 
not filter out spurious defects because they are not fully aware of the contractual 
obligations associated with the facility. As a consequence, the FM Co might wrongly 
categorise some defects to be legitimate when in fact they are spurious. Recording, 
rather than filtering, these spurious defects in turn contributed to inflating the number 
of defect reports to be managed. 
 
4.3.3.4 Stakeholder Interests 
A further factor that was found in both cases to generate, and also affect the 
reporting of, ‘spurious’ defects was stakeholder interests.  For example, in project A 
(page. 167) overlapping stakeholder interests were found to create informal 
coalitions between stakeholders whereby they supported one another’s claims about 
defects. For example, a defect reported by end users might receive support (rather 
than be opposed) by the client or FM provider because it plays to their (FM Co 
and/or Client) interests. To explain further, a defect reported by end users might 
require the replacement of an element of the facility (e.g. a piece of equipment or 
part of the building fabric) and thus increase the life span of that element. This 
outcome could be in the FM provider’s interests since they are responsible for the 
maintenance of the facility and therefore increasing the lifespan of an element might 
decrease the cost to the FM provider of maintaining the facility. This coalition 
between stakeholders adds to the defect and delay situation. 
251 
 
A further example of stakeholder interests at work was found in in project B 
(page. 220). It was found that the FM Co pursuing its business interest of keeping 
maintenance costs low can lead to ‘spurious’ defects being reported to BuildIt to 
resolve. The underlying reason was that when working within the construction 
liability period, it is in FM Cos interests to pursue BuildIt to remedy defects in the first 
instance (rather than FM Co resolving). This situation adds to the number of defects 
for BuildIt to manage and causes resultant delays in resolving the defects. 
 
4.3.3.5 Changes to Stakeholder Personnel 
In both cases, changes to personnel were also found to trigger defects to be 
reported. Again this trigger focused on ‘spurious’ defects. Changes to personnel 
identified in project A were end users (page. 161). Changes to personnel in project 
B related to FM Co and Client (page. 220). In both cases, these changes were 
believed to cause the types of knowledge gaps described above (page. 249) to re-
emerge as well as introducing new stakeholder interests to manage. Knowledge 
gaps and stakeholder interests, as discussed, both contribute to the defect and 
delay situation.  
 
4.3.4 Factors Compounding Delays 
In both case A (page. 169) and case B (page. 223), factors were identified that 
could compound delay in resolving defects. However, there was no commonality 
between the factors found in the two cases. In project A the compounding factors 
were identified to be simple logistical matters such as getting materials as well as 
more complex socio-political matters such as disagreement between stakeholders 
over defect ownership. In project B however, delays seemed to be compounded by 
the capability and capacity of staff tasked with managing defect situations which 
resulted in delay in attending to defects. In relation to capability, delays were 
incurred while gaps in knowledge were filled such that remedial action could be 
taken. Furthermore, gaps in knowledge concerning contractual arrangements led to 
lost opportunities to resolve defects quickly by means of temporary repairs. Gaps in 
knowledge have already been identified as important in both cases whereas issues 
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around logistics and socio-political matters such as disagreement between 
stakeholders over defect ownership found in project A were not verified by project B.  
 
4.3.5 The Influence of Contextual Conditions 
Exploring the above factors in greater detail revealed that, in both case studies, 
they were influenced by contextual conditions existing within the internal and 
external organisational environments of the stakeholders involved in the project. 
In project A (page. 163), the contextual conditions of facilities management skills 
shortages in the market place, coupled with the complexity and scale of the project, 
were found to contribute to the risk of not being able to find maintenance staff with 
the right skills in the numbers needed for the project. The consequence of this risks, 
in turn contributed to risk concerning maintenance of the facility (discussed above). 
In project B, the contextual condition of tight government fiscal policies 
contributed to the client being financially constrained driving the need for design 
changes to achieve cost reductions. However, design changes to achieve cost 
reductions were also found to be influenced by internal conditions at BuildIt’s which 
put pressure on their staff to win new projects (page. 210). The combined effect of a 
financially constrained client and the need to win new projects were believed to have 
led to an overemphasis on cost reduction to achieve short term objectives (i.e. 
winning the project and achieving construction profits). As discussed in case B 
findings, the consequences of cost reduction were design changes which 
contributed to the defect and delay situation experienced on the project. 
Contextual conditions at the client’s side were also found to have influence, in 
particular on the high rate of turnover of personnel (page 161). As one participant 
noted, in other types of projects such as schools the stakeholders (teachers and 
clients) are more static than in health care projects.  Furthermore, at the client side 
an external condition of negative media concerning PFI projects was found to 
fuel negative end user and client perceptions leading these stakeholders to be 
critical of, and thus finding fault with, the project.  
It was also found that the contextual conditions of organisational success 
and human resource policies at BuildIt can have effect on the ability to 
commission and maintain projects like project B (page. 214). BuildIt had secured 
a number of projects in quick succession and the organisations human resource 
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structure meant it relied upon a small number of best people. The compound effect 
of these was to stretch staff across multiple projects which negatively impacted their 
ability to assist in activities such as commissioning the building properly as well as 
sharing their knowledge about the facility with stakeholder such as the FM Co. As 
noted above, inadequate commissioning and maintenance was found to be a 
contributing factor in the defect and delay situation on project B. 
 
4.3.6 On Project Objectives  
The findings revealed that both projects had in common a central concern for 
project financial objectives. In project A, a key aspiration for the team was to avoid 
the ‘negative objective’ (Ackermann and Eden, 2011 , p.118) of incurring paymech 
deductions. However, in project B a central financial objective focused upon 
achieving construction costs.  The pursuit of cost reductions in project B, in order to 
win the project, was one of the contributing factors in the project experiencing 
overrun in its operational costs.  
The overall finding that is drawn from the case studies is that when considering 
projects, objectives (positive and negative) and their ramifications need to be fully 
explored. This is because the objectives can be interdependent as was illustrated by 
project B where decisions taken to meet construction objectives negatively impacted 
the project’s operational objectives. Based upon the foregoing it is suggested that 
project management might benefit from using the concept of a ‘goals system’ 
(Ackermann and Eden, 2011) when considering project goals. Understanding a 
project’s goal system would facilitate practitioners identifying possible conflicts of 
proposed actions (e.g. an action which attends to one goal having a negative 
consequence on another, such as the impact of design changes on project 
operations).  
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4.3.7 The Systemic Nature of Operational Cost Overrun in Projects 
In both case A and case B the findings described in the foregoing sections were 
found to operate as a system rather than each having its own discrete effect on the 
projects. To reflect the systemic nature of the factors, the findings are used to 
construct the following model which offers a description of the pathology of 
operational cost overrun in projects (Figure 50). The word ‘pathology’ is used simply 
to denote that explaining ‘the cause’ of cost overrun actually requires the 
explanation of a series of interacting causes and effects.  
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Figure 50 A model explaining a pathology of operational cost overrun in PFI projects 
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4.3.8  Counteractions to Systemic Behaviour 
The purpose of this research was to reveal the causes of project overruns. 
However during the course of inquiry, participants of both case studies brought 
attention to actions that were taken either to avoid cost overrun or mitigate the scale 
of overrun. 
The approach used in each of the case studies was fundamentally different; in 
that project A adopted a proactive approach to the factors described above, 
whereas project B took a reactive approach. The approach used in project A (page. 
182) was underpinned by joint problem solving among the key stakeholders of 
BuildIt, FM Co and SPV. This led to a series of actions to mitigate the risk 
associated with the factors described in the preceding sections. For example, BuildIt 
took steps to share knowledge with end users, the client’s representatives, and the 
FM Co concerning the operation of the facility. BuildIt also kept construction staff 
onsite for 6-9 months to support defect management.  A ‘fix first argue later’ policy 
was agreed between SPV, FM Co and BuildIt. The policy meant defects were 
remedied by which ever organisation was best placed to do so at the time the defect 
occurred thus ensuring a rapid response. Time was then spent at a later point 
agreeing who should have been accountable. Finally, regular defects management 
meetings were conducted involving BuildIt, FM Co and SPV in order to discuss and 
agree necessary actions. These were identified as central to project A mitigating the 
risks associated with the factors described in the preceding sections.  
Case B on the other hand adopted a reactive approach (page. 235) to the 
factors described above. The actions that were taken were to implement project 
enhancements, bring back some of the best BuildIt staff, as well as executive level 
management, and also to adopt a subservient attitude toward that client. The 
combination of these actions was found to bring the operational cost overrun 
situation back under control. However, it was also found that these actions were 
costly.  
The quantification of cost associated with the actions was not undertaken as part 
of this research study. The costs included implementing significant project 
enhancements, opportunity costs associated with bringing key BuildIt staff, costs 
associated with assigning executive level management, and the potential 
reputational costs of the defect and delay situation. While these costs were not 
quantified, comparing them with those of the proactive approach used in project A, it 
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seems reasonable to suggest they may have been significantly higher than those of 
project A’s proactive approach. The damage to BuildIt’s reputation alone could have 
served to negate BuildIt’s opportunities to win future projects, the income from which 
would presumably far outweigh the costs associated with the proactive approach of 
project A. It is of course accepted that such an assertion would require quantification 
to verify it.  None the less, some a priori assessment of these costs by BuildIt would 
seem prudent so that an informed judgement can be made as to whether a reactive 
or proactive approach to the factors described earlier in this section are more cost 
effective. 
 
4.3.9 Conclusions  
The preceding discussion compared the findings of the two case study projects. 
It was found that a broad range of findings from case study A were literally or 
analytically replicated in case study B thus forming the overall research findings. In 
the next section, these findings are examined in light of the extant literature to reveal 
the contributions to knowledge that they can make. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.0 CHAPTER ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the research findings in light of the extant literature on 
project overruns. The chapter is opened with a synopsis of the findings which are 
subsequently examined in light of the extant literature to establish what contributions 
to knowledge the findings can make. Next consideration is given to how the 
research findings can usefully inform project management practice. Implications for 
methodological practice of the thesis is also explored before the limitations of the 
study are examined.  
During the following sections, page references to the case study findings are 
included recognising that the reader may wish to refer back to this material for more 
detail. 
 
5.1 SYNOPSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The opening chapters of this thesis argued that despite growing academic 
research and practitioner experience in projects, they are regularly reported as 
having failed to meet time or cost objectives. Consequently, the argument was made 
that more needs to be done to understand the phenomenon of overruns in 
projects. It was further suggested that the aim of research be to provide ‘causal 
explanations, explanations that revealed the factors, but also relationships between 
those factors, that can bring overruns into being.  
To attend to the aim of this research, analysis of two PFI case study projects 
was undertaken from the perspective of the provider, in particular the company 
BuildIt. It was found that neither of the two projects suffered time or cost overruns 
during their construction phase therefore the locus of discussion for this thesis was 
cost overruns during the operational phase. The project management literature 
suggests that success during the construction phase of a PFI project, at least in 
relation to schedule, is not unusual. Ive (2004, p.366), for example suggests that PFI 
projects ‘have achieved an excellent track record of becoming operational at or 
before contracted date’. 
259 
 
It was revealed that cost overruns experienced by the BuildIt during a 
project’s operating phase can be the result of incurring deductions to their 
regular payment from the client (page. 244). These deductions, referred to as 
paymech deductions, are brought about by facility (or part thereof) becoming 
‘unavailable’ under the terms of the payment mechanism. The cause of 
unavailability was found in both cases to be the occurrence of defects.  
Experiencing a high number of defects, in particular, can trigger delay in remedying 
defects thus increasing the likelihood of the facility being ‘unavailable’ and paymech 
deductions being made. In short, a very superficial explanation of operational cost 
overruns in PFI projects is captured by the causal chain of events in Figure 51 
below. 
 
Figure 51 Superficial explanation of operational cost overrun 
 
The research revealed that this simple chain of events (Figure 51) can induce 
complex dynamic project behaviour, in particular vicious feedback loops; one 
involving re-work due to secondary defects; and another involving decay of 
client trust in the provider (page. 245). Both were found to damage the project by 
exacerbating the cost overrun situation (Figure 52 below).  
The research findings also suggested that poor project performance in terms 
of occurrence of defects and attendant delays in making facilities available can 
induce a feedback loop outside the boundaries of the project. This feedback 
loop involves damage to the provider’s reputation for delivery of these types of 
projects which can in turn damage the organisation (BuildIt) as a whole (page. 
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247). In summary, poor performance experienced at the project level can have 
serious business affecting consequences (Figure 52). 
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Figure 52 Feedback dynamics induced by defect and resultant delay situation
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Following the principles of a critical realist approach to research set out in 
Chapter 3:, the aim was to get beneath the simple chain of events in Figure 51 
and the dynamic behaviours described above to understand how these events 
were brought into being. A series of factors were revealed to have influence. In 
particular, the occurrence of design changes (page. 248), issues with 
commissioning and maintenance (page.249), gaps in stakeholder knowledge 
(page. 249), stakeholder interests (page. 250), changes to personnel (page. 
251) were all found to be capable of triggering defects to be generated. Exploring 
these factors in greater detail revealed that they were influenced by a number of 
contextual conditions existing within the internal organisational and external 
organisational environments of the stakeholders involved in the project. These 
conditions included skills shortages in the market place, government fiscal 
policy, shareholder expectations and staff performance management systems 
at BuildIt, human resource policies and practices, and media coverage of PFI 
projects (page. 252). 
Finally, it was revealed that the foregoing triggers of defects, contextual 
conditions, and dynamic behaviours operate as a system of factors. 
Consequently, to gain a full appreciation of operational cost overruns the foregoing 
factors need to be considered within the greater whole, and on this basis a model 
was developed describing the pathology of operational cost overrun (reproduced in 
Figure 53 below).  
The following section examines the above findings in light of the extant project 
management literature to determine what their contributions to knowledge can be. 
As discussed, the two projects examined within this thesis were both PFI projects. 
Although strictly speaking PFI is a type of PPP (Public Private Partnership) the 
terms are often used synonymously within the literature (Tuner, 2004) consequently 
literature in the following discussion uses both terms. 
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Figure 53 A reproduction of Figure 50 
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5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE 
5.2.1 A Micro-Level View of PFI Operational Cost overruns   
Evidence from Ke et al. (2009) suggests that there has been growing academic 
interest in PFI projects. In their review of literature, the author’s found that early 
research interest (1998-2003) largely revolved around three topics of risk, 
procurement and finance. More recent literature reviews (Tang et al., 2010) suggest 
that the variety of research topics has broadened to include relationships, project 
success factors, concession periods, investment environment, economic viability 
and governance issues.  
Yet despite this broadening of academic interest in PFI projects, there remains 
an important gap. Through their review of PFI literature, Yuan et al. (2009, p.256) 
found that much of existing research has offered a macro-level view of PFI projects 
focusing on examining PFI’s ‘at a broad social or organisational level’. Research at 
this level of analysis has, for example, explored finance structuring (Turner, 2004), 
the rationale for the PFI model (Hodge and Greve, 2005, Roehrich et al., 2014), the 
costs of the PFI procurement process (Tang et al., 2010) as well as risk 
allocation/sharing between public and private sectors  (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002, 
McDowall, 2003, Bing et al. 2005a). While this research is valuable, Yuan et al 
(2009) concluded that focusing on the macro-level leaves a ‘significant gap’ in 
current understanding of PFI’s concerning the ‘micro-level’ processes of managing 
these projects. The authors suggested that all factors, not just the macro ones ‘must 
be considered if they may affect the process, implementation and success’ of PFI 
projects (Yuan et al., 2009, p.256).  
Examining literature in the prevailing period since Yuan et al’s (2009) 
publication, research at a more micro-level has emerged. For example, El-Gohary et 
al. (2006) examined the management of project stakeholders, Holmes et al. (2006) 
conducted a qualitative study of health care projects from bid stage through to 
construction, De Lemos et al. (2004) conducted a case study of the Lusoponte 
bridge project in Portugal. However, despite these contributions to fine grained 
understanding of PFI projects, research at the macro-level is still dominant by far 
and so the ‘significant gap’ to which Yuan et al. (2009) referred remains to be 
addressed. The findings presented in this thesis provide fine grained insight into the 
micro-level processes associated with operational cost overrun in PFI projects 
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therefore it is argued that the findings are in a good position to contribute to 
addressing the gap in knowledge identified by Yuan at al. (2009).  
In particular the thesis contributes to understanding the risk of operational cost 
overruns in PFI projects, from the perspective of the provider (BuildIt). The risk of 
operational cost overrun has been identified within the literature for some time. For 
example, Akintoye et al. (1998, p.12) in their survey of PFI practitioners (clients, 
contractors, lenders and SPV members) identified the ‘risk of operating/ 
maintenance cost’ as one of the ‘10 most important risk factors’ in a PFI project. 
Akintoye’s study focused on the risk associated with estimating operating costs (in 
terms of maintenance and repair costs) but provides no insight in terms of explaining 
the factors that can affect operating costs in PFI projects and ultimately manifest in 
cost overrun.  The importance of operational cost overrun still features in more 
recent research. For example, studies by Bing et al. (2005a) and Hwang et al. 
(2013) both identify operational cost overrun as a major risk. However these studies 
take a macro-level view of the risk, in particular how risks are allocated in PFI 
projects, and therefore offer little in-depth insight into the nature of the risk.  
Recent research examining health care projects (Shaoul et al., 2008, Henjewele 
et al., 2014) suggests that these projects are subject to rising operating costs. 
However, the research has tended to look at operating costs from the perspective of 
the client (rather than the provider) and also has provided little in the way of fine 
grained explanation into the cause of rising operating costs.  
Based upon the foregoing points, it is argued that this thesis makes a 
contribution to knowledge by extending existing understanding of operational cost 
overrun in PFI projects. In particular, through new findings which provide a nuanced 
explanation of a system of factors that can bring about operating cost overrun in PFI 
projects.  
 
5.2.2 Feedback Dynamics  
As illustrated in Figure 53, page. 263, the findings of this study revealed that 
feedback dynamics were a feature of the system that explained operating cost 
overrun in PFI projects. Three vicious feedback loops were identified - one involving 
re-work due to secondary defects, another involving decay of client trust in the 
provider, and a third involving damage to BuildIt’s reputation.  
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The role of feedback dynamics in explaining project behaviour such as overruns 
has been explored within the general project management literature. Eden et al. 
(2000) for example, revealed feedback involving rework brought about by changes 
in design. Similarly, Cooper (1993, p.175) revealed feedback involving rework 
brought about due to the ‘quality of work done’. Howick and Eden (2001) revealed 
feedback involving rework brought about by staff fatigue because of the extended 
use of overtime during compression of projects.  
However, the role of feedback dynamics in PFI projects in particular has 
received much less attention. Perhaps the closest work has been the use of system 
dynamics models on macro-level issues such as concession pricing (Xu et al., 2012) 
which is concerned with prediction of project outcomes rather than explanation of 
project behaviour. The lack of attention to feedback dynamics is somewhat 
unsurprising given that much of PFI research has focused upon macro-level issues 
(Yuan et al., 2009) whereas feedback dynamics tend to be found deep within a 
project at the micro-level.  
That the PFI literature is silent on feedback dynamics involving rework, trust, and 
reputation, presents opportunities for this thesis to contribute to knowledge in this 
regard.  The contribution to knowledge concerning the role of rework is perhaps less 
significant than those of trust and reputation given that the general project 
management literature has already examined rework in depth (Cooper, 1993, Love 
et al., 2009, Godlewski et al., 2012). However, a modest contribution to knowledge 
can still be claimed in that the general PM literature has tended to look at rework 
from the design and build perspective whereas what this thesis has done is reveal 
that rework can be present itself within the operational stages of a project. In 
particular, the thesis has revealed that rework feedback dynamics experienced 
during the operational phase of a PFI project can serve to worsen operational cost 
overruns. 
Turning attention to the topic of trust, this has received attention in the general 
project management literature and PFI specific literature. Smyth et al. (2010) for 
example explored the value of trust and how trust is formed within projects. Lazar 
(2000) examined trust-based partnering relationships in projects. Black et al (2000) 
revealed that trust was a central pre-requisite to successful project partnering. 
Smyth and Edkins (2007)Smyth and Edkins (2007) suggested that trust was one 
measure for evaluating the condition of relationships between project partners in PFI 
projects. All of these authors underline the importance of trust however the literature 
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is silent on the dynamic behaviours described in this thesis that can result from the 
loss of trust between the client and the provider. In particular it does not reveal the 
feedback loop described in Figure 53. Indeed, Pinto et al. (2009) assert that the 
literature is lacking in empirical study of the importance of trust in projects.  
Research suggests that, once lost, re-establishing trust is likely to be challenging 
(Maurer, 2010). The findings of this thesis suggest that, once the trust feedback loop 
has been induced, recovery is likely to be problematic. This finding corroborates the 
general assertion made by Williams, (1995) and Ackermann et al. (2014) that 
recovery from feedback dynamics in projects is challenging. 
Similar to the topic of trust, the importance of organisational reputation in project 
management has received attention within the general project management 
literature. For example, Watt et al. (2009) and later Watt et al. (2010) identified the 
importance of reputation as a selection criterion in tender evaluations.  
 In the context of PFI projects, the survey of PFI practitioners by Akintoye et al., 
(1998) did not reveal reputational risk to be one of the considerations of 
practitioners. However, more recently research has pointed to the importance of 
reputational risk in PFI projects, in particular infrastructure projects such as 
highways (Verweij, 2015). In their case study of the Lusoponte bridge PFI 
concession project in Portugal, De Lemos et al (2004, p.68) identified damage to 
reputation as a ‘major risk’ to the provider. While existing research has identified the 
importance of reputation risk and revealed possible causes, the systemic effects of 
reputational damage on the provider have not been examined.  
Yet this thesis has revealed a vicious feedback loop involving organisational 
reputation which can have powerful negative consequences (Figure 53). The 
feedback loop explains that poor project performance (in terms of defects and 
resultant delays) can damage the provider’s (BuildIt) reputation which in turn can act 
as a serious barrier to the organisation securing future projects which are central to 
the organisations ongoing profitability. This finding resonates with those of Watt’s 
mentioned earlier concerning the importance of reputation as a criterion in tender 
evaluations.  
The reputation feedback loop links project performance to organisational 
reputation and subsequently to organisational success (in terms of securing future 
projects). Although the link between project performance and organisational success 
is recognised in the project management literature for a long time (Morris 1997) the 
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aforementioned feedback loop has not been elucidated within the project 
management literature. A possible explanation for this gap is that the importance of 
maintaining a strong reputation with regard to future organisational success is 
perhaps self-evident and so does not require any attention.  
However, the author of this thesis argues that in the context of PFI projects, and 
from the perspective of the provider (BuildIt) in particular, reputation should be a 
central concern. This argument is based upon a set of compounding assertions, the 
combination of which is idiosyncratic to PFI projects (illustrated below in Figure 54), 
and are discussed next.  
 
Figure 54 Central importance of reputation in PFI projects 
First, PFI projects deliver services which are of central importance to the public 
such as medical facilities (e.g. hospitals) and schools. The risk of poor service 
delivery in a PFI project, for example a hospital operating theatre being unavailable, 
could be life threatening whereas in a factory or office block the risk might concern 
damage to the client’s profitability. It seems reasonable to assert then that a 
prospective PFI client is perhaps going to be more risk averse than the factory or 
office block client and, therefore, look more favourably on those providers with a 
strong track record (reputation) for the successful delivery of similar projects.  
Second, PFI projects can involve an enormous amount of public money being 
spent (National Audit Office, 2009). Given the scarcity of public funds it seems 
reasonable to assert that prospective PFI clients are likely to be risk averse and 
therefore look favourably on those providers with a strong reputation for the sorts of 
projects they wish to deliver.  
Third, PFI clients, although being distinct from one another, belong to a wider 
community. For example, in the UK, NHS Trusts who are responsible for managing 
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and delivering hospitals operate separately but they are part of a wider community 
of other Trusts and the Government Department of Health. Consequently, even if 
news of poor project performance on one hospital does not reach the media it is 
most likely to reach other constituents of the community, some of whom might be 
future clients. It seems less likely however that a prospective private sector client’s 
(for a factory or office block for example) will be part of the same community in the 
way that public sector clients are. Thus again, with respect to PFI projects it would 
appear that maintaining a strong reputation is of key importance. 
Fourth, participation in a PFI procurement exercise can last many months, even 
years and are notoriously expensive to participate in. However, it might only be after 
participation in a procurement exercise that the potential provider receives feedback 
from the client that their track record has let them down. Consequently, damage to a 
provider’s reputation might be very costly and time consuming to reveal, more so 
than a standard design and build procurement.  
Finally, and related to all of the above, this thesis has found that poor project 
performance can damage reputation and induce a vicious feedback loop making it 
difficult for the provider to secure future PFI projects therefore affecting the viability 
of the entire organisation. On this basis, it seems reasonable to assert that perhaps 
protecting organisational reputation might be of slightly more importance at an 
organisational level than incurring the costs associated with experiencing 
operational cost overruns a PFI project. In short, recovery from the reputational 
feedback loop (Figure 53) is likely to be extremely challenging. However, recovery 
from operational cost overruns on a project might reasonably be offset by good 
performance on other projects within the portfolio.  
As described above, the PFI literature has given little attention to explaining 
reputational risk. However, based upon the foregoing assertions the author of this 
thesis argues that, from the perspective of the provider (BuildIt) at least, reputational 
risk should be a critical concern within the context of PFI projects due to the long 
term impact this risk can have on the entire organisation.  
In summary, based upon the foregoing discussion, the trust and reputation 
feedback loops identified by this thesis are argued to make valuable contributions to 
knowledge because they have not been revealed in the PFI project management 
literature. It is also argued that although not new, the identification of a re-work 
feedback loop also makes a contribution to knowledge by extending this concept to 
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the operational phase of projects. It is also worthy of note that the these three 
feedback loops interact with one another and consequently attending to the triggers 
of one (i.e. defects and delays) can mitigate or avoid both these loops coming to 
fruition (Figure 53).  Furthermore, the difficulty of recovering from these feedback 
loops suggests that it is better to avoid triggering them rather than to try to recover 
from them once they are induced.  
 
5.2.3 Triggers of Overruns 
As well as feedback dynamics, the research study also revealed a series of 
factors found to have influence in triggering operational cost overrun, these included 
design changes, commissioning and maintenance issues, gaps in stakeholder 
knowledge, stakeholder interests, and changes in stakeholder personnel. The 
following sections explore the research findings concerning each of these factors in 
light of the extant literature in order to establish what contribution to knowledge the 
findings can make.   
 
5.2.3.1 Design Changes  
One of the factors identified within this thesis as contributing to operational cost 
overrun in PFI projects was changes to the project’s design (page. 207). In particular 
it was found that reducing the design specification to meet project cost objectives 
can have serious implications for the operation of a PFI facility. Moreover, it was 
found that the use of alternative materials (again to meet cost objectives) in 
combination with inadequate commissioning and maintenance of those materials 
can result in systemic material failures during the operation of a project.  It was also 
found (page. 208) that design changes, although driven by a need to meet client 
cost constraints can also be influenced by other contextual conditions, in particular a 
perceived necessity within the organisation (BuildIt) to secure new projects (the 
contextual conditions are discussed in more detail later).  
The impact of design change on construction delays has been examined in 
depth within the general project management literature. Williams et al. (1995) , for 
example, explored the effects of design changes and resultant delays on project 
costs. Wu et al. (2004) examined the causes of change orders specifically in 
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construction projects. The importance of design risk has also been recognised within 
PFI projects. In a report for the UK Government, design consultants Mott 
MacDonald (2002, p.55) suggested that the complexity of the design in PFI projects 
‘needs significant management to reduce the impact on project outcomes’. In a PFI 
research context, Akintoye et al. (1998) in their survey of PFI practitioners found that 
contractors regarded design risk as the number one risk in PFI projects.  
While Akintoye et al’s (1998) study found design risk to be a top priority, there 
was no exploration of the nature of the risk, only a definition concerned with meeting 
the performance requirements specified by the client and also the risk of design 
changes. The study offers no insight as to how design changes can have a negative 
impact upon the operational performance requirements nor what contextual 
conditions might influence design changes, both of which were found to be salient in 
the findings of this thesis. Also in a PFI context, Wong et al. (2009) examined design 
compliance against the clients briefing document. However, again while providing 
valuable insight, this research does not reveal the underlying micro processes of 
what might have caused the design not to meet the client’s briefing and thus help in 
explaining the nature of design risk.  
Despite having been identified as a central risk to PFI projects, Raisbeck and 
Tang (2013, p.36) found that in theory and in practice ‘design development has 
been neglected’ in the PFI project management literature. To begin attending to this 
omission, authors in their study of Australian PFI projects sought to understand the 
organisational factors and capabilities that are central to the development and 
management of a PFI design. Thier study identified only one contextual condition 
that is close to the findings of this thesis which concerned the fact that the design 
must meet ‘established cost benchmarks’. Moreover, the study was concerned with 
the design and construction phase of projects rather than the operating phase. The 
findings reported in this thesis indicate that there are a number of contextual 
conditions that influence design decisions and that design change can have 
significant effect on a project’s operational performance. Neither of these points is 
addressed in Raisbeck and Tang (2013). 
In summary, while design risk has received significant attention in the general 
project management literature there is a scarcity of research on this issue from a 
PFI project perspective. Furthermore, the PFI research that has taken place, while 
offering valuable insights, provides little in the way of explanation as to the impacts 
of design changes in the operational phase of PFI projects or why design changes 
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are brought about. Both of which were found to be salient in the findings of this 
thesis. It is therefore argued that this study extends knowledge concerning design 
change risk in PFI projects through the following new findings: 
Firstly, that design changes can have serious operational consequences in 
terms of maintaining the facility which in turn can induce operational cost overrun 
(page. 207). In particular, it was found that reducing the design specification to meet 
construction cost objectives can have a multiplicative effect on the cost associated 
with repairing defects during a project’s operating phase. For example, to help meet 
construction cost objectives the electrical design specification might be reduced by 
decreasing the number of isolators within the electrical system. As a consequence, 
isolating the electrical supply to a room to affect a repair during the operational 
phase of a project might mean having to isolate the electrical supply for an entire 
corridor of rooms. This would render all rooms on the corridor (rather than just the 
one with the defect) ‘unavailable’ under the terms of the paymech system. 
Consequenelty, the provider would experience a multiplicative increase in the cost 
associated with repairing a defect. This suggests that the operational costs of design 
changes should be examined a priori to determine whether the construction cost 
saving is worthwhile when examined in light of operational cost implications.  
Secondly, this thesis found that design changes (page. 207) coupled with 
inadequate commissioning and maintenance procedures, can trigger systemic 
failures within the operating phase of the project (page. 249). For example, it was 
found in project B that to meet construction cost objectives new materials were 
adopted that were quicker (therefore cheaper) to install. However, if commissioning 
and maintenance procedures of these new materials were not rigorously followed, 
as was the case on project B, then these materials were more prone to failure than 
conventional materials. The result in project B was systemic material failure and 
operational cost overrun. (Detailed discussion of the reasons for inadequate 
commissioning and maintenance are explored in the next section) 
A final contribution the thesis makes with respect to design changes is made 
through the finding that, although driven by a need to meet client cost constraints, 
design changes can also be influenced by a number of other contextual conditions, 
in particular a perceived necessity within the provider organisation (BuildIt) to secure 
new projects.  (Detailed discussion of the role of contextual conditions is provided 
later on page.281).  
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5.2.3.2 Commissioning and Maintenance 
As touched upon in the previous section, this study found that commissioning 
and maintenance risks respectively are salient in relation to operational cost overrun 
in PFI projects (page. 249). In particular, the risks identified were inadequate 
commissioning and maintenance, the cause of which was found to be explained by 
the pattern of factors presented in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55 A pattern of factors that can impact upon commissioning and maintenance. 
 
The importance of commissioning risk and maintenance risk has been 
understood within a PFI context for some time. Akintoye et al. (1998, p.12) for 
example in their survey of PFI practitioners found that ‘commissioning’ and 
‘operating maintenance’ are among the top 10 risks in PFI projects. The authors’ 
focus on the risk of commissioning taking longer than expected and the risk 
associated with estimating the volume of repairs to defects that might need to be 
conducted over the life time of the facility. However, the study is silent on the causes 
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and effects of inadequate commissioning and maintenance, both of which have 
been revealed by the findings presented in this thesis.  
 Although Akintoye et al. (1998) identified commissioning and maintenance risks 
almost a decade ago, nuanced explanation of these risks and their systemic 
consequences has received scant attention in the PFI literature. Indeed, Dvir (2005) 
notes that there is a dearth of research focused on project commissioning in 
particular within the project management literature suggesting that this omission is 
because few researchers see project commissioning as part of the project lifecycle. 
Perhaps part of the reason omitting commissioning from the lifecycle is that the 
projects studied are largely design and build, and therefore completion of the 
construction phase might be seen as the project being ‘complete’. However, the 
same cannot be said of PFI projects since the project lifecycle will continue some 
25+ years after completing construction.  
It is therefore argued that commissioning and maintenance, as Akintoye et al. 
(1998) found, should be a key concern in PFI projects. Furthermore, it is argued that 
the findings of this thesis extend knowledge regarding commissioning and 
maintenance risks in PFI projects through the following new findings. 
Firstly, at a simple level the nature of commissioning risk and maintenance risk 
involves the adequacy with which the two tasks are undertaken, rather than only the 
duration of time needed for the activities. As shown in Figure 55, if either task is not 
adequately performed then systemic material failures can ensue which can lead to 
operational cost overruns.   
Secondly, as shown in Figure 55, the risks of inadequate commissioning and 
maintenance can be interrelated, in particular due to demand for construction staff to 
move on to, or get involved in, other projects (the drivers of this demand are 
discussed later, page. 281). As Figure 55 shows, demand for BuildIt staff to move to 
new projects can lead to construction staff being moved off their current project. 
They are, therefore, unavailable to share their experience and knowledge of the 
facility with FM Co staff meaning FM Co staff might not have a full appreciation of 
the facility, ultimately leading to inadequate maintenance activities. Similarly, 
demand for BuildIt staff to be involved in other projects can mean staff are stretched 
across multiple projects and therefore have less time to dedicate to ensuring project 
commissioning activities are adequately undertaken. The compound effect of 
inadequate commissioning and maintenance can lead to systemic material failures 
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during the operating phase and ultimately to a project experiencing operational cost 
overrun.  
 
5.2.3.3 Gaps in stakeholder knowledge 
A further finding of this research study was that gaps in stakeholder knowledge 
can contribute to the phenomenon of operational cost overruns in PFI projects 
(page. 249). In particular, it was found that gaps in the knowledge of end users, the 
client, and FM Co all have the potential to generate defects, specifically spurious 
defects. These defects, although illegitimate in the eyes of the contracts, contribute 
to a project experiencing a high number of defects and ultimately operational cost 
overruns.  
Looking across all of the stakeholders in the case studies, the principal issue 
was one of how knowledge is communicated and shared across project 
stakeholders. The project management literature suggests that this issue is 
encapsulated in the topic of knowledge management (Schindler and Eppler, 2003).  
Knowledge management has received significant attention in the project 
management literature. Reich et al. (2014) found that knowledge management was 
central to the performance of projects. Pemsel and Müller (2012) examined the 
organisational mechanisms and structures that enable knowledge management in 
terms of using, sharing and integrating knowledge, finding that these structures can 
help to avoid knowledge silos among project participants. Others have looked at 
knowledge sharing among supply chain stakeholders (Xue et al., 2011, Aloini et al., 
2015), among construction teams (Zhang and Ng, 2012), and between design 
teams (Ding et al., 2007). While all this research has provided valuable insight into 
the nature of knowledge management in projects, the tendency has been to focus 
on the design and construction stages. There has been little in the way of insight 
regarding knowledge sharing among stakeholders during the operational phase of 
projects which, as noted above, was found by this thesis to be salient to operational 
cost overruns.  
In the context of PFI projects knowledge management has also received 
attention. For example, Carrillo et al. (2006) focusing on collective learning looked at 
transferring knowledge between PFI projects.  However, again there is little in the 
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way of literature concerning knowledge sharing among stakeholders at the 
operational stages of PFI projects.  
In summary, the general project management literature, and literature on PFI 
projects in particular, tends not to look at knowledge sharing among stakeholders 
during the operational phase of projects.  Yet, this thesis has found that knowledge 
sharing during the operational phase is important to attend to gaps in stakeholder 
knowledge; gaps which have the potential to generate defects and ultimately 
contribute to a project experiencing operational cost overruns. It is therefore argued 
that this study extends knowledge concerning knowledge management in PFI 
projects through the following new findings. 
Firstly, it was found that gaps in stakeholders’ knowledge can contribute to 
defects being reported. For example, it was found (page. 158) that ventilation and 
cooling of a facility can be achieved through sophisticated design of the building 
structure to create natural airflow and/or by using technologies such as ‘chill beams’ 
(ceiling mounted devices that use pipes of water to cool areas of a facility using a 
process of convection). In both approaches there might be little or no physical 
indication to end users that ventilation and cooling is taking place. Therefore, if they 
are not furnished with information about how the system operates then this gap in 
knowledge can lead to perceptions that the ventilation system is defective when in 
fact the system is operating as specified. 
Secondly, it was found (page. 249) that gaps in knowledge are not restricted to a 
particular stakeholder but rather can affect all of the main stakeholders involved in 
the operation of the facility, namely end users, FM Co, and the client. These gaps 
mean that it is possible that defect reports can emanate from all of the main 
stakeholders.  
Finally, it was found that knowledge gaps can be in relation to financial, 
contractual, or technical matters. An example of a gap in the technical knowledge of 
end users has already been provided above. In relation to gaps in financial 
knowledge, it was found (page. 250) that a gap in client and end user knowledge 
concerning the cost associated with affecting repairs on the facility can lead these 
stakeholders to perceive that the project is lacking in value for money. A particular 
situation that illustrated this point was the replacement cost of a bulb (page. 218). 
The costs associated with bulb replacement include the cost of the bulb ($10) but 
also costs associated with sourcing, delivery, fitting and any necessary servicing 
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adding an additional $70 to the cost of replacement. Therefore, the total cost of 
replacement might be $80. However, the findings from this study suggest that end 
user and client stakeholders can be unaware of the additional costs over and above 
the cost of the bulb itself, leading them to perceive the $80 cost of replacement as 
being excessive and lacking in value for money. This negative perception was found 
to cause stakeholders to be critical of, and find fault with, the facility.  
In relation to gaps in contractual knowledge it was found (page. 250) that these 
can affect the reporting of defects, in other words the administrative process of 
recording defects and alerting the relevant stakeholders. In particular, it was found 
that if the FM Co does not have a full appreciation of the contractual obligations 
associated with the facility then this can result the FM Co wrongly categorising 
defects to be legitimate when in fact they are spurious. Recording (rather than 
filtering out) these spurious defects in turn contributes to inflating the number of 
defect reports to manage and ultimately to project cost overruns. 
 
5.2.3.4 Stakeholder Interests 
A further factor identified within this thesis as contributing to operational cost 
overrun in PFI projects was the various interests of stakeholders (page. 250). In 
particular, it was revealed that stakeholder interests can cause defects to be 
generated. For example, In project B (page. 220) it was found that the FM Co 
pursuing its business interest of keeping maintenance costs low can lead to 
‘spurious’ defects being raised because, during the construction liability period, it is 
in FM Cos interests to pursue BuildIt to remedy defects in the first instance thus 
adding to the number of defects for BuildIt to manage and resultant delays. 
Management of stakeholders has received growing attention within the general 
project management literature (Winch, 2004, Olander and Landin, 2005). However 
in a recent publication De Schepper et al. (2014, p.1210) noted that ‘despite being 
seen as one of the main success factors of PPP, to date, limited research has 
investigated actual stakeholder management in PPP’s.’ One of the studies that has 
contributed to this space is by El-Gohary et al. (2006) who developed a model for 
how stakeholders might be managed in PPP projects. While valuable, this study 
focused upon managing stakeholder interests in the planning and construction 
phases so as to mitigate the potential for opposition to the project. However, the 
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findings presented in this thesis suggest that managing stakeholder interests during 
the operational phase is equally important. 
Based upon the foregoing points, it appears that stakeholder management in 
PFI projects has received only limited attention and, furthermore, in relation to the 
operational phase of projects literature is silent on stakeholder management. It is 
therefore argued that this study extends knowledge concerning stakeholder 
management in PFI projects through the following new findings. 
Firstly, it was found that managing stakeholder interests is important during the 
operational phase of PFI projects because these interests can result in defects 
being reported which ultimately contribute to operational cost overruns.  
Secondly, the findings suggest that overlapping interests among stakeholders 
can lead to coalitions forming during the operational phase concerning the validity of 
particular defects. For example, it was found (page. 250) that the FM Co or client 
might concur with the complaints of the end users because these complaints play to 
their (FM Co and/or Client) interests. These coalitions can add to the perceived 
validity of defects making them more difficult for the provider (BuildIt) to argue 
against without damaging their relationships with stakeholders.  A similar picture 
was painted with regard to the FM Co finding defects which played to the client’s 
interest of improving the facility. Therefore, not only is managing individual 
stakeholder interests important but understanding how stakeholder interests overlap 
in such a way as to form coalitions. Literature from the domain of strategy suggests 
that such coalitions can be very powerful and therefore should be explored within 
stakeholder management and mapping processes (Ackermann and Eden, 2011).  
 
5.2.3.5 Changes to Stakeholder Personnel 
A final factor identified within this research study was changes to stakeholder 
personnel, in particular changes in the end user population and change to the client 
representative.  
The effect of changes to project personnel has been explored within the general 
project management literature where the focus has primarily been on changes to 
project managers between estimation and design stages. Savolainen and Ahonen 
(2015) for example looked at changes in the project manager between stages of the 
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project life cycle finding that the change created significant knowledge gaps.  Parker 
and Skitmore (2005) examined turnover in project managers and suggested that this 
can cause significant disruption and damage to project performance.  
While changes to project manager have received attention in the general project 
management literature, the causes and effects of changes to personnel outside of 
the project team, and during the operational stage in particular, have not been 
explored in the context of PFI projects. It is therefore argued that this study extends 
knowledge concerning changes to personnel in PFI projects through the following 
new findings. 
Firstly, although extant literature focuses on changes to the project manager, the 
findings from this thesis suggest that change of personnel is not restricted to these 
project participants. Rather, change can be experience in terms of change to client 
representative and changes within the end users population. Secondly, it was found 
that these changes can take place during the operational stage of PFI projects 
(page. 251) and can cause knowledge gaps to re-emerge as well as introducing new 
stakeholder interests to manage, both of which can generate defects and ultimately 
contribute to operational cost overrun (as discussed earlier). 
 
5.2.4 On Project Objectives  
The project management literature suggests that project objectives play an 
important role in achieving projects success because objectives help define what 
success is and, consequently, guide ‘appropriate courses of action’ toward the 
attainment of success (Ward et al, 1991, p.345). 
One of the findings from both case studies was that financial project objectives 
attracted much of the attention of the project team in relation to what constituted 
project success. This focus seems reasonable given BuildIt were a commercial 
organisation and consequently to survive would need to maintain a healthy financial 
position.  
However, the project management literature suggests that from an overall 
project perspective project success should comprise much more than financial 
objectives. For example, Atkinson (1999) suggested the need to attend to 
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stakeholder benefits. More recently Turner (2009, p.48) suggests that to focus 
success on time, cost, and quality is ‘simplistic in the extreme’.  
Yet, as discussed above, data from both projects studied in this research 
indicate that financial objectives are of central concern when projects are examined 
from the perspective of a commercial organisation such as the construction 
company. Survey research by Bryde and Robinson (2005) within a residential 
housing context, also found that the emphasis of contractors was on cost and 
duration. From a PFI perspective Ive (2004) identified 6 objectives from a provider’s 
point of view, of which four are financially related such as return on investment (the 
other 2 are about gaining experience and presence in the market place). 
Consequently, the research findings presented in this thesis corroborate existing 
literature concerning the relative emphasis placed upon project financial objectives.  
A further finding of this study in relation to project objectives concerned the 
nature of objectives. For example, in project A (page. 154) an objective which 
gained the attention of the project team was to avoid paymech deductions whereas 
in project B (page. 205) the objective of achieving construction cost reductions 
gained attention. As noted above, the literature suggests objectives guide 
‘appropriate courses of action’ (Ward et al, 1991, p.345). Project A’s objective of 
avoiding the undesirable outcome of paymech deductions at least in part framed the 
actions of the project team. Within the project management literature concerning 
objectives, the tendency is to focus on aspirations to be achieved rather than those 
to be avoided. Expanding the search for literature concerning objectives to 
organisational strategy making revealed the concept of negative objectives which 
Ackermann and Eden (2011, p.118) describe as ‘aspirations to be avoided’. The 
authors suggest that, in the context of organisational strategy making, negative 
objectives can have just as strong an influence on organisational action as those of 
positive objectives (desirable outcomes). The finding from project A was that 
negative objectives can have a similar strong influence in a project management 
context.  
Based upon the findings from this study it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
courses of action guided by the two previously described objectives of project A and 
project B could result in quite different and perhaps even conflicting actions. For 
example, in project B there was a strong emphasis on achieving construction cost 
reductions which guided the project team’s actions toward achieving this outcome. 
However, a ramification of the actions to reduce costs (such as design changes, 
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page. 207) was to trigger defects and resultant delays which jeopardised the 
objective of minimising paymech deductions and ultimately the overall objective of 
achieving operational financial returns.  
The overall implication for project management knowledge is that, when 
considering projects, objectives (positive and negative) and their ramifications need 
to be fully explored. This is because the objectives can be interdependent as was 
illustrated by project B were decisions taken to meet construction objectives 
negatively impacted the project’s operational objectives. It is suggested that project 
management might benefit from using the concept of a ‘goals system’ (Ackermann 
and Eden, 2011) when considering project goals. Understanding a project’s goal 
system would facilitate practitioners identifying possible conflicts of proposed actions 
(e.g. an action which attends to one goal having a negative consequence on 
another, such as the impact of design changes on project operations). 
Based upon the foregoing it is argued that this study extends knowledge 
concerning project objectives in PFI projects by introducing the concept of negative 
objectives in a project management context as well as bringing to light that when 
considering projects, objectives (positive and negative) and their ramifications need 
to be fully explored in order to gain a broader appreciation of the actions that might 
be necessary to successfully delivery the project.  
 
5.2.5 Contextual Conditions 
As discussed earlier, an aim of this research was to get beneath the superficial 
explanation of overruns illustrated in Figure 51 (page. 263) in order to understand 
how these events can be brought into being. A series of factors were found to have 
influence and have been discussed in the foregoing sections. These included design 
changes, commissioning and maintenance issues, gaps in stakeholder knowledge, 
stakeholder interests, and changes in stakeholder personnel. However, the research 
study also revealed a number of contextual conditions at work (page. 252) which 
were found to have influence on the previously described factors. These were 
identified as being internal or external contextual conditions, internal signifying a 
condition within the organisation of one of the project stakeholders, and external 
signifying a condition in the external environment. 
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The following sections explore the research findings concerning contextual 
conditions in light of the extant literature in order to establish what contribution to 
knowledge the findings can make.   
 
Internal Contextual Conditions 
As discussed earlier, and illustrated in Figure 56 below, one of the findings was 
that high demand for construction staff (at BuildIt) to move on to other projects can 
have negative consequences for commissioning and maintenance of projects which, 
in turn, can contribute to a situation of operational cost overruns. The findings also 
revealed that a number of compounding contextual conditions offer explanation as 
to why there might be such high demand for construction staff to move on to other 
projects. In particular these concern contextual conditions in relation to human 
resource management and organisational success. These are highlighted in Figure 
57 and discussed briefly next. 
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Figure 56 A pattern of factors that can impact upon commissioning and maintenance. 
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Figure 57 The influence of contextual conditions (highlighted) on commissioning and 
maintenance 
 
Firstly, in relation to human resource management, the common practice in 
project organisations is for staff to be moved on to new projects once their current 
assignment (project) is ‘complete’. In the context of this research study it was found 
that as projects approached construction completion there was already demand for 
construction staff to move on to new projects.  
Secondly, it was found that the business model within BuildIt was akin to that of 
a consultancy on the grounds that if project staff were not working on a project they 
were, in effect, incurring cost to the organisation. As a result, it was found that the 
tendency was to run a ‘slim’ human resource base with respect to project staff in 
order to manage organisational costs. However, the impact of this was that BuildIt 
relied upon a small and fixed number of ‘best people’. Naturally when new projects 
came on line, these ‘best people’ were in high demand. 
Both of the foregoing conditions are concerned with human resource 
policies/practices however as Figure 57 shows, organisational success compounded 
Human resource management 
Organisational 
success 
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the situation. In particular, it was found that securing a number of major projects in 
quick succession only served to further increase the demand for project staff to 
move on to or be involved with other projects rather than focus solely on a single 
project.  
In summary, it was found that the compound effect of the contextual conditions 
of human resource management and organisational success can have significant 
effect upon commissioning and maintenance activities on projects which in turn can 
contribute to projects experiencing operational cost overrun.   
.  
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Figure 58 The influence of internal contextual conditions (highlighted) on design change 
decisions  
 
As illustrated in Figure 58 above, alongside other conditions, conditions relating 
to human resource management were also found to influence decisions concerning 
design changes. What Figure 58 shows is that the compound effect of the following 
contextual conditions can generate significant pressure on staff at the bid stage to 
secure the project: 
• Human resource management practices and systems that are geared 
toward winning new projects 
• Organisational track record of having delivered similar projects 
• Large scale and duration of PFI projects which create prospects of 
securing long term revenues and profits  
 
Human resource management 
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As Figure 58 shows, the findings of this study suggest that pressure to win a 
project coupled with the contextual condition of needing to recover x% from 
construction profits can drive team behaviours toward a short term focus on 
securing the project, leading to design change decisions that are driven by an 
(over)emphasis on cost reduction. While design decisions to achieve cost reduction 
can help achieve the short term aim of securing the project, the findings of this study 
also suggest the same decisions can have longer term operational implications.  
Summarising the foregoing points, one of the findings from this study was that 
human resource management acting in combination with other contextual conditions 
such as organisational success, organisational track record, and organisational 
commercial expectations can contribute to the outcome of operational cost overrun 
in a project. 
Human resource management has received limited attention within the general 
project management literature. Fabi and Pettersen (1992) in their review of literature 
concerning human resource management (HRM) concluded that ‘publications on 
this particular management function are relatively rare’, a point later supported by 
Belout (1998) review of literature. More recently Huemann et al. (2007) suggested 
that HRM practices in ‘project-orientated companies have generally been neglected’.  
The extant literature with respect to human resource management in relation to PFI 
projects is even less well populated. 
 Consequently, it is argued that this study extends knowledge concerning human 
resource management in PFI projects in particular, and projects in general, by 
providing some elementary insight into the potential impacts of human resource 
practices and policies on projects in terms of project overruns. Moreover, the 
findings bring to light how human resource management practices and policies can 
interact with other contextual conditions such as organisational success (in terms of 
securing many new projects) suggesting that HRM needs to be considered within 
the wider system of factors and conditions.   
The findings from this study also suggest that the influence of contextual 
conditions is not restricted to the provider (BuildIt). For example, contextual 
conditions at the client’s side were found to influence a high rate of turnover of end 
user personnel and client presentative (page 161). As one participant noted, in other 
types of projects such as schools there is much less change in stakeholder 
personnel (end users and client representatives) than there is in health care 
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projects. Changes to personnel were discussed earlier as contributing to the 
situation of operational cost overruns 
 
External Contextual Conditions 
As well as internal contextual conditions, this study found that conditions in the 
external environment can also have influence on project outcomes. For example, it 
was found (page. 163) that shortages of FM skills in the market place can mean the 
FM Co are unable to adequately satisfy the human resource requirements of 
projects which can lead to difficulties concerning maintenance and re-
commissioning.   
Two further external conditions that were identified were BuildIt’s shareholder 
expectations for year on year revenue/profit growth and buoyancy in the market 
place. These external conditions were found to influence the internal conditions at 
BuildIt (discussed above). In particular, they were found to contribute to a culture 
that emphasised the (short term) necessity to win new projects and the need to 
satisfy commercial expectations to recover x% construction profits, the effects of 
which were found to contribute to issues in the operational phase of the project.   
A final contextual condition identified in this research was the role of news 
media, in particular in relation to how end users and clients responded toward the 
project. For example, it was found (page. 252) that news in the press concerning 
poor value for money being experienced in other similar PFI projects can fuel end 
user and client perceptions of poor value for money.  As discussed earlier, this 
negative perception can in turn cause end users and clients to be very critical of, 
and thus find fault with, the project leading to defects being generated. The 
conclusion drawn is that the media is clearly a powerful stakeholder for whom 
strategies should be developed to aid the strategic management of these 
stakeholders (Freeman and McVea, 2001)  
In summary, this study has identified a series of contextual conditions that can 
have influence on project outcomes and that these conditions can interact with one 
another to create a system of conditions that can affect project outcomes. 
The influence of contextual conditions in the general project management 
literature has received attention, recognising that projects exist in open systems 
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(Engwal, 2003). Love et al. (2002) focusing on the construction phase identified a 
variety internal and external conditions, such as changes to government policy, as 
key triggers of change and resultant rework in projects.  
Within the PFI context, Bing et al (2005a) highlighted the importance of a variety 
of contextual risks to PFI project outcomes including macroeconomic risks, political 
and government policy and social risks such public opposition to projects. However, 
like many PFI studies (Yuan, 2011) the approach adopted in Bing et al (2005a) gave 
a macro-level view of these risks.  Verweij (2015) on the other hand offered a more 
micro-level view, examining how project managers respond to events from 
contextual conditions and how their response can affect project outcomes.  
The findings presented in this thesis corroborate existing research on the 
important role of contextual conditions in PFI projects. However, it is also argued 
that the findings extend existing research by providing a more micro-level view of 
the conditions. This view reveals how internal and external conditions can interact 
with one another and how this interaction can come to affect project outcomes.  
 
5.2.6 The systemic nature of the Factors Influencing Cost Overrun 
The factors discussed in the previous sections have been discussed in isolation 
from one another in order that each could be explored in detail and in light of the 
extant research base so as to establish their contribution to knowledge about cost 
overrun.  
Although each of the foregoing factors makes a unique contribution to explaining 
operational cost overruns, the study found (page. 255) that the factors are in fact 
constituents of a system from which operational cost overrun can manifest. This has 
two implications. First, to gain a fuller appreciation of individual factors it is 
necessary to examine them in light of one another because, to borrow a quote from 
Reason, the characteristics of each factor ‘are largely determined by the whole to 
which it belongs and by its particular location in the whole system’ (Reason and 
Rowan, p.137-8).  
The second implication is that, as noted above, operational cost overrun is the 
manifestation of a system of factors, therefore, in order to gain a comprehensive 
explanation of operational cost overrun a view of the system of factors is needed. 
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For example, the internal contextual condition of a shortage of FM skill capability is 
influenced by the shortage of skills in the market place (an external market 
condition). A further example is to examine the occurrence of defects. It was found 
that part of the explanation for defects occurring during the operational phase was 
the combined effects of design change and poor commissioning procedures. 
Therefore only by exploring the system of factors can one gain an appreciation of 
why and how operational overruns can be experienced in PFI projects.  
By way of a final illustration of the importance of gaining a system view, Akintoye 
et al. (1998) also identified design risk and commissioning risk. These risks were 
reported as a list with no facility for exploring the relationships between them. 
Design risk is reported as the number one risk and commissioning risk reported as 
17th. Yet, based upon the previous points above, taking a systemic approach 
suggests that the two risks can have equal effect when acting in unison which is to 
generate defects during the operational phase.  
 To attend to both of the above implications, the findings were used to develop a 
model which provides a holistic view of the system of factors that have been 
identified in this study and offers a model of the pathology of operational cost 
overrun (reproduced for ease in Figure 59). 
A number of models offering insight into the pathology of overruns in projects 
have already been presented within the extant project management literature. For 
example, Eden et al. (2005) provided a conceptual model of the amoebic growth of 
project costs during the design and construction phase, Cooper (1993) modelled the 
effects of the re-work cycle on project costs, Williams et al. (1995) offered a model 
that explained the effects of design changes.  
The model presented by this thesis aligns with some of the models already 
presented within the literature. In particular, it fits with the findings of Cooper (1993) 
which suggests that the rework cycle can negatively impact project outcomes. The 
model also fits with the work of Williams et al (1995) who identify the negative 
effects of design changes on project outcomes. However, it is also argued that the 
model presented in this thesis offers a number of extensions to existing models and, 
therefore, makes the following new contributions to knowledge.  
First, the model offers an explanation of the pathology of cost overruns in the 
operational phase of projects whereas previous models have tended toward 
explanation of overruns in the design and construction phase. Second, the model 
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extends the concepts of rework (Cooper, 1993) and impacts of design changes 
(Williams et al., 1995) illustrating that these concepts can present themselves in a 
PFI context and in particular the operating phase. Third, the model introduces two 
new feedback loops involving erosion of client trust and reputational damage which 
have not as yet been identified within the cost overrun project management 
literature. Fourth, the model captures contextual conditions and offers explanation 
as to how these conditions can affect project behaviour during the operational 
phase. Lastly, but perhaps most significantly, the model presented by this research 
integrates all of the foregoing points, taking steps toward an integrated view of the 
pathology of project cost overruns during the operational phase. Existing models on 
the other hand have tended toward focusing on a particular issue affecting project 
overruns (such as design change (Williams et al., 1995) or re-work (Cooper, 1993) 
or compression (Howick and Eden, 2001). The integrated view provides a fuller 
appreciation of the components that can affect project overrun. It suggests that 
overrun can be the culmination of concepts identified in existing literature (such as 
the rework cycle and design change) as well as new concepts such as the trust 
feedback loop, which interact with one another and can be in operation 
simultaneously.   
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Figure 59 Reproduction of Figure 50
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5.2.7  Counteractions to Operational Cost Overruns 
A final contribution to knowledge of operational cost overruns that is made by 
this thesis concerns actions to mitigate or avoid the phenomenon. The findings 
revealed two approaches to avoiding or mitigating cost overrun in the operational 
phase of PFI projects. One approach was reactive, whereby actions were taken 
once the factors that manifest in overruns began to emerge. The second approach 
was proactive, whereby actions were taken to mitigate factors that might bring about 
overruns. Of the two, it was argued that a proactive approach outweighed the 
reactive approach because of the associated costs of the reactive approach which 
included reputational damage discussed earlier to be very harmful to the 
organisation (BuildIt) as a whole.  
Underpinning the proactive approach was joint problem solving through a ‘brain 
storming session’ between the key stakeholders involved in the provision of the 
service, in particular the construction company (BuildIt), SPV managers and the FM 
Co. It was found that the brain storming session provided a forum for stakeholders 
to surface potential operational risks as well as to jointly explore and agree potential 
mitigating actions. Consequently, the session was instrumental in identifying and 
operationalising counteractions to operational cost overruns such as the ‘fix first 
argue later policy’.  
However, it was also found that a brain storming session can have more subtle 
effects concerning the social processes taking place between the stakeholders 
involved in it. In the findings of this study these subtle effects manifested themselves 
most obviously the establishment of the ‘ethos’ of the group involved in the session 
in terms of how they would work to manage defects.  In essence, the brain storming 
session was an enabler for, and helped engender, common values, beliefs and 
understandings among the stakeholders – a willingness to work together.  
The effects of this ethos were found to be important and systemic. For example, 
while the brain storming session revealed the risk of disagreement between 
stakeholders over defect ownership, without the ethos of working together the policy 
of ‘fix first argue later’ which neutralised disagreements might never have been 
agreed to. Moreover, the ethos of the team to work together encouraged openness 
about possible issues, therefore facilitating issues to be surfaced earlier and 
managed collectively.   
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The construction industry is recognised within the literature as being adversarial 
in nature (Black et al., 2000). Moreover, because the paymech system in PFI is 
designed to incentivise the provider to resolve defects quickly, there is tremendous 
emphasis on urgency when defects do occur.  In effect there is a paymech clock 
ticking while defects are unresolved and consequently managers are under 
significant pressure to make quick decisions. Nutt’s (1999, p.80) research on 
decision making shows, that putting managers under pressure engenders 
behaviours that focus on ‘who is responsible’ and invoke ‘defensiveness’. Thus it 
seems that the inherent behaviours within the industry coupled with the conditions 
created by a paymech system meant the scene in project A was pre-set to 
adversary. However, the findings of this study suggest that the ethos of working 
together, generated by the brain storming session, mitigated tendencies for partners 
to be adversarial in their relationship with one another and yielded benefits to the 
project.  
In short, while the primary purpose of the brain storming session was to elicit 
and manage risks, the session also played a role in managing the social processes 
among the partners in a way that changed the way partners behaved toward risks 
(and perhaps toward one another) and in a way that had lasting positive effects on 
the project. 
However, the findings revealed a weakness of the brain storming session which 
was there was no codified process followed either for managing the social aspects 
of the session or the process of risk elicitation. In essence, the structure of the 
session was very fluid and involved staff simply ‘pitching in’ their thoughts.  It is 
suggested that the adoption of risk management workshops (Ackermann et al., 
2014) could be valuable in tackling this weakness as they provide a structured 
means of risk elicitation, supporting a systems perspective, and providing active 
management of the social aspects of group working. These features could be 
incredibly valuable in the context of PFI projects where stakeholders, sometimes 
with opposing objectives, are brought together to achieve a common goal of project 
delivery.  
A further step to augment the foregoing proposal would be to point practitioner’s 
to Peter Senge’s (1990) book on the ‘The 5th Discipline’ as a point of entry to gain 
familiarisation with the concept of systems thinking. Although Senge’s (1990) book 
is written from an organizational perspective, the concepts it presents have 
relevance in a project management context. In particular, Senge (1990, p.94) draws 
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attention to ‘system archetypes’, or in other words ‘certain patterns of structure that 
recur again and again’ in organisations and in life more generally. If project 
managers were aware of these archetypes then it might prompt them to look for the 
archetypes when making decisions – thus adopting a systems thinking perspective.  
To further illustrate the relevance of the archetypes in a project management 
context, the two archetypes which Senge (1990) describes in detail are summarised 
below. For each archetype, an example situation is drawn from one of the two case 
studies in this thesis. The example is used to illustrate how the archetype presented 
itself in the case study and thus demonstrate the relevance of the archetypes in a 
project management context.  
Archetype 1: Limits to Growth 
In the limits to growth archetype actions are put in place to create a desired 
result. These actions can create success however they can also create ‘inadvertent 
secondary effects’ which eventually slow down or reverse success (Senge,1990, 
p.95). Senge (1990) illustrates this archetype with the example that the decision to 
work long hours might solve a sudden deadline pressure but that the added stress 
and fatigue of working long hours will eventually slow work down. 
This archetype presents itself in the second case study examined in this thesis. 
In case study B a decision was taken at the design phase to reduce the project’s 
design specification as a means of reducing project costs. As discussed in the 
findings section however, reducing the design specification resulted in inadvertent 
secondary effects during the project’s operational phase (rising numbers of defects 
and delays in resolving defects). Thus, although the decision to reduce 
specifications lowered project costs in the short term, in the medium to long term the 
decision contributed to rising project costs.  
Archetype 2: Shifting the Burden 
The essence of this archetype is that approaches to solving problems often 
focus on attending to the symptoms rather than the underlying cause of the problem. 
Senge (1990) explains that this approach is often adopted because attending to the 
underlying cause can be demanding and costly.   
This archetype can be seen in an example drawn from case study A. The project 
team identified that delay in rectifying a defect was a key problem because it would 
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result in rising project costs (through the Paymech system). A contributing factor to 
delay was the time needed for contracting partners to agree who among them was 
responsible for rectifying the defect. To tackle this problem the project team could 
have set about finding ways of reducing the time needed for the partners to reach 
agreement. However, instead, the team sought to understand the underlying cause 
of the issue which transpired to be the protocol for how defects were managed. In 
short, a defect needed to be rectified by the partner who was contractually 
accountable for that particular defect. Thus, until agreement was reached as to 
which partner was accountable no work could be done to resolve the defect.  
The project team therefore proposed that the protocol be changed. In the new 
protocol any partner who had the skill set to resolve a defect and who could reach 
the defect quickly would do so. Identifying and agreeing who was contractually 
accountable for the defect would take place later. The change in protocol required 
significant effort, time and negotiation among the partners. However, through co-
operation and joint problem solving, the project team succeeded. The underlying 
cause of delay was remedied, allowing defects to be rectified at the first possible 
opportunity and thus minimising delay.  
The importance of co-operation and joint problem solving in partnership projects 
is recognised in the project management literature (Black, 2000) however the 
literature is scant on how this is to be achieved in practice. Therefore, it is argued 
that the foregoing findings and proposals, in particular the use of risk management 
workshops, represent a further contribution to knowledge.  
 
5.3 SUMMARY OF KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
The review of literature conducted in the previous chapter revealed that PFI 
projects are of growing interest to the research community. However it was found 
that current research has generally adopted a high level perspective on these 
projects exploring them from a social or organisational perspective and leaving a 
‘significant gap’ in current understanding of PFI’s’ concerning the ‘micro-level’ 
processes concerning the management of these projects (Yuan et al., 2009, p.256). 
In particular, there has been little fine grained analysis of the operational stage of 
PFI health care projects to expose the nature of operational cost overruns.  It is 
therefore argued that, through a nuanced exploration of two DBFO PFI health care 
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projects, the overarching contribution to knowledge this makes is revealing a system 
of factors that can bring about operational cost overruns in PFI projects from the 
perspective of the service provider, in particular the construction company BuildIt. 
This system was encapsulated in a model that offers an explanation of the 
pathology of operational cost overrun. 
It was argued that the research findings concerning the factors and patterns of 
factors that comprise the system contribute to knowledge of cost overruns during the 
operational stage of PFI projects in the following specific ways. 
The findings extend theory concerning feedback dynamics in projects. In 
particular, two new feedback loops not yet revealed in the PFI literature have been 
identified. The first, involving the decay of client trust in the provider which found to 
exacerbate operational cost overruns. The second, a feedback loop involving 
damage to the provider’s reputation in the market place which was found have 
potentially long term damaging consequences for the providers business as whole. 
In addition, the findings extend theory concerning the re-work cycle. Extant literature 
on the rework cycle (Cooper et al, 1993) has tended to focus on the design and 
construction stages. This thesis extends existing knowledge with the finding that the 
cycle can present itself in the operational stage of projects and contributes to 
operational cost overrun. Finally, existing literature has tended to explore individual 
forms of feedback behaviour, such as rework. The findings of this study extend 
knowledge concerning feedback behaviour with the finding that different forms of 
feedback behaviour involving rework, trust and reputation can exist concurrently. 
The findings of this study also extend theory concerning the triggers of overruns. 
In particular triggers of operational cost overruns in PFI projects have been identified 
and include design changes, inadequate commissioning and maintenance, gaps in 
stakeholder knowledge, and stakeholder interests. It was argued that although some 
of these triggers, particularly design changes, have been identified previously in the 
general project management literature, they have received scant attention from a 
PFI project perspective. Therefore, by identifying the aforementioned triggers of 
operational cost overruns in PFI projects and uncovering reasons why these triggers 
can come about, the findings of this study extend knowledge concerning the triggers 
of overruns. 
The study also extends theory concerning the consequences of experiencing 
operational cost overruns. In particular, it was found that the consequences are not 
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contained within the boundaries of the project. Instead it was found that they can 
propagate up to the organisational level to affect other projects within the 
construction company’s portfolio because, for example, in order to remedy the 
overrun situation staff may need to return to the project therefore impacting upon 
their ability to undertake their current project assignment. While this issue can be 
said to be true of all projects, the findings of this study indicate that it is particularly 
salient with respect to PFI projects. This is because of the lengthy defects liability 
period which is idiosyncratic to these types of project. It was found that this period 
can be many years in length. In one of the case studies it was greater than 10 years, 
a duration that is far longer than in the more common lump sum contract where the 
period might be in the order of one year. The lengthy defects liability period in a PFI 
project means, in theory, the construction firm could be returning to the project over 
a period of many, many years. Therefore, the risk to the project portfolio is arguably 
much greater in a PFI project than in, for example, a lump sum contract where the 
liability period is likely to be much shorter. 
The study also found that the consequences of experiencing operational cost 
overrun in PFI projects can propagate outside of the organisation, in particular 
damaging the construction company’s reputation in the market place with respect to 
delivery of these types of projects. In turn, this can significantly damage the 
company’s prospects of winning new PFI projects. Again this issue could be said to 
be true of all projects however the findings of this study indicate that it is particularly 
salient with respect to PFI projects because of their idiosyncrasies. In particular, it 
was argued that the client base of PFI projects is likely to be risk averse because 
these projects deliver services that are of vital social importance (for example, 
hospitals) and involve investment of enormous amounts of scarce public funds. 
Moreover, it was argued that clients of PFI projects, although being distinct entities, 
have connections with one another by virtue of being part of a wider public sector 
community. This creates conduits for news of poor project performance to reach 
potential future clients.   
Based upon the foregoing it was argued that this study extends theory 
concerning the consequences of experiencing operational cost overruns in a PFI 
context.   
The findings of this study also contribute to knowledge concerning the role of 
contextual conditions in PFI projects and how these conditions can interact with one 
another to affect project behaviour. For example, it was found that demand by 
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shareholders for revenue/profit growth (external condition) can influence internal 
contextual conditions (e.g. staff performance management systems) that focus staff 
decision making on achieving near term goals (e.g. securing and constructing new 
projects), marginalising a longer term outlook (e.g. making design decisions in light 
of project operability). 
Finally, the findings contribute to knowledge concerning mitigating the risk of 
operational cost overrun in PFI projects. A proactive approach to risk management 
through brain storming among the project stakeholders of the construction company 
(BuildIt), SPV and FM co was found to be effective (page.256). However, it was also 
found that the brainstorming session was potentially flawed because it lacked a 
codified process for managing the session. It was therefore proposed that a 
systemic risk management workshop (Ackermann et al., 2014) could offer value in 
this regard.  
 
5.4 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROJECT MANAGEMENT PRACTICE  
The aim of this research study is to contribute to both theory and practice. This 
section attends to the latter aim. It examines the research findings through the lens 
of project management practice, in particular exploring how the findings can help 
practitioners mitigate or avoid the risk of project overruns.  
Firstly, as shown in the model presented earlier Figure 59, feedback dynamics 
involving the erosion of trust, re-work and damage BuildIt’s reputation were all found 
to be salient in this study. The project management literature, corroborated with the 
findings of this thesis, suggest that recovering from these feedback dynamics once 
they are in progress is very difficult to achieve. The implication for project 
management practice is that efforts should be focused on avoiding these dynamic 
behaviours before they are induced. An excerpt from the model developed in this 
thesis (Figure 60) suggests that focusing resources on minimising the delay in 
making the facility available following a defect situation can mitigate or break all 
three of the feedback dynamics. In other words, if the node incur delay in making the 
facility available following a defect is removed from Figure 60 then the feedback 
loops are broken. 
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Figure 60 Excerpt from model of pathology of cost overrun 
 
Secondly, gaps in stakeholder knowledge, stakeholder interests, and changes to 
stakeholder personnel were all found to be contributing factors to projects 
experiencing a high number of reported defects (a key driver of rising operating 
costs). The implication for practice is that these factors should be managed. For 
example, it was found that a proactive approach to knowledge sharing between the 
construction company (BuildIt) and stakeholders (end users, client and FM Co) can 
help attend to gaps in stakeholder knowledge. Workshops were found to be valuable 
in this regard as well as for managing stakeholder interests. In terms of changes to 
stakeholder personnel, these changes could be managed through communication 
with stakeholders which could give visibility of impeding change. In addition, 
developing a transition management plan for key stakeholder personnel (such as 
the client representative) could be valuable so as to identify the key actions that 
need to take place in the event of a change. 
Thirdly, it was found that decisions taken to meet construction goals can have 
negative consequences on the operability of projects. For example, reducing the 
design specification to meet construction cost goals was found to have a 
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operating phase. What this finding suggests for practice is that design decisions 
should be made in light of the project’s operating phase if these multiplicative effects 
are to be avoided. However, the more general implication for practitioners is that 
project decisions should be made in light of the full suite of project goals (for 
example design, construction, operation goals). To aid this process, it would be 
valuable for practitioners to borrow form the world of strategy the concept of seeing 
project goals as a system of goals rather than each goal being distinct from the 
other. As Ackermann and Eden, (2011, p.113) explain that organisations normally 
aspire to achieve more than one goal and that these goals are interconnected 
whereby ‘each goal is supported by others, and in turn each gaol supports other 
goals – the goals make up a system of goals’. Understanding a project’s goal 
system would allow practitioners to identify possible conflicts of proposed actions 
(e.g. an action which attends to one goal having a negative consequence on 
another, such as the impact of design changes on project operations).  
Fourthly, it was found that a decision taken at the project level (e.g. design 
changes) which contributed to experiencing defects and resultant delays, in turn, 
presented substantial risk to the ongoing operations of the construction company 
(BuidlIt), in particular, putting at risk the organisations ability to secure new PFI 
projects (due to damaged reputation) and delivering its existing project portfolio (due 
to resources being channelled toward resolving defects). However it was also found 
that human resource management policies at the organisational level such as 
having a ‘slim’ human resource base can lead to construction staff being stretched 
over multiple projects contributing to defect and delay situations on projects.  What 
the foregoing findings point to is a powerful reciprocal dependence between 
organisation decision making and project goals; and project decision making and 
organisational goals. What this suggests for practice (in particular for senior 
management and project managers) is that decision making at one level should take 
into consideration potential impacts on the other.   
Fourthly, the thesis also found that a proactive approach to managing the risk of 
operational cost overrun, in particular, the use of a brain storming session among 
the project stakeholders ((BuildIt), SPV and FM Co), was effective (page.256). 
However, it was also found that the brainstorming session was potentially flawed 
because it lacked a codified process for managing the session. It was therefore 
proposed that Ackermann et al’s (2014) systemic risk management workshop 
approach could offer value in this regard. 
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Finally, Loosemore and Cheung (2015) suggests that it is normally case in PFI 
projects for risk management to treat risks as discrete. However, a finding of this 
thesis is that factors (risk) which influence overruns interact with one another to form 
a system rather than each factor operating in isolation from the others.  The 
implication for practice is that a systemic approach to risk management in PFI 
projects is needed.  
The model presented in this thesis provides contribution to practice with regard 
to supporting a systemic approach to risk management. The model could be used, 
for example, to stimulate reflection among practitioners concerning the management 
of these projects, reflection that includes consideration of systemic effects. The 
model points to a range of risks and sources of risk thereby encouraging project 
managers (and other project participants) to open their mental antenna to the 
multitude of risks that can face a project. This might also stimulate practitioners to 
reveal risks that are specific to their context but perhaps not represented on the 
conceptual model. Furthermore, by capturing interrelationships between risks the 
model can be used to stimulate a systemic way of thinking, encouraging 
practitioners to look for potential linkages between risks rather than adopting a 
typical mentality of treating risks as discrete (Loosemore and Cheung, 2015). 
Encouraging practitioners to think systemically may in turn help them to see the 
added value of adopting a systemic approach. As a consequence, the model could 
act as a segue to more sophisticated systemic modelling techniques such as 
systemic risk management workshops (Ackermann et al., 2014) and system 
dynamic modelling(Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996).  
Loosemore and Cheung (2015) found that one of the barriers to systemic 
thinking in PFI projects is that it challenges conventional reductionist approaches 
which are deeply embedded in the world of practice. The model presented in this 
thesis could help in this regard by providing a training device to introduce the ideas 
and benefits of systemic thinking to practitioners. The sophistication of the model is 
low therefore making it accessible to a broader population than, for example, system 
dynamics models which require specialist knowledge to engage with. Furthermore, 
systemic modelling could be used to complement conventional approaches. For 
example, as noted above, the model presented in this thesis could be used to 
stimulate thinking about a broad range of risks and the interrelationships between 
those risks thus constructing a systemic model of project risk. This model could then 
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be deconstructed into a project risk register (PRR) format, a format that aligns to 
conventional reductionist approaches.  
 
5.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO METHODOLOGICAL PRACTICE 
Chapter 3: of this thesis highlighted that there have been frequent calls by 
leading academics for project management research to move beyond the use of the 
dominant positivist approach to research and to adopt new approaches that can 
offer fresh insights (Williams, 2005, Turner et al, 2010, Söderlund, 2012, Bredillet, 
2013). With critical realism as its methodological foundation, this research study 
answered this call by adopting a systemic modelling perspective to researching the 
phenomenon of overruns. In the discussion that follows, it is argued that the 
research approach used in this study of project overruns represents a 
methodological contribution to knowledge. 
The review of literature found that critical realism has only been recently 
introduced (by Smyth and Morris, 2007) as an approach to research in project 
management. Since then, there have been no explicit instances of its application in 
the central journals of project management research (e.g. IJPM, PMJ). Smyth and 
Morris’ (2007, p.427) aim was to introduce critical realism as a ‘possibility’ and to 
‘stimulate consideration of this option among researchers’ rather than provide a 
detailed exposition of the approach which the authors left to future research 
projects.  However, without detailed exposition, important gaps in contextualising 
critical realism within project management research remained. Gaps included 
elucidation of how it is that critical realism can have concern for the particular and 
the general (Smyth and Morris, 2007) while other leading academics have proved 
strong arguments that researchers cannot have both in equal measure (McGrath, 
1981). Implications for the nature of theory developed using a critical realist 
approach also remained to be explained. Nor had it been brought to light how a 
critical realist contribution to theory ‘fits’ with an extant project management 
research base that, as noted earlier, is largely positivist orientated (Bredillet, 2004, 
Williams, 2005). 
Comprehensive exploration of a critical realist approach to researching project 
overruns, including comparison with the dominant positivist paradigm, was 
conducted in Chapter 3: of this thesis. It is argued that this exploration attended to 
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gaps concerning the adoption of critical realism in a project management context 
and thus contributes to the methodological knowledge base in project management 
by extending the work of Smyth and Morris (2007) in the following ways: 
• Explicating an approach to research that has been explicitly designed and 
conducted using an underlying critical realist philosophy of research. Smyth 
and Morris found no evidence of project management research that had 
explicitly adopted, and thus explained, the use of a critical realist approach to 
researching projects in practice.   
• Revealing the perceived ‘weaknesses’ of the approach including knowledge 
claims that not statistically generalisable but demonstrating that such 
limitations are consistent with a growing appreciation in the project 
management literature of projects being context dependent.  
• Explicating the concept of generalisation within a critical realist approach to 
researching projects, qualifying the meaning of the concept ‘generalisation’ 
which, if left ill-defined, can lead to false knowledge claims and 
methodological confusion.  
• Presenting an argument, supported by extant literature outside of project 
management, that theory in critical realism is progressed in an incremental 
fashion and is, therefore, representative of Wieck’s (1995) notion of ‘interim 
struggles’ and consequently Merton’s (1968) concept of middle range theory. 
This argument extends the work of Smyth and Morris (2007) by unifying a 
critical realist approach to research with calls for middle range theory 
development in project management (Packendorff, 1995, Söderlund, 2004, 
Bredillet, 2013).  
• Bringing to light that, by accepting part of inquiry can be about observed 
events, critical realism offers an approach to research that can generate 
findings which can converge with those of extant project management 
literature, even though extant research has largely adopted an alternative 
realist approach of positivism. Consequently it has been shown in this thesis 
that critical realism offers theoretical progress, rather than theoretical 
fragmentation, within project management research by providing an 
approach to research that is different to but not separate from existing 
project management literature. 
A methodological contribution to knowledge is also argued for in terms of the 
use of the causal mapping technique adopted within this thesis. Causal mapping 
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has received attention in project management (Eden et al., 2000, Maytorena, 2004, 
Edkins, 2007) and has been suggested as offering an alternative perspective for 
researching projects (Ackermann and Alexander, 2015). This thesis extends the 
existing methodological knowledge base concerning causal mapping in project 
management by unifying it with a critical realist research philosophy and in so doing 
demonstrating how it can form part a cohesive approach to researching overruns in 
projects.  
Causal mapping has been used to research a variety of topics in project 
management research. Some examples include studying the process by which 
project managers identify risks (Maytorena et al. 2004), exploring the effects of 
schedule compression (Howick and Eden, 2001), understanding how projects are 
affected by disruptions such as design changes (Williams, et al. 1995), and being 
used for modelling feedback dynamics in project litigation claims (Eden et al., 2000). 
This thesis extends this work by explicating how the technique can be used for 
researching overruns in projects to gain a holistic view of the phenomenon, in 
particular in the context of complex PFI projects.  
Thus it is argued that, although causal mapping has already been used in 
project management, its application in researching the problem of project cost 
overruns in combination with a critical realist research philosophy is a contribution to 
knowledge.  
 
5.6 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
McGrath (1981, p.179) observed that ‘all research strategies and methods are 
seriously flawed’ and therefore, despite best efforts, all research has its limitations. 
The particular limitations of this study are discussed below. 
One of the significant limitations of this study is that the findings are based 
exclusively on primary data rather than complementing the findings with secondary 
data. As discussed in section 3.6.2.4, (page.126) organisational change and 
commercial sensitivities surrounding the project’s themselves meant accessing 
secondary data from BuildIt was incredibly problematic, indeed accessing primary 
data was at times in jeopardy. A search for secondary data outside of BuildIt (e.g. 
news media and industry reports) returned no substantive contributions on either 
project, a finding that is perhaps unsurprising given the commercial sensitivities 
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surrounding the projects. None the less the exclusive use of primary data is 
recognised as a limitation, though it is argued that the methodology described in 
Chapter 3: yielded robust findings from the primary data.  
A second limitation of the study is that it is based upon the provider’s 
perspective therefore the findings are bias toward this point of view. It would have 
been useful to gain input from the client and also end users to gain a more rounded 
view of the projects that were studied. These opportunities were pursued during the 
research study but were not realised due to commercial sensitivities. 
A third limitation of the study is that it focuses on the operational phase of PFI 
projects. There are two compounding reasons for this. Firstly, as discussed in 
section 4.1.2, neither of two project studied encountered construction cost or time 
overruns. Secondly the method of interviewing that was used had an open style 
(Chapter 3:, page. 93) and therefore the researcher provided little in the way of 
direction to interview participants in terms of the topics to be covered. Consequently, 
when questioned about the relative success or failure (in terms of overruns) of 
projects, interview participants rather than the research decided the meaning of 
success or failure. In both projects participants moved directly to a discussion about 
operational costs. A further round of interviews specifically geared toward 
investigating the design and construction phases could have illuminated other 
salient issues however this was precluded due to the limitation of accessing 
participants described earlier.  
Fourth, the findings are based upon only two case studies both of which were: 
health care projects; design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) PFI projects rather than 
concession PFI projects; and based in the United Kingdom. Consequently, the 
findings contained with this thesis document may be limited to application in the 
foregoing contextual conditions.  None the less, it is argued that through analytic 
generalisation the findings can be transferred to other projects of this type. 
Finally, it is important re-emphasise that the findings presented in this thesis 
document have been arrived at using a critical realist methodology. In line with the 
underpinning assumptions of critical realism discussed in Chapter 3: the research 
findings, encapsulated in the model of the pathology of operational cost overrun, are 
limited in their predictive power. Instead, they offer rich explanation of the system of 
factors that can bring about operational cost overrun in PFI projects.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This brief final chapter brings the thesis to a close. It opens by examining how 
the research aims set out at the beginning of the thesis document have been 
addressed. Next, the specific contributions to theory and practice that the thesis has 
made are examined. The chapter is closed with proposals for future research and 
concluding remarks. 
Addressing the Research Aims 
The overarching goal of this study was to contribute to understanding of 
phenomenon of overruns in projects. This goal was argued to be important for two 
interrelated reasons. First, projects are of significant economic and social 
importance, and secondly, despite a growing body of knowledge concerning their 
management, projects are frequently reported as having failed to meet expectations 
of cost and time.  
Based upon a review of the extant literature, the particular aims were set out as 
follows in Chapter 2: (page. 55) 
• To identify factors, and the relationships between them, that describe a 
system of factors that can bring about overruns in complex projects, and 
subsequently   
• To use the knowledge gained about the system of factors to develop a 
conceptual model that could be put to use by practitioners to mitigate 
overruns in current and prospective projects. 
It is argued that this study has addressed the above aims by using the 
methodology set out in chapter 3 to develop a nuanced understanding of a system 
of factors that can bring about cost overrun in the operating phase of PFI projects 
and, furthermore, using this understanding to develop a  model explaining a 
pathology of operational cost overrun.  
Based upon the findings and arguments made in the preceding chapters, it is 
argued that this study has the above research aims from the perspective of theory 
and practice in the following specific ways. 
308 
 
Contributions to Project Management Theory 
From a theory perspective, contributions to knowledge concerning operational 
cost overruns in PFI projects have been made. The main unique contributions are 
revealing a system of factors that can bring about cost overrun in the operational 
phase of PFI projects and encapsulating this system in a model that offers a broader 
appreciation of the pathology of operational cost overrun.  The model was found to 
align with existing models of overrun in the extant literature but also extend them in 
key ways. In particular, it explains cost overrun in the operational phase of projects 
where other models have tended toward the design and construction phase. The 
model also identifies new feedback dynamics involving trust and reputation. Finally, 
the model offers a holistic view of a pathology of overrun which comprises design 
change, feedback dynamics (e.g. rework, trust, reputation) and contextual 
conditions. Although it was found that some of the features have been explored in 
the extant literature individually, the model presented in this thesis suggests that 
they interact with one another and, in the case of feedback dynamics, operate 
concurrently.  
Contributions to methodological practice have also been claimed. Firstly, 
Chapter 3: of this thesis highlighted that there have been frequent calls by leading 
academics for project management research to move beyond the use of the 
dominant positivist approach to research and to adopt new approaches that can 
offer fresh insights (Williams, 2005, Turner et al, 2010, Söderlund, 2012, Bredillet, 
2013). With critical realism as its methodological foundation, this research study 
answered this call by adopting a systemic modelling perspective to researching the 
phenomenon of overruns in projects. In was subsequently argued that the research 
approach used in this study represents a methodological contribution to knowledge 
in the following specific ways. 
Secondly, the thesis builds on the proposal made by Smyth and Morris (2007) 
that critical realism offers an appropriate philosophy of research for the study of 
projects. Although Smyth and Morris (2007, p.427) introduced the philosophy to 
project management research, the authors omitted a ‘detailed exposition’ of the 
philosophy, leaving this to future research projects. It was argued in this thesis, that 
this omission left important gaps in knowledge concerning the suitability of critical 
realist methodology to project management research and its practical application 
within the domain. The main contributions made by this thesis have been to attend 
to the knowledge gaps and to provide a detailed exposition of the practical 
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application of a critical realist methodology in the context of project management 
research.  
Thirdly, the research approach extends the use of a causal mapping technique to 
researching the phenomenon of overrun in projects. The technique was found to 
have been applied to a variety of problem topics in project management such as 
examining the effects of project design change (Williams et al. 1995), examining the 
impact of project schedule compression (Howick and Eden, 2001) as well as being 
applied to researching risk identification practices (Maytorena et al., 2004) and the 
process of project risk management (Ackermann et al., 2014). The previous chapter 
argues that this thesis extends the application of causal mapping to researching the 
topic of project overruns, explicating how it can be used as part of a critical realist 
methodology to research to gain a holistic appreciation of the phenomenon of 
overruns in projects. In summary, it is argued that, although causal mapping has 
already been used in project management, its application in researching the 
problem of project cost overruns in combination with a critical realist research 
philosophy represents a contribution to knowledge. It is subsequently argued that 
the methodology presented in this thesis offers a start point for future studies of 
project overrun using an alternative to the dominant positivist paradigm. 
 
Contribution to Project Management Practice 
The main unique contribution to project practice is the model describing a 
pathology of operational cost overrun in PFI projects. In particular the model offers 
added value to project management practitioners and their management teams in 
the following ways:  
• Bringing to attention the need for practitioners to gain a systemic view of 
projects in order to that they can gain a fuller appreciation of project 
behaviour. 
• Encouraging project managers (and other project participants) to open 
their mental antenna to the multitude of risks that can face a project. 
• Stimulating a systemic way of thinking among practitioners, encouraging 
them to look for potential linkages between risks rather than adopting a 
more typical (Loosemore and Cheung, 2015) mentality of treating risks 
as discrete.  
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• Encouraging practitioners to think systemically which may, in turn, help 
reveal the added value of adopting a systemic approach. As a 
consequence, the model could act as a segue to more sophisticated 
systemic modelling techniques such as systemic risk management 
workshops (Ackermann et al. 2014) and system dynamic modelling 
(Rodrigues and Bowers,1996).  
• Stimulating reflection about the approaches used to manage these types 
of projects and encouraging these approaches to be informed by 
systemic thinking.  
• Related to the previous points, the model could be used as a training 
device to introduce the ideas and benefits of systemic thinking to 
practitioners. The sophistication of the model is low therefore making it 
accessible to a broader population than, for example, system dynamics 
models which require specialist knowledge to engage with. 
A series of other practical implications were also inferred from the findings. The 
thesis found that a proactive approach to managing the risk of operational cost 
overrun, in particular, the use of a brain storming session among the project 
stakeholders (BuildIt, SPV and FM Co), was found to be effective (page.256). 
However, it was also found that the brainstorming session was potentially flawed 
because it lacked a codified process for managing the session. It was therefore 
proposed that a systemic risk management workshop approach (Ackermann et al. 
2014) could offer value in this regard. 
The findings suggested that that practical efforts should be focused upon 
avoiding the onset of feedback dynamics because once they are induced they are 
difficult to recover from. Based upon the findings of this study, advice on how to 
achieve this was provided. In particular, mitigating delays in attending to defects was 
found to be a potent action that could mitigate the onset of feedback dynamics 
involving rework, loss of client trust and reputational damage. 
It was also proposed that practical efforts be focused upon knowledge sharing 
activities between the provider (BuildIt) and other key stakeholders (including the 
end user, client and FM Co) so as to attend to gaps in stakeholder knowledge. The 
findings suggested that workshops involving key stakeholders can be useful in this 
regard. 
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Changes to personnel were found to re-instate gaps in stakeholder knowledge 
and introduce new stakeholder interests both of which were contributors to a defect 
and delay situation. It was therefore proposed that practical efforts be focused upon 
managing personnel change through transition plans and stakeholder 
communications.   
Finally, project goals were found to be interdependent, in that decisions to 
achieve one goal (e.g. a construction goal) can have a negative effect on others 
goals (e.g. operating goals). It was therefore suggested that project management 
practitioners might benefit from using the concept of a ‘goals system’ (Ackermann 
and Eden, 2011) when considering project goals. Understanding a project’s goal 
system would facilitate practitioners identifying possible conflicts of proposed actions 
(e.g. an action which attends to one goal having a negative consequence on 
another, such as the impact of design changes on project operations).  
 
Future Research Areas 
As discussed in Chapter 3:, in fitting with the critical realist methodology 
adopting by this thesis the author subscribes to Wieck’s (1995) view that theoretical 
progress is incremental in nature. Thus while a number of contributions to 
knowledge are argued to have been made by this thesis there remains a series of 
research avenues that can extend the contributions and attend to the studies 
weaknesses. These avenues include the following: 
• Only two case studies were examined in this research. Examining other 
health care PFI projects would therefore be valuable for verifying the 
factors and patterns of factors identified in this research as well as 
identify other factors and patterns of factors that might form part of the 
system that can bring about operational cost overruns in PFI projects 
• As discussed in section 4.1.1, Ive (2004, p.360) explains that PFI 
projects come in two forms - Concessions and DBFO (Design Build 
Finance Operate). The two case studies explored in this thesis document 
were both DBFO therefore it would be valuable to explore whether the 
findings hold in concession type PFI’s.  
• The thesis examined operational cost overruns from the provider’s 
perspective, in particular the construction company (BuildIt). In future 
research into overruns in PFI projects, it would be valuable to 
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complement this perspective with those of other key stakeholders in 
particular the client and end users to gain a more rounded view of the 
phenomenon.  
• Based upon the findings drawn from the extant PFI project management 
literature presented in this thesis, further qualitative approaches to 
researching overruns in PFI projects would seem to offer a fruitful 
avenue for future research in terms of the revealing the micro-processes 
concerned with the management of these projects.  
• Adopting an action research paradigm (Eden and Huxham, 1996)to 
examine the practical implementation of the findings of this thesis, in 
particular the application of the model of pathology of overrun,  would be 
valuable for developing understanding of how practitioner-led (rather 
than researcher-led) systemic modelling can be achieved.  
• Finally, the PFI literature examined in this thesis suggests that it is 
common for PFI projects to be delivered on time and to budget in terms 
of their construction (Ive, 2004). It would, therefore, be valuable to 
investigate the design and construction phases of PFI projects to 
understand why PFI projects are so successful in their delivery and, 
furthermore, whether efforts to achieve construction time and cost 
objectives have any influence on the operational phase of the projects.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
Projects are of central economic and social importance; this is particularly the 
case in relation to PFI projects which are tasked with the delivery of essential public 
services such as hospitals, schools and roads. Experiencing project overruns can 
negatively impact the delivery of these services therefore it seems an imperative to 
better understand the phenomenon so that this type of behaviour can be avoided or 
mitigated. This thesis has advanced understanding of cost overrun by identifying a 
system of factors that can bring about the phenomenon during the operational 
phase of PFI projects and encapsulating the system in a model that provides a 
broad appreciation of the pathology of operational cost overrun. As with all research, 
this study has its limitations however it is hoped that the work presented has made 
credible and useful contributions to both academic and practical knowledge within 
the project management domain. 
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Appendix A Case Selection Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 Project Outcome 
Contract type Successful Unsuccessful  
For example: 
Joint Venture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example: 
Sub-contract 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
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Appendix B  Model Themes and Descriptions 
LABEL/THEME Description 
Procurement process 
including its rules and stages; cost of 
participation; maturity of the process; as well  as 
organisational roles & responsibilities in the 
process. 
External organisational context 
 the environment outside of an organisation 
involved in the project,  comprising for example 
competition, government legislation, and market 
conditions  
Project Design 
all statements referring to the design of the 
facility,  including changing, elaborating, 
reviewing, as well as design data/information 
Contracts their content, and the development thereof 
Construction milestones & schedule statements relating to construction start and construction end dates (hand over) 
Mentality, behaviours  and cultures  
(of individuals, teams, orgs) 
For example,  Silo or holistic;  opportunistic; 
subservient or dominant; co-operative or 
adversarial; complaining and critical;  open or 
closed;  
Partnering arrangements 
Partnering between organisations, for example 
partnering to create the JV including its 
distributions of equity and liability 
The 'bid' 
concerning 'the bid' in terms of its development, 
timescales for submission, and its content (eg 
proposed value, schedule and design) 
Organisational objectives the objectives of individual organisations involved in the project (eg winning future work) 
Invoke (or reduce) feelings or emotions in 
others 
eg feelings of  trust,  being under pressure, 
optimism, anger, nervousness, threat, 
frustration, dependability,  
Conflicts and negotiations statements relating to conflicting views and negotiating toward agreement  
Team performance  Relating to the performance of teams involved in the project e.g. bid team, construction team 
Project cost relating to the costs of construction or operation of the facility 
Project staffing concerning staffing on the project e.g. allocating, capacity issues, changes, skill levels,  
Knowledge sharing 
sharing of knowledge between project team 
members, and between individual projects (eg 
lessons learned) 
Problems and problem solving 
Concerning issues (e.g. cost, operational, 
construction) and the process of solving issues 
including determining accountability, information 
gathering, decision making, resource allocation, 
response time, implementation of remedial 
actions. 
Risk statements relating to the risk and its assessment 
Internal organisational context 
the context inside of an organisation involved in 
the project  for example organisational 
decisions, processes, structures, polices 
Roles and responsibilities 
roles and responsibilities of individuals, teams, 
and organisations at various stages of the 
project 
 
Commissioning 
Commissioning of facilities as part of preparation 
for handover as well as part of general 
operational maintenance  
Delays statements referring to incurring time delays 
Expectations expectations of those involved  
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Incentives to win the tender incentives such as potential revenues, reputational growth 
Paymech system 
concerning the payment mechanism (paymech), 
for example monitoring, points accrual, and 
deductions 
Project characteristics characteristics such as scale, complexity  
Project objectives e.g. time, on budget, operating objectives 
Public ownership statements relating to the public ownership and financing of the project  
Publicity publicising events beyond those directly affected 
Reputation and image reputation of individuals or organisations 
Stakeholder management relating to the management of internal and external stakeholders 
History of decisions, structure, relationships that exist in the project at a particular time 
Relationships between people forming and cultivating relationships between individuals (rather than organisations) 
Preconceptions relating to individuals preconceptions of people and situations 
Communication 
relating to communication and modes of 
communication (eg face to face; telephone; 
email) among individuals and teams 
Colocation of staff locating those involved in the project in close physical proximity 
Common understandings unified understandings among those involved in the project 
Project management structures 
organisational structures created within the 
project to support its management (e.g progress 
meetings) 
Lender aspect relating specifically to the financers (lenders) of the project 
Project planning and monitoring concerning the development of project plan and monitoring against the plan 
Process of facility handover activities surrounding handing over of the project between construct and operate 
Managing staff management of direct reports 
 
 
 
 
